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This thesis examines Anglo-Korean relations between 1895 and 1905, when Korea was 
independent of both Qing China and Japan. This thesis mainly uses official archival documents from 
both governments to study their high-level diplomacy and policy-making.  
In 1895, when Britain and Korea faced the change of the international order of Northeast Asia as 
a consequence of the First Sino-Japanese War, both nations shared that Korean independence 
would be desirable for their interests. However, both countries had different approaches to achieve 
it. Britain preferred the self-strengthening and the modernisation of the Korean administration, 
whereas Korea focused on diplomacy due to its incapacity to oppose foreign aggression by its own 
forces. Therefore, Anglo-Korean relations gradually deteriorated through a series of political crises in 
Korea and eventually reached a point where Britain gave up its hope in Korean independence. 
Meanwhile, Korea became a new battlefield for rivalry between Russia and Japan. Having 
confronted Russian advance together, Britain and Japan found that they shared the same interests in 
Korea. By 1900, both countries closely worked together to deter any Russian attempts to obtain 
concessions on the Korean Peninsula, which would potentially damage their interests in the region. 
Afterwards, British and Japanese representatives in Seoul worked not only for the defence of their 
shared interests, but also for the other’s own interests in the country. Thus, when the Russo-
Japanese War broke out, British Legation in Korea helped Japan facilitate the occupation of Korea 
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In the middle of the 19th century, Northeast Asian states had to cope with an unprecedented 
threat: Western Powers. For centuries, the international politics of Northeast Asia was based on 
Sino-centric world order, where a Chinese Empire claimed the Mandate of Heaven and placed itself 
above every known nation in the world. Those other countries must recognise the Chinese Empire’s 
nominal suzerainty to partake in the China-led international network of trade and diplomacy. Britain 
was one of many other countries who eagerly hoped to trade with China. In 1793, King George II 
appointed George Macartney as the first ever envoy to Qing China in hope of establishing a legation 
in Beijing and gaining access to more Chinese ports than just Guangzhou, the only Chinese city 
where Western merchants were allowed to visit and trade. Qianlong Emperor, who only saw 
Britain’s Macartney Mission as an envoy of tribute who should recognise Qing China’s traditional 
suzerainty, declined Britain’s requests for the relaxation of trade and the concession of a territory for 
the residence of British merchants.1 Britain eventually achieved the objectives – the relaxation of 
trade and the concession of Hong Kong Island – in 1842, after their victory over Qing China in the 
First Opium War of 1839-1842 obtained further privileges, including the opening of more treaty 
ports and missionaries’ rights to travel freely, after winning in the Second Opium War of 1856-1860.2 
Meanwhile, Japan also faced a challenge from a Western Power demanding an end to Japan’s 
long-lasting isolation. American Commodore Matthew Calbraith Perry, whose mission was the 
establishment of a diplomatic relationship between Japan and the United States, led his fleet to Edo 
Bay in 1853 and 1854. After a series of hostile presentations and continuous threats to achieve the 
objective by violent means, The Kamakura Shogunate signed the Convention of Kanagawa, Japan’s 
first unequal treaty with the Western Power which included several privileges such as most 
favourable nation clause and extraterritorial jurisdiction. It eventually led to the signing of the 
 
1 For an account of Macartney Mission, see James Louis Hevia, Cherishing Men from Afar: Qing Guest Ritual 
and the Macartney Embassy of 1793 (Durham, N.C.; London: Duke University Press, 1995). 
2 For an account of the Opium Wars and the opening of Qing China, see James Louis Hevia, English Lessons: 
The Pedagogy of Imperialism in Nineteenth-century China (Durham, N.C.; London: Hong Kong: Duke University 
Press; Hong Kong University Press, 2003); John K. Fairbank, Trade and Diplomacy on the China Coast; the 
Opening of the Treaty Ports, 1842-1854 (Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press) 1964; James M. Polachek, 
The Inner Opium War (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1992); Timothy Brook and Bob Tadashi 
Wakabayashi, Opium Regimes: China, Britain, and Japan, 1839-1952 (Berkeley: University of California Press, 
2000); Peter Ward Fay, The Opium War, 1840-1842 : Barbarians in the Celestial Empire in the Early Part of the 
Nineteenth Century and the War by Which They Forced Her Gates Ajar (New York: Norton, 1976) 
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United States – Japanese Treaty of Amity and Commerce of 1858, which stipulated the opening of 
various treaty ports, the exchange of diplomats and the establishment of foreign settlements.3 
Korea was no exception to gunboat diplomacy as well. Unlike China or Japan, Korea managed to 
defend its nation from two western invasions; Pyŏnginyangyo (The French Invasion of 1866) and 
Shinmiyangyo (The American Invasion of 1871).4 Neither country succeeded in negotiating a treaty 
with Korea because both Powers only expected to impose a military threat in hope that Korea would 
voluntarily give up further resistance and accept the offered deal. However, when Japanese gunboat 
‘Un'yō’ deliberately entered the Korean water near Kanghwa Island and attacked fortresses on the 
island in 1875, Japan coerced that Korea should come to a negotiation table or Japanese troops 
would march towards Seoul, the capital of Korea. Therefore, Korea was forced to sign the Treaty of 
Kanghwa of 1876, Korea’s first treaty with any foreign country. 
Considering the fact that it was Japan that forcefully opened Korea to the outer world for the first 
time in 1876 and eventually annexed the country later in 1910, it may seem as Japan’s consistent 
penetration and colonisation of Korea in this period between 1876 and 1910. However, international 
pressure and domestic unrest, caused by the modernisation and the Westernisation of the country, 
often initiated political crises that dramatically changed the balance of foreign influence and even 
dragged them into the domestic politics of Korea. Japan’s penetration into Korea was soon 
challenged by Qing China, who wanted to change Korea from its traditional tributary into a vassal in 
the new Western world order. Therefore, until 1894, Qing China and Japan confronted each other to 
exert their own influence over Korea and the fierce rivalry resulted in the Sino-Japanese War of 
 
3 For an account of the opening of Japan, see Michael R, Auslin, Negotiating with Imperialism: The Unequal 
Treaties and the Culture of Japanese Diplomacy (Cambridge, Mass.; London: Harvard University Press, 2004); 
William G. Beasley, Great Britain and the Opening of Japan, 1834-1858 (London: Luzac, 1951); William G. 
Beasley, Japan Encounters the Barbarian: Japanese Travellers in America and Europe (New Haven, Conn.; 
London: Yale University Press, 1995); Marius B. Jansen, The Emergence of Meiji Japan (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1995); William McOmie, The Opening of Japan, 1853-1855 : A Comparative Study of the 
American, British, Dutch and Russian Naval Expeditions to Compel the Tokugawa Shogunate to Conclude 
Treaties and Open Ports to Their Ships (Folkestone: Global Oriental, 2006). 
4 For an account of the French Invasion of Korea, see Daniel C. Kane, “Bellonet and Roze: Overzealous Servants 
of Empire and the 1866 French Attack on Korea." Korean Studies, 23 (1999), pp. 1-23; Ju Cheon Lee and Kim Jin 
Hwan, ‘Pyŏnginyangyoŭi chaejomyŏng [The Reillumination of Byeonginyangyeo Incident - Fighting between 
the Chosun and the French Army]’, Yŏllinjŏngshin inmunhakyŏn'gu [Wonkwang Journal of Humanities], 8 
(2007), pp. 131-146. For an account of the American Invasion of Korea, see Gordon H. Chang, “Whose 
"Barbarism"? Whose "Treachery"? Race and Civilization in the Unknown United States-Korea War of 1871." 
The Journal of American History, 89.4 (2003), pp.1331-1365; Myeong-Ho Kim, Ch'ogi hanmi kwan'gyeŭi 
chaejomyŏngr syŏmŏnho sagŏnesŏ shinmiyangyokkaji [Reexamination on the Early Relations between Korea 
and the U.S.: From the USS Sherman Incident in 1866 to the American Invasion of Ganghwa Island in 1871] 
(Seoul: Yeoksa Bipyeongsa, 2005) 
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1894-1895, where Japan consequently triumphed and forced Qing China to revoke its suzerainty 
claim over Korea.  
Thus, considering that Korea would become a Japanese protectorate in 1905, the next 10 years 
between 1895 and 1905 became a crucial period for the fate of Korea. On one hand, the Korean 
Government was finally able to pursue its own foreign policies without any interference from Beijing 
since Qing China recognised the complete independence of Korea. On the other hand, however, 
Korea now had to cope with not only the rising of Japan as a dominant regional power but also 
Russia’s southward advance towards Manchuria and Korea, especially since Russia prevented Japan 
from obtaining the Liaodong Peninsula by the Triple Intervention of 1895. Obviously, it was almost 
impossible for Korea to deter any foreign aggression, especially from Japan or Russia, by military 
means. Thus, diplomacy with other Western Powers became a focal point of Korea’s foreign policy in 
this period.  
For this reason, Britain became a significant counterpart for Korea at this time. Britain showed its 
interest in trade with Korea since the early 18th century.5 It was not crystallised until 1882, when 
Britain and Korea signed the Treaty of Amity and Commerce (and revised in favour of Britain’s 
interest in the following year). The opening of commercial trade with Korea could be one of the main 
objectives of the Anglo-Korea Treaty. However, it should also be considered that, in the 1880s, 
Britain was confronting Russia at every corner of the world and the most favoured nation clause in 
the Anglo-Korean Treaty would prevent Russia from obtaining any exclusive privileges and 
concessions. A threat of Russian advance towards Korea was taken by Britain so seriously that Britain 
occupied Korean isles called Kŏmundo as a countermeasure against the Panjdeh Incident in 
Afghanistan. Therefore, once Korea lost its traditional ties with Qing China and became a new 
battlefield of Russo-Japanese rivalry, Britain’s Korea policy had to change accordingly.  
This doctoral research intends to find an answer to the question, “why did Britain give up on the 
idea of Korean independence and then agree with Japan’s establishment of protectorate over Korea 
in 1905?”, by examining the progress and development of Anglo-Korean relations between 1895, 
when Korea became completely independent of Korea, and 1905, when Korea lost its diplomatic 
rights and became a Japanese protectorate. In 1895, when Korea faced the change of the 
international politics of Northeast Asia, Korea relied on diplomacy as a primary tool to secure its 
territorial integrity and independence. Britain also expected Korea to become an independent power 
 
5 James E. Hoare, ‘The Centenary of Korean-British Diplomatic Relations: Aspects of British Interest and 




that would be capable of preventing itself from falling into the hands of any hostile Power against 
Britain. Therefore, at this time, Korean independence seemed desirable for the interests of both 
countries. However, in 10 years, Anglo-Korean relations gradually deteriorated to a point where 
Britain did not oppose to Japan’s establishment of a protectorate over Korea, even though Britain 
was a signatory of the Anglo-Korean Treaty. This doctoral research aims to demonstrate what Britain 
and Korea expected from each other to secure Korean independence; how Anglo-Korean relations 
was influenced by a series of political crises happening in Korea; and why Britain and Korea failed to 




There are mainly three approaches to the questions of the covering period. Firstly, Because of 
this sudden end to the 500-year-old dynasty, many researches drew attention to a series of events 
that eventually lead to the Japanese annexation of Korea in 1910. Since Hilary Conroy’s The Japanese 
Seizure of Korea, 1868-19106 demonstrates that Japan’s annexation of Korea was not a result of 
long-term objectives or strategy but a chain of short-term events that eventually led to the Japanese 
colonisation of Korea, many scholars analysed the bilateral relationship between Korea and Japan. 
While Conroy argues that Japan’s colonisation was greatly motivated by economic development and 
their needs for larger market and resources, The Abacus and The Sword by Peter Duus7 argues that 
such relatively short-changes in Japan’s Korea policy could be caused by Japan’s domestic politics, 
just like many other countries in the contemporary times. While these studies focus on the foreign 
policies of Japan in the period, Alexis Dudden’s Japan’s Colonization of Korea: Discourse and Power8 
analyses the intellectual aspect of the period by examining the influence of languages and how it 
established a relationship between the coloniser and the colonised. Unlike other researches focusing 
on Japan’s prominent roles, Korea between Empires, 1895-1919 9by Andre Schmid examines how 
Korea’s encounteres with modern media as well as the external world shaped and developed their 
original concept of the Korean nation.  
 
6 Hilary Conroy, The Japanese Seizure of Korea, 1868-1910: A Study of Realism and Idealism in International 
Relations (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1960)  
7 Peter Duus, The Abacus and the Sword: The Japanese Penetration of Korea, 1895-1910 (Berkeley, California: 
University of California Press, 1995). 
8 Alexis Dudden, Japan’s Colonization of Korea: Discourse and Power (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 
2005). 
9 Andre Schmid, Korea between Empires, 1895-1919 (New York : New York , 2002). 
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Secondly, numerous researches focus on the relationship between Korea and multiple powers. 
Korea and the Politics of Imperialism, 1876-191010 by C.I.E. Kim and H.K. Kim provides a 
comprehensive account of Korea’s encounters with imperialist powers. George W. Lensen’s Balance 
of Intrigue11 examines the evolution of the Russo-Japanese rivalry over Manchuria and Korea with 
analysis on Russian archival sources, which provides a better understanding of Russia’s Northeast 
Asia policy in the late 19th century. The Sino-Japanese War of 1894-1895: Perceptions, Power and 
Primacy12 by S. C. M. Paine and The Origins of the Russo-Japanese War by Ian Nish investigates the 
evolution of two regional wars, whose main focus was the Korean Peninsula.  
Thirdly, other researches focus on Korea’s bilateral relations with other powers. K. W. Larsen’s 
Tradition, Treaties, and Trade: Qing Imperialism and Chosŏn Korea13 examines the transition of two 
countries’ complicated relationship from the traditional Asian tribute system to the Western treaty 
system. This research reveals that it was not Japan but Qing China who threatened the integrity of 
Korea before the Sino-Japanese War. American Diplomacy and Strategy toward Korea and Northeast 
Asia, 1882-1950 and After14 by S. Y. Kim offers an apprehensive account of the United States – 
Korean relations from the Chosŏn Dynasty to the beginning of the Cold War era. It shows a vivid 
contrast of the difference in the United States’ Korea policy by period. Regarding Russo-Korean 
relations, Russian Far Eastern Policy, 1881-1904, with Special Emphasis on the Causes of the Russo-
Japanese War15by Andrew Malozemoff offers a good understanding of Russia’s Northeast Asia policy 
with the analysis of Russian archival sources. Although it does not exclusively cover Russo-Korean 
relations, Malozenoff’s research shows how crucial Korea was to Russia’s Northeast Asia policy.  
While many researchers studied Korea’s relations with other powers in the period between 1895 
and 1905, there are few studies focused on the history of Anglo-Korean relations covering this 
particular period. Some researches other topics of Anglo-Korean relations. D.Y. Ku’s Korea Under 
Colonialism: The March First Movement and Anglo-Japanese Relations16  focuses on the March First 
 
10 Chong-Iik Eugene Kim, Korea and the Politics of Imperialism 1876-1910, ed. by Han-Kyo Kim and Berkeley. 
Center for Japanese and Korean Studies University of California (Berkeley : London: Berkeley : University of 
California Press, 1968). 
11 George A. Lensen, Balance of Intrigue: International Rivalry in Korea and Manchuria, 1884-99 (Gainesville, 
Fla: University Press of Florida, 1986). 
12 S C M Paine, The Sino-Japanese War of 1894-1895 : Perceptions, Power, and Primacy (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2003). 
13 Kirk W Larsen, Tradition, Treaties, and Trade : Qing Imperialism and Chosŏn Korea, 1850-1910 (Cambridge, 
Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2008). 
14 Seung-Young Kim, American Diplomacy and Strategy toward Kora and Northeast Asia, 1882–1950 and After 
(New York: Palgrave, 2009). 
15 Andrew Malozemoff, Russian Far Eastern Policy, 1881-1904, with Special Emphasis on the Causes of the 
Russo-Japanese War. (Berkeley, California: University of California Press, 1958). 
16 Daeyeol Ku, Korea under Colonialism : The March First Movement and Anglo-Japanese Relations, ed. by 
Royal Asiatic Society--Korea Branch (Seoul: Published for the Royal Asiatic Society Korea Branch, 1985). 
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Independence Movement of 1919 and demonstrates how Britain’s view of Japan was influenced by 
Korean-Christian convertors’ confrontation against the brutal repression of Japan during the 
independence movement. This research also shows how Christian missionaries shaped the Koreans’ 
perception of modernism under Japanese colonialism. C. S. Chong’s The Korean Problem in Anglo-
Japanese Relations 1904-1910: Ernest Thomas Bethell and His Newspapers; The Daehan Maeil Sinbo 
and the Korea Daily News17 also focuses on another example of the complicated question of Korea in 
Anglo-Japanese relations, Ernest Thomas Bethell. He was the editor and publisher of The Daehan 
Maeil Sinbo and the Korea Daily News. Because of the nationalist and patriotic character of the 
newspapers, his publishing became a complicated issue between Britain and Japan, who were bound 
in an alliance at that time. Relationship with Distance: Korea, East Asia and the Anglo-Japanese 
Relationship, 1876-189418 by Suzuki Yu also deals with Korea’s complicated international status in 
Northeast Asia and its effects in Anglo-Japanese relations.  
Aside from the question of Korea in Anglo-Japanese relations, the British occupation of Port 
Hamilton, also known as Kŏmundo Island, is a popular topic in academia. The latest research on the 
British occupation of Komundo Island is Anglo-Korean Relations and the Port Hamilton Affair,1885-
1887, Empires in Perspective19 by Stephen A. Royle. While previous researches on the diplomatic 
aspects of the event with Russia and Qing China, this research also covers their relationship between 
the British Navy and indigenous Koreans on the island.  
James Hoare’s Britain and Korea, 1797-199720 coveres the history of Anglo-Korean relations from 
the very beginning and gives a comprehensive understanding of 200 years of the history of Anglo-
Korean relations. In terms of collected papers, two volumes of Aspects of Anglo-Korean Relations21 
were published in 1984 to commemorate the 100th anniversary of the Anglo-Korean Treaty of 1883. 
Some of short research papers covers certain topics from the Anglo-Korean relations in the period 
between 1895 and 1905, such as Daeyeol Ku’s ‘A Korean Diplomate in London: Yi Haneung and 
 
17 Chin-sok Chong, The Korean Problem in Anglo-Japanese Relations 1904-1910: Ernest Thomas Bethell and His 
Newspapers; The Daehan Maeil Sinbo and the Korea Daily News. (Seoul: NANAM Publications, 1987). 
18 Yu Suzuki, ‘The London School of Economics and Political Science Relationship with Distance : Korea , East 
Asia and the Anglo-Japanese Relationship , 1876-1894’ (Unpublished doctoral thesis, London School of 
Economics, 2015). 
19 Stephen A. Royle, Anglo-Korean Relations and the Port Hamilton Affair,1885-1887, Empires in Perspective 
(London ; New York: Routledge Taylor & Francis Group, 2017). 
20 James E. Hoare, Britain and Korea, 1797-1997 (Seoul: Seoul : British Embassy, 1997, 1997). 
21  Roger Bullen, Ian Nish and James E. Hoare, Aspects of Anglo-Korean Relations (London: International Centre 
for Economics and Related Disciples, London School of Economics, 1984); Daeyeol Ku, Aspects of Anglo-Korean 
Relations. Part Two, Papers by Daeyeol Ku, Tony Michell and Shinya Sugiyama., ed. by Tony Michell, Shin’ya 
Sugiyama, and Suntory-Toyota International Centre for Economics and Related Disciplines (London: London : 




Anglo-Korean Relations’22  about the life of Yi Han-Eung, the last Korean Minister in London before 
the Japanese Annexation of Korea.  
In Korea, some researchers examined the imperialist nature of Britain’s Northeast Asia policy. 
Choi Moon-Hyung’s Han’gukŭl Tullŏssan Chegukchuŭi Yŏlgangŭi Kakch’uk [Imperialist Powers’ 
Rivalry over Korea]23newly shed lights on the imperialist policies of Great Powers other than Japan. 
Kim Won-Soo published several researches explaining Britain’s Northeast Asia policy as part of 
Britain’s global strategy, including ‘Yŏnggugŭi Haeyang P’aegwŏn’gwa Tongashia Oegyo Chŏllyagŭi 
Chŏnhwan - Ŭihwadansagŏn’gwa Kŭktongwigiwa Yŏn’gyehayŏ [Transition of British Sea Power and 
East Asian Diplomatic Strategy - Connected with the Boxer Rebellion and the Far Eastern Crisis]’.24 
Moreover, new researchers such as Kwang-Ho Hyun and Seung-Hoon Han publish various researches 
on the topics related to Anglo-Korean relations in recent years.25 Despite the rise of research interest 
in Anglo-Korean relations amongst Korean scholars, there are still many topics to be covered and 
published in English. This research also aims to fill the gap in English literature.  
 
The Structure of the Thesis 
 
As mentioned, the main objective of This doctoral research is to show the evolution and 
development of Anglo-Korean relations from 1895, when Britain and Korea shared the same interest 
 
22 Daeyeol Ku, ‘A Korean Diplomate in London: Yi Haneung and Anglo-Korean Relations’, in Korean-British 
Relations, Yesterday, Today and Tomorrow: Essays in Celebration of the Centenary of Korean-British Diplomatic 
Relations, ed. by Chong-Hwa Chun and James E. Hoare (Seoul: Korean-British Society, 1984), pp. 69–88. 
23 Moon-Hyung Choi, Han’gukŭl Tullŏssan Chegukchuŭi Yŏlgangŭi Kakch’uk [Imperialist Powers’ Rivalry over 
Korea] (Seoul: Chishiksanŏpsa, 2001). 
24 Won-soo Kim, ‘The Russo-Japanese War and the Crisis Diplomacy of Great Han Empire - Connected with 
Yongampo Incident’, Sŏyangsahakyŏn’gu [Journal of Western History], 39 (2016), 221–47; Won-soo Kim, 
‘Yŏnggugŭi Oegyojŏngch’aekkwa Kŭllobŏlchŏllyagŭi Hyŏngsŏng, 1900-1904 [British Foreign Policy and the 
Formation of Global Strategy, 1900-1904]’, Sŏyangsahakyŏn’gu [Journal of Western History], 28 (2013), 179–
202; Won-soo Kim, ‘Yŏnggugŭi Haeyang P’aegwŏn’gwa Tongashia Oegyo Chŏllyagŭi Chŏnhwan - 
Ŭihwadansagŏn’gwa Kŭktongwigiwa Yŏn’gyehayŏ [Transition of British Sea Power and East Asian Diplomatic 
Strategy - Connected with the Boxer Rebellion and the Far Eastern Crisis]’, Sŏyang Yŏksawa Munhwa Yŏn’gu 
[Journal of Western History and Culture], 45 (2017), 65–90. 
25 Kwang-Ho Hyun, ‘Taehanjegugŭi Ŭnsan’gŭmgwang Ch’aegulgwŏn Hŏyŏwa Kŭ Oegyojŏk Ŭimi [Diplomatic 
Plan of Eunsan Mining Concession in the Great Han Empire]’, Taegusahak, 92 (2008), 227–48; Kwang-Ho Hyun, 
‘Yŏngiltongmaeng Ijŏn Chuhanyŏnggukkongsaŭi Taehanjeguk Chŏngseinshik [Understanding of Situation of 
The British Ministers to the Great Han Empire before the Conclusion of a Treaty of Anglo - Japanese Alliance]’, 
Yŏksahakyŏn’gu, 31 (2007), 71–100; Kwang-Ho Hyun, Taehanjegukki Kojongŭi Taeyŏng Chŏngch’aek [A Policy 
toward Great Britain of King Kojong in the Great Han Empire], Han’guksayŏn’gu [The Journal of Korean 
History], 2008; Seunghoon Han, ‘Ŭlsanŭkyakŭl Chŏnhuhan Yŏnggugŭi Taehanjŏngch’aek [British Policy toward 




in Korean independence, to 1905, when Britain agreed with Japan’s plan to make Korea a 
protectorate. To effectively demonstrate how Britain and Korea reacted to the question of Korean 
independence, the main body of the thesis is chronologically divided into five chapters and each 
chapter discusses Anglo-Korean relations in a certain period.  
In the first chapter, which covers the period between October 1895 and February 1896, starts 
with a brief discussion of Anglo-Korean relations between 1882, when the Anglo-Korean Treaty was 
first negotiated and signed, and September 1895, when Britain witnessed the change of Northeast 
Asian regional order and considered Korean independence as a serious option to maintain British 
interests in the region. Afterwards, it will be discussed how Britain responded to two political crises 
that happened in October 1895 (Japan’s notorious murder of Queen Min) and in February 1896 
(Kojong’s Asylum at the Russian Legation in Seoul). These two incidents clearly undermined Korean 
independence and yet Britain cautiously approached to the matters in fear that Russia might exploit 
any crack in Anglo-Japanese relations. Britain’s responses to them shows Britain’s intention to not 
proactively interfere with Korean affairs.  
In the next chapter, it will be Britain’s opposition against Russia’s dominant influence, 
underpinned by the presence of Kojong at the Russian Legation between 1896 and 1897, will be 
examined. Interestingly, Britain was convinced that there was no hostile intention on the Russian 
side when they provided protection for Kojong and even believed that a guidance of Russia to 
modernise the nation would be desirable for Korea. However, Britain strongly confronted Russian 
penetration when it reached a point of attempting to replace British advisors within the Korean 
Government with Russians. It will be discussed why Britain thought their influence in Korea was at 
stake and how they confronted Russia.  
In Chapter Three, two major topics will be discussed; Kojong’s assumption of emperor title and 
the Russo-Japanese dispute over Korean ports on the south coast of the peninsula. Kojong vigorously 
worked on the assumption of emperor title while believing that it would significantly increase the 
nation’s profile especially in Northeast Asia and send an obvious signal that Korea became a 
completely independent state. Despite Kojong’s effort to raise its profile by the assumption of 
emperor title, Britain hardly cared about the title assumption. Instead, Britain focused on preventing 
Russia from obtaining a concession on the south coast of Korea, which might operate as a naval port 
for the Russian Fleet and damage the interests of Britain and Japan in the region. It clearly 
demonstrates the differences Britain and Korea had when it came to the question of actually 
achieving Korean independence. 
19 
 
The following chapter will cover the period between 1900 and 1902, when Anglo-Korean 
relations started to steeply deteriorate. Since 1898, Kojong was challenged by civil rights movement 
in the country while he had to deal with the rise of tension between Russia and Japan. Kojong 
responded by centralising political power to himself and proposing the neutralisation of Korea, both 
of which were seen by Britain as negative and sceptical. Rather, Britain started to recognise the fact 
that Japan and Britain shared the same interests in Korea and closely worked together to secure 
their interests. By this point, Britain not only became an imperialist Power to obtain beneficial 
concessions in Korea by any means, but also actively deterred Korea’s efforts to secure foreign loan 
to be used for the modernisation of the country.  
In final chapter, it will be discussed how actively Britain opposed Russian penetration into Korea 
in 1903 and how closely Britain worked with Japan before, during and after the Russo-Japanese War 
of 1904-1905. Since 1903, Russia resumed its interest in Korea and vigorously activated and 
defended its lumber concessions along the Yalu River on the Sino-Korean border, which could be 
strategically significant for the defence of Russian interests in Manchuria. Britain and Japan strongly 
condemned Russia’s fortification of the Yalu River and pressed Korea not to give any exclusive 
privileges to Russia. Moreover, after the outbreak of the Russo-Japanese War, the British Legation in 
Korea not only tolerated Japanese occupation and their unilateral introduction of political reforms, 
but also disrupted Korea’s domestic and international actions to secure overseas support for the 
international guarantee of Korean independence.  
By demonstrating the analyses of Anglo-Korean relations at key points between 1895 and 1905, it 
will reach a conclusion that Britain and Korea fell apart due to differences in how to achieve Korean 
independence. Britain believed that the modernisation of the political and economic systems of the 
country was urgent for the sake of Korean independence, whereas Korea was convinced that 
diplomacy would be essential to gain international assurance of Korean independence, especially 
when Korea had a limited amount of resources to facilitate its modernisation schemes. On top of 
that, Britain found that Japan, one of the only two nations that had strong intention to put Korea 
under their sphere of influence, shared similar interests in the region. By signing the Anglo-Japanese 
Alliance of 1902, Britain became an ally to support Japan’s ambitions expansion towards Korea and 
the idea of Korean independence, which had been once shared between Korea and Britain, also 




Chapter 1: Britain’s Response to the Korean Problems, 1895-6  
 
Anglo-Korean Relations between 1882 and 1895 
 
It was the Anglo-Korean Treaty of 1883 that established the official diplomatic relations between 
Britain and Korea for the first time in history. The treaty intended to meet not only the needs of the 
signatories, but also those of China, who proposed the treaty and mediated both parties. From the 
British perspective, the Treaty would open a new potential market to British products. Additionally, to 
a lesser extent, Britain also expected that the presence of British and other Western representatives 
in the nation would deter a possible advance of Russia. On the other side, Korea believed that treaties 
with Western powers would strengthen the independence of Korea. Meanwhile, China believed that 
the treaty would balance off Japanese penetration and confirm Chinese suzerainty over Korea.26  
Therefore, in the period between 1883, when the Anglo-Korean Treaty was concluded, and 1895, 
when Chinese defeated to Japan in first the Sino-Japanese War, Britain’s policy in Korea was; to 
maximise its commercial interest; to minimise its political interference; and to acknowledge Chinese 
suzerainty by affiliating the British representative in Korea to the British minister in Beijing, China. The 
only exception from the non-interference policy was the British occupation of Kŏmundo, also known 
as Port Hamilton, between 1885 and 1887. It was Britain’s firm response to the threat of Russian 
advance from the Vladivostok harbour to the Korean Peninsula and the Pacific Ocean. After two years 
of the seizure, Britain withdrew from Port Hamilton when Russia gave an assurance that Russian 
Government would not occupy any part of the Korean territory. 27  The incident shows that the 
deterrence of Russian advance was one of Britain’s strategic interests in Korea. 
In the same period, Korea struggled with Chinese predominance within the country. In 1884, when 
Korean reformists, led by Kim Ok-Kyun, initiated a coup to throw over the Korean Government, China 
claimed its duty to intervene in the domestic affairs of its vassal and suppressed the uprising by sending 
troops. 28  Since China successfully repressed the coup and restored the Korean Court, China 
strengthened its influence upon the Korean Government. China attempted to transform its traditional 
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Sino-centric world order into the Westphalian suzerainty-vassal relationship. On the other hand, the 
Korean Government tried to raise its profile in the international society by establishing legations in 
Western powers. 
In principle Britain was reluctant to challenge the Chinese predominance in the country despite such 
diplomatic disputes as the Sedan Chair Scandal, where Yuan Shikai, the Chinese Imperial-Resident in 
Seoul, claimed China’s superiority to Korea and persisted in sitting in the highest position in royal 
audiences.29 When Korea attempted to establish a legation in the United States, China approved it on 
three conditions; the Korean minister must be companied by the Chinese minister when visiting the 
foreign ministry of the country of residence; the Chinese minister must stand or sit in a higher position 
that that of the Korean minister in official occasions; the Korean minister must contact the Chinese 
Legation in the country of residence and ask for instruction in urgent situations.30 The Chinese stance 
in the suzerainty issues could affect the status of British representatives in Korea. However, Britain was 
reluctant to challenge the Chinese predominance for two main reasons; firstly, Britain believed that 
Korea was not sufficiently strong to modernise and strengthen itself; secondly, from the British 
perspective, China was a desirable partner to provide protection for Korea in face of Russian threat.  
Therefore, when war between China and Japan over Korea seemed inevitable, Britain concerned that 
Russian would take advantage of war and exert its influence. Therefore, when China and Japan rejected 
the withdrawal of both troops, proposed by foreign representatives in Seoul on 25 June 1894, Britain 
called for international pressure from the Great Powers to prevent the war on 13 July 1894, but it 
became void since the United States rejected to join the action. However, despite their willingness to 
stop the war by diplomatic means, Britain was reluctant to take any military intervention.31 Therefore, 
Japan continued its attacks on China and eventually won the war. 
However, when Japan had to give up Port Arthur and the Liaodong peninsula under the pressure 
from Russia, Germany and France, Britain did not provide any diplomatic support to back Japan 
because British interests in the region were not threatened by the Triple Intervention.32 Due to the 
fear that Japan would not deter Russia’s further advance to Korea, Japan asked to Britain for the 
international guarantee of Korean independence. On 12 June, Japanese Minister in London Katō 
Takaaki asked to Lord Kimberly whether or not the British Government would be willing to make the 
proposal with the Great Powers for the international guarantee of the Korean independence, which 
had already been planned during the Sin-Japanese War in October 1894. However, Lord Kimberly 
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politely rejected the proposal by saying that “the situation had been much changed by the war”.33  
By September 1895, Japanese high-rank officials shared a very negative view on the future of Korea. 
Inoue Kaoru, Japanese Minister in Seoul, revealed his opinion to British Consul-General William Hillier 
that his mission to guide the modernisation of the country was “more or less of failure” and that the 
future of Korea would be “very gloomy” due to the insufficiency and corruption of the current Korean 
Government. 34 In early October, Inoue told Ernest Satow, British Minister in Tokyo, that Japan only 
wished to initiate administrative and military reforms for the maintenance of independence of Korea 
but he complained that it would take much longer than it had been done in Japan because Koreans 
were indifferent to launching such progressive reforms. Moreover, he justified the Japanese protection 
of their residents and interests in Korea by emphasising Korea’s failure in dealing with the Tonghak 
Uprising, which eventually resulted in the Sino-Japanese War. From his perspective, the future of Korea 
was ‘full of dangers’ and thus Japan must play a role similar to ‘that of Britain in Egypt’ to help the 
nation modernise itself.35 
Japanese Prime Minister Itō Hirobumi also shared a similar point of view that was even more 
sceptical on the independence of Korea than that of Inoue Kaoru. Itō believed that “idea of Korean 
independence was quite impracticable”. He even argued that “Korea must be either annexed or be 
placed under the protection of some other Power”.36 Having said that power would be ‘the strongest’ 
one in the region, Itō clearly saw Korea as a power vacuum in the region and assumed that either Japan 
or Russia would eventually place Korea under its sphere of influence. It was apparent that the power 
Itō mentioned was Japan, but he was well aware that Japan was incapable to resist Russia’s southwards 
advance at this stage. 
However, British diplomats in the region disagreed with their opinions. Hillier pointed out that it was 
Inoue Kaoru who was responsible for the inefficiency and corruption of the Korean Government. He 
pointed out that he planned to separate the King and the Queen from the Korean politics and that 
Japan forced Korea to accept the Japanese loan scheme without any precaution with regard to the 
spending of the money.37 British Minister in Japan Ernest Satow also emphasised that, unlike Japan’s 
policy in Korea, Britain’s policy in Egypt was ‘self-denial’ that ‘Egypt was open as a field of enterprise 
to all nations and that there were foreigners of all nationalities in the Egyptian service’.38 He pointed 
out the key difference between Britain and Japan in terms of protectorate policies: Britain aimed to 
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respect the local government’s autonomy and free-trade principle whereas Japan sought to secure its 
special interests in the country.  
London also preferred the maintenance of Korean independence to the Japanese predominance in 
the country. In a meeting with Katō Takaaki, Japanese Minister in London, on 25 October 1895, Lord 
Robert Cecil Sainsbury said that “it would be very desirable that the independence of the country 
should be maintained and that it should be given time to develop its resources”.39 He thought that the 
independence of Korea would be assured as long as its three neighbouring countries – China, Japan 
and Russia – had rival interests in Korea. Despite his additional comment that the stance would be 
changed if the number of Japanese migrants to Korea increased significantly, as of 1895, Britain was 
certain that the independence of Korea would have favourable effects for British interests in the 
country and that Korea should be given a certain amount of time to modernise the nation on its own. 
Britain was especially concerned about Japan’s attempts to seek for exclusive privileges in the 
country. In May 1895, the Japanese Government attempted to obtain special rights to monopolise 
mining and railways in the country. In response, the British consul-general in Seoul appealed to the 
Foreign Ministry of Korea against the Japanese plot and eventually the Japanese Government 
abandoned their original attempt in September 1895.40 Furthermore, when Acting Vice-consul William 
Henry Wilkinson visited Mokpo, which was proposed to be open to foreign trade soon, he found that 
the treaty port had a great potential. However, he soon discovered that Japanese nationals had already 
purchased all the available land beforehand. Hillier criticised that these transactions should not be 
recognised by the Korean Government.41 
By September 1895, Britain was convinced that the idea of Korean independence would be desirable 
for British interests if it prevented other foreign powers from seeking for exclusive privileges. British 
diplomats in the region believed that Japanese high-rank officials were pessimistic of the possibility of 
Korean independence and that they attempted to secure their special interests by intervening in 
Korean politics and monopolising the market. It would not only damage British commercial interests 
in the country, but also provoke Russia to advance towards Korea for establishing protectorate ore 
even annexing it. From British perspective, the independent Korea would keep its market open to the 
firms of all foreign nationalities, including Britain, and play a role as a buffer state between Russia and 
Japan. London and British legations in the region were aware that Korea would need a reasonable 
amount of time to develop and modernise itself and believed that the nation could manage it on its 
own.  
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The Response of the British Representatives in Seoul to the Murder of Queen 
Min 
 
Despite Britain’s wish for Korea to concentrate on the modernisation of the country, Korea fell into 
another political turmoil only six months after the end of the First Sino-Japanese War, when Queen 
Min was murdered in the palace on 8 October 1895. She was widely known as the leader of the anti-
Japanese party. Since Japan won the Sino-Japanese War in April 1895, Japan attempted to keep Korea 
under the sphere of Japanese influence. However, before long, Japan had to face the Triple 
Intervention from Russia, France and Germany and gave up the privileges they had won from China. 
The Triple Intervention also asserted that the complete independence of Korea should be assured by 
Japan. Furthermore, when Japan attempted to monopolise mining and railways in the country in May 
1895, foreign representatives in Seoul took a joint action to appeal against the Japanese demand.42 
Before the outbreak of the Sino-Japanese War, Queen Min relied on the Chinese presence in the 
country to balance off the Japanese influence. However, since she witnessed that Japan was unable to 
challenge the Russian influence, she decided to invite Russia as a new counterpart to Japan.43 
On the other side, Japan failed to secure the international guarantee of Korean independence due 
to Britain’s indifferent attitude the proposal by June 1895. Furthermore, Park Young-Hyo, the Korean 
Home Minister and a subordinate of the Japanese authorities, lost his position and left for Japan in 
July 1895. Therefore, Itō and Inoue were convinced that a radical measure should be taken in order to 
strengthen Japan’s footing in the country, which was the assassination of the Korean Queen. 
Apparently, the plot was discussed in July 1895, when Inoue stayed in Tokyo for a month. In a cabinet 
meeting during his visit, Inoue proposed the so-called “Korea Policy” and suggested replacing himself 
with former army general Miura Gorō as the commander of the plot.44 
Interestingly, Miura Gorō never had experience in diplomatic service and lacked English language 
skills. Satow even believed that the appointment of Miura was “a great blunder” for similar reasons.45 
Since his appointment to the Japanese Legation in Seoul in September, Hiller noticed that Miura 
persisted on acting on his own without any interference by the Japanese Government or Japanese 
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advisors to the Korean Government.46 Furthermore, he only stayed for less than two months in the 
position of Japanese minister in Seoul and was replaced with Komura Jutarō immediately after the 
outbreak of the assassination of the Korean Queen. Therefore, considering his lack of experience and 
skills in diplomacy, no sign of change of policy and his extraordinarily short term in office, it was 
apparent that he was assigned a mission to execute the murder of the Queen.  
When Hillier was reported about the attack on the royal palace on 8 October 1895, he believed that 
the Queen had successfully escaped from the palace.47 However, after listening to European witnesses, 
including Russian architect Afanasy Ivanovich Seredin-Sabatin and American military instructor William 
McEntyre Dye, Hillier was convinced that the Queen was murdered during the disturbance. According 
to Sabatin’s testimony, the Queen’s house was invaded by ‘Japanese in civilian dresses. He also 
witnessed that three or four women were dragged out and killed by Japanese alone in the presence 
of Japanese officers.48 
Furthermore, when Hillier had an audience with King Kojong and the Crown Prince after the incident, 
he also had an impression that the King was frightened of the Japanese minister and his troops. In the 
meeting, the King revealed his concern about the Queen, who was still missing at that time. He also 
worried that the Korean guards, who were occupying the palace, would harm him and asked Hiller to 
replace them with Japanese troops. Furthermore, the King additionally asked him to ‘remain in hail as 
long as Miura was in the palace’.49 To ensure the safety of the King and the Crown Prince, foreign 
representatives agreed to visit the palace on a daily basis. Hiller and American acting minister Horace 
Allen talked to the King about their plan on 9 October. King Kojong showed his gratitude and then 
“whispered” what foreign vessels of war were in Chemulpo.50 Allen answered that two vessels of war, 
one Russian and the other American, were stationing in Chemulpo and that American soldiers were 
ready to come to Seoul anytime. 
The number of Western troops in Incheon was insufficient to cope with Japanese troops and 
Japanese-drilled Korean guards. Nevertheless, King Kojong seemed to have believed that the presence 
of Europeans would help impose pressure to prevent the Japanese side from threatening the King and 
Crown Prince. In response to the King’s request, American officers Dye and Charles Le Gendre decided 
to stay in the palace all night. Hillier also understood the King’s willingness to secure European 
presence and reported to Beijing that the presence of a British warship would be desirable even though 
not absolutely necessary.51 
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In the afternoon of 8 October 1895, foreign representatives Karl Ivanovich Waeber (Russia), Horace 
Allen (United States), Hillier (Britain), Ferdinand Krien (Germany) and Pascal Lefèvre (France) gathered 
at the Japanese Legation to listen to Miura’s explanation. At first, Miura tediously stated that the attack 
was planned and carried out only by Taiwonkun, the father of King Kojong and the political enemy of 
Queen Min, and Korean guards. Miura argued that he had been told about the incident by a messenger 
and headed to the palace with Japanese troops in order to prevent further disturbance. According to 
him, he arrived too late to prevent Korean soldiers from rushing into the palace and order was already 
restored there.52 
However, other foreign representatives, who had been already informed by European witnesses that 
Japanese took part in the assault and murder, could not simply believe Miura’s argument that any 
Japanese had not been involved in the attack.53 Miura persistently denied that no Japanese took part 
in the outrages and argued that the matter should be investigated in conjunction with the Korean 
Government. However, Waeber reminded him that the accusation was made against the Japanese and 
emphasised that the Japanese Government incurred serious responsibilities by putting troops in 
motion. In the end, Miura agreed to make further investigations into two points; the assault committed 
by Japanese civilians and the escort of Taiwonkun by Japanese troops.54 Moreover, Waeber asked to 
Miura whether he would be able to remove Japanese drilled Korean guards from the palace in 
response to the King’s request. Miura did not think it as a proper measure and said he would not 
control the procedure. However, he stated that he had no objection to ‘advising’ the removal of Korean 
guards.55 
Despite Miura’s persistent denial, Hillier was convinced that Japanese nationals had been involved 
in the outrages for mainly two reasons. Firstly, it was testimonies from Europeans. Sabatin saw armed 
Japanese civilians ill-treating and killing palace ladies in the courtyard of the Queen’s apartment. 
Sabatin described the Japanese civilian, who took charge in directing the processes, so accurately that 
even Waeber and Allen could recognise him amongst Japanese civilians in the courtyard, despite their 
late arrival. Secondly, Cho Hee-Yon, Kim Ka-Jin, Kwon Jae-Hyung and Yoo Kil-Jun, the key members of 
the pro-Japanese party, had been present in the palace even though they were not in the office and 
thus had no right to be there. Interestingly they were appointed to prominent positions in the Korean 
Government only a few hours after the events on the same day. Therefore, judging from Miura’s 
inconsistent statements and the presence of pro-Japanese Korean officials, Hillier drew a conclusion 
that the plot had been carefully arranged beforehand; and that Taiwonkun attempted to rush into the 
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palace with a small number of soldiers because help from the Japanese side was promised.56  
Meanwhile, Hillier continuously reported on the development of the assault. On 11 October, Hiller 
reported that the Queen had been doubtlessly assassinated in the courtyard at the time of the attack 
after collecting numerous stories from four principal witnesses of the murder.57 Nevertheless, King 
Kojong issued a royal decree on 10 October 1895, which proclaimed the degrading of the Queen. In 
his decree, he condemned that the Queen had rejected the King’s order not to intervene with the 
government’s affairs and allegedly provoked the troubles by introducing her followings into the 
Government and disbanding the troops. The decree also argued that the Queen should be deposed 
because she kept hiding.58 
From his point of view, the Decree weirdly accused the Queen of hiding, whereas everyone knew 
that the Queen had been killed by Japanese assassins.59 Hillier assumed that there might be mainly 
two reasons why the decree had been issued; Firstly, it intended to remove the necessity of national 
mourning when the death of the Queen was admitted; and secondly, the proclamation would prevent 
the Crown Prince, the son of Queen Min, from succession to the throne. Having based on his previous 
experiences in the country, Hiller believed that King Kojong would never acknowledge the public 
denunciation of the Queen.60 
Hiller and other foreign representatives were furious at the letter from the Korean Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs with regard to the public denunciation of Queen Min.61 Furthermore, when they received 
another letter from the Korean Foreign Ministry that explained the causes of the attack on the palace, 
they found that it was simply a duplication of Miura’s contradictory statements.62 Therefore, Waeber 
invited other foreign colleagues except for Miura at the Russian Legation on 12 October in order to 
discuss what reply should be sent to those two letters from the Korean Ministry of Foreign Affairs.63 
After discussions, foreign representatives decided to reject the official explanations of the Korean 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs, which were inconsistent with the testimony of European residents, asked 
for the truth of the events. Additionally, Hillier stated that it was very difficult for him to believe that 
the decree degrading Queen Min had been duly approved by King Kojong.64 
While Hillier sent a reply to Korean Foreign Minister Kim Yun-Sik for the criticism of the languages in 
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those two letters from him,65 Russian Charge d’affaires Waeber asked for an interview with Kim Yun-
Sik. First, Waeber pointed out that some Korean officials and palace ladies had been certainly 
murdered in the palace even though the Korean Government persistently denied the death of the 
Queen. Waeber then stated that it was unreasonable for the Korean Government to appoint new 
ministers immediately after the murder. Furthermore, those soldiers who had tolerated the murders 
were present at the palace. 
Waeber condemned that the Korean Government was powerless to act, or they were worried that 
investigations would eventually head for themselves. Then Waeber informed Kim that he would not 
recognise any act of the present Government until the murderers were punished; the present guard 
was withdrawn from the palace, and new ministers recently appointed in the Government were 
punished or at least removed.66 When Waeber told Hillier about the interview with the Korean Foreign 
Minister, Hillier believed that his strong language had been approved by the Russian Government. 
Furthermore, Allen also appeared to have telegraphed to the United States Government that he would 
not recognise any act of the present Korean Government.67 Hiller agreed that the current Korean 
Government acted without the sanction of the King, but he did not align himself with his Russian and 
American colleagues.68 
Apparently, Waeber and Allen were even asked by the King for saving him from the palace by military 
means. In the mid-October, they informed Hillier that they had received a confidential message from 
the King, who urgently asked them to send guards to the palace to protect him and asked whether he 
would join them in requesting permission from home.69 At this time, the British consulate in Seoul had 
fifteen additional marines from HMS Edgar, which had arrived at Chemulpo on 17 October. On the 
following day of the arrival, William H. Henderson, the captain of HMS Edgar, and Hillier visited the 
palace to see King Kojong. He told them that he was very satisfied with the presence of a British vessel 
in the country and asked to send a guard of marines to Seoul. Therefore, they decided to send 15 out 
of 25 marines, who had landed at Chemulpo, to Seoul. In the same meeting, King Kojong also asked 
Waeber and Allen, who had already come to the palace to see him, to increase the number of guards 
at their legations.70 Considering the timing, it appears that King Kojong had already thought of the plan 
by that time. However, Hillier thought that such a step should be taken only if it was agreed upon by 
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all foreign representatives, including the Japanese Minister, while Waeber and Allen believed that the 
Japanese Minister would attempt to prevent the process of a plan once he knew about it. After 
discussions, they decided that it would be more desirable to wait for the return of John Mahelm Berry 
Sill, the United States Minister. They also agreed to invite Japanese Minister Komura Jutarō, who was 
newly appointed to replace Miura and to investigate into the incident to the meeting of foreign 
representatives to discuss the matter.71  
Despite his hesitation to join Waeber and Allen in sending guards to the palace for the protection of 
King Kojong, he was convinced that a threat against King Kojong’s safety was increasing. In the night 
of 21 October, Hillier and other foreign relatives received another letter from King Kojong, stating that 
Cho Hee-Yon and Kim Ka-Jin, warned the King that they would murder him before they got killed if a 
foreign guard entered the palace. Moreover, he also informed them that the Japanese Minister had 
demanded from the King and Taiwonkun a statement to confirm that the recent attack on the palace 
was committed only by Koreans.72 Hillier disagreed with Waeber and Allen, who believed that any 
measure should be immediately taken to secure the safety of King Kojong. Hillier doubted whether 
they would take such an extreme measure as the murder of the King, which would not be backed by 
their Japanese supporters. However, he was certain that further incidents were likely to happen at any 
time as long as the current mutineers stayed in power and the Japanese-drilled Korean guards were 
present at the palace. Therefore, he stated that the disbandment of the Japanese-drilled guards was 
vital to restore order and peace in the Korean Court.73   
On 25 October, all foreign representatives, including American Minister Sill and Japanese Minister 
Komura, had a meeting to discuss the current situations and what measure should be taken in order 
to secure the King’s safety. Sill stated that King Kojong had been certainly threatened by mutineers, 
especially War Minister Cho Hee-Yon and that the representatives of the treaty powers were 
responsible to rescue the King form danger. He believed that Komura would be the most suitable 
person to take charge of the matter, thanks to the strong influence of the Japanese Legation in the 
country. Russian Charge d’affaires Waeber asserted that the removal of mutineers was the only way to 
end this difficulty and pointed out that Japanese Minister Komura was the only person to apply. Hillier 
also asked if Miura had asked to the Japanese Government for permission to withdraw Japanese-
drilled guards from the palace, which Miura had promised in the previous meeting on 8 October. 
Komura replied that he had not been aware of it until then and asked if others had agreed that the 
removal of the guards could be done without a risk of confrontation. Waeber answered that the 
presence of a foreign guard at the gate of the palace would be sufficient to coerce the Japanese-drilled 
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troops, which other representatives except the German consul agreed with. After discussions, Komura 
stated that such measures as the dismissal of War Minister Cho Hee-Yon, the disarmament of 
Japanese-drilled guards and the restoration of the King’s authority would be desirable and that he 
would take some time to consider the best means to exercise these measures.74  
 
The Disparities between London, Tokyo and Seoul with regard to the Murder of Queen Min 
 
The Japanese Government was unhappy with the decision that all foreign representatives in Seoul 
agreed that the Japanese Legations would play a leading role in the removal of the participants in the 
assault on palace. While Japanese ministers Miura and Komura in Seoul attempted to buy time by 
avoiding discussions with other foreign colleagues or hesitating to act immediately,75 Japan vigorously 
appealed to the powers having treaties with Korea that the Japanese Government was not responsible 
for the attack against the palace in Seoul. On 10 October, Saionji Kimmochi, the Japanese acting 
Foreign Minister, told Satow that the Japanese Government was greatly unpleasant that Japanese 
nationals had participated in “a treasonable conspiracy against the sovereign of a friendly state” and 
additionally informed him that Komura Jutarō was dispatched to Seoul in order to replace Miura Gorō 
and to investigate into all the matters.76 
The Japanese Government admitted the engagement of Japanese nationals in the events so early 
probably because of the testimony of Europeans since the Japanese Legation failed to disguise the 
murder as a crime committed only by Koreans. On 16 October, Saionji informed Satow that the Queen 
was believed to have been murdered by Japanese and that at least sixteen or seventeen Japanese 
nationals took part in the attack.77 Saionji also assured that the Japanese Government had determined 
to solve this case and bring the Japanese offenders to justice.78 Thanks to the efforts made by the 
Japanese Government, Satow was convinced that ‘the Japanese Government were entirely innocent 
of the matter’.79 
It is one of the reasons why Satow tended to take an attitude to support the Japanese side rather 
than the British consul-general in Seoul. He was aware that there was some confrontation between 
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the Japanese Legation and other foreign representatives in Seoul. When Saionji showed him a telegram 
with regard to the meeting of foreign representatives without the Japanese minister on 14 October, 
Satow understood that other foreign representatives were reluctant to act in co-operation with Miura 
because of the suspicion and accusation against him.80  
However, later when Satow talked with Japanese Prime Minister Itō Hirobumi on 23 October 1895, 
he was leaning towards the opinion of the Japanese Government in the matter. Itō told Satow that 
foreign representatives in Seoul, or at least Russian and American Charges d’affaires had asked their 
Governments for instructions with regard to whether or not they should recognise the current Korean 
Cabinet, which included the main participants of the attack on palace. In response, Itō instructed 
Komura to discuss with his foreign colleagues if it would be possible to make a compromise by forcing 
Taiwonkun to leave the Korean Court. Satow agreed that it would be a good idea to solve the 
problem,81 while Hillier was convinced that the removal of the War Minister and other participants 
would be desirable to restore order. Furthermore, when Satow was informed by Itō about the requests 
of foreign representatives, Satow strongly condemned that the proposal of the disbandment was 
‘unsafe’ and the denial of recognition to the Korean Government was ‘unwise’.82  
It is worth noting that Satow described the foreign representatives were ‘influenced by the Russian 
Charge d’affaires’ to request the disarmament of the Japanese-drilled troops.83 It is probably the other 
reason why Satow preferred the opinion of the Japanese Government. From the beginning, Satow 
realised that the Japanese Government worried that the murder of the Korean Queen, obviously 
encouraged and even committed by Japanese nationals, would provoke the Russian side. On 10 
October, When Saionji asked Satow as to Britain’s policy, Satow answered that the British Government 
had no intention to interfere with Korea and that they would be satisfied if any international 
arrangement reduced the current tension. Saionji believed that Japan should have a predominant 
position in Seoul because of the proximity to Korea and the exceeding number of Japanese residents. 
However, Saionji said that Russia would prefer to talk alone with Japan and if so, then Japan would not 
be able to forward any proposals but only leave it to Russia and let them write their wishes.84  
The Japanese Government were very concerned about a threat of Russian penetration into Korea 
because Russia had greater interests in Korea than any other powers. In a conversation with Satow on 
23 October 1895, Japanese Prime Minister Itō Hirobumi pointed out that Russia was the only Western 
power that had called upon the Japanese Government immediately after the end of the first Sino-
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Japanese War to respect Japan’s declaration with regard to the independence of Korea. Furthermore, 
Itō also informed that Prince Alexey Borisovich Lobanov-Rostovsky had told the German Emperor that 
“Russia would not tolerate the Japanese establishing themselves in Korea”.85 Moreover, the Japanese 
Government noticed that Russia was interested in providing military protection to Korea.86 
Satow assured that the British Government would not accept that Russia had more critical interests 
in Korean than Britain. Additionally, he warned that “Russia would become the sole arbiter of Korea’s 
future if Russia were treated as if that power was alone to be dealt with”.87 Satow warned that Japan 
should abandon its policy that aimed to secure exclusive privileges in the country to avoid further 
collision.88 However, judging from Satow’s statements, Britain seemed ready to align itself with Japan 
by recognising Japan’s predominant voice in Seoul to some extent if it would prevent Russia from 
stepping into Korea. 
Satow even gave him a strategic advice on how to respond if Russia firmly demanded the withdrawal 
of the Japanese garrisons from Korea. Satow told Itō that the Japanese Government should attempt 
to avoid such a demand from the Russian side because it would be very dangerous for Japan to reject 
it in the current conditions of the Japanese Navy. To avoid a demand from Russia, Satow suggested the 
withdrawal of the Japanese garrison stationing in Seoul and replacing them by a detachment from 
those already in other parts of Korea. He believed that it could be seen as the beginning of the 
withdrawal and even expected to remain the latter in the country in justification of protecting the 
telegraph cables with the Liaodong Peninsula.89  
It is an example that Japan and Britain shared similar strategic interests in Korea. In August 1895, 
Satow assured Itō that “Britain had a similar interest to the Japanese in preventing Russian annexation 
of Korea” even though its commercial interest is insignificant. 90  Furthermore, Satow had a very 
negative view of the future of Korea. On 9 October 1895, immediately after the outbreak of the murder 
of Queen Min, Satow wrote to F. V. Dickins about his view on Korea: 
 
“…Korea I anticipate will be another Morocco, a rotten fruit which no one may touch, and which 
will be carefully propped up lest it should fall into someone’s hands of whom the others would be 
jealous to the point of fighting”.91 
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Considering Britain’s strategic interest in Korea and his negative view on the future of the country, 
Satow probably drew a conclusion that the presence of Japanese military capacities would help Korea 
maintain order and peace and concentrate on the modernisation of the nation. Furthermore, on 26 
October, Satow was told by Itō that Miura had assassinated Queen Min to destroy her scheme to 
accept a Russian protectorate and Satow thought “it was very likely the explanation”.92 This may 
explain why Satow strongly criticised the foreign representatives in Seoul when Itō told him that they 
had been influenced by the Russian Charge d’affaires.93 Satow believed Hillier had been indulged into 
a Russian plot to strengthen its influence within the country. London was surprised by Satow’s alarming 
report and immediately telegraphed the British Legation in Beijing and asked them to instruct British 
Consul-general Hillier to report as to the related situations in Korea.94 
As demanded, British Minister in Beijing Nicholas Roderick O’Conor gave Hillier instructions to report 
on the recent decisions made by foreign representatives as to the disarmament of Japanese-drilled 
guards and the denial to recognise the current Korean Cabinet. However, O’Conor also advised that it 
was still desirable for Hillier to work in close co-operation with the Russian Charge d’affaires and that 
any representations made to the Korean Government would be better to be those of the general 
diplomatic body rather than that of the Russian Charge d’affaires alone.95 Although he was unsure if 
the proposal by foreign representatives in Seoul was suitable to the present situations, he believed 
that Hillier would have more power to moderate the demands of the Russian Charge d’affaires when 
working in co-operation with him. He thought that the separation of Hillier from Waeber would draw 
a distinctive line between Britain’s policy and those of Russia and the United States and it would 
probably cause very serious tension between them.96 
In his report to London, Hillier pointed out that Satow’s statements had been based on inaccurate 
information. He indicated that the removal of the Japanese-drilled Korean guards had been requested 
by King Kojong and suggested by him and his colleagues to the Japanese Minister. He emphasised that 
it was not a demand but a suggestion and that Komura had accepted the suggestion, but he believed 
delay would be desirable to seek for the best means. Additionally, he indicated that he did not join the 
Russian Charge d’affaires’s action to refuse the recognition of the current Korean Government. He also 
stated that the disbandment of the Japanese-drilled troops would be safe if it was carried out 
judiciously.97 
Hillier and his foreign colleagues held a meeting on the morning of 5 November. It is worth noting 
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that the Japanese Minister and Special Envoy Inoue Kaoru were present at the meeting. The mission 
of Inoue was to express the Japanese Emperor’s condolences to King Kojong.98  Inoue arrived at 
Chemulpo on 30 October and came to Seoul on the next day.99 After discussions, all participants, 
including Komura and Inoue, unanimously agreed that it was imminent to disarm the Japanese-drilled 
Korean guards at the palace for the King’s personal safety. Since Japanese Minister Komura also 
believed that resistance from the palace guard would be ignorable, it was decided that the measure 
would be taken by Japanese troops within a few days from the meeting.100  
Again, the foreign representatives’ decision upset the Japanese Government. On 12 November, 
Saionji told Satow that foreign representatives’ request to replace the Japanese-drilled Korean guards 
with the Japanese garrison was inconsistent with Japan’s recent announcement of non-intervention 
policy in Korea.101 Furthermore, he emphasised that the Japanese Government were unwilling to take 
any responsibility for the disarmament by Japanese troops of the Korean guards, which seemed likely 
to lead to bloodshed. Moreover, from his perspective, the current situations in Korea seemed 
satisfactory. Thus, he was unsure if it would be advisable to disband the Japanese-drilled Korean guards 
by military means.102 Additionally, Saionji asked whether or not Satow was able to talk to Hillier in 
Seoul and make him change his attitude. Satow answered that British Consul-general in Seoul was 
affiliated to the British Legation in Beijing and all he could do was “to transmit his communication to 
London or Beijing by telegraph”.103  
However, on 14 November, Satow received a report that the replacement of Japanese-drilled Korean 
guards by Japanese troops had been actually suggested by Inoue Kaoru who was present at the 
meeting. Saionji also confirmed that he had been informed by Mikhail Hitrovo, Russian Minister in 
Tokyo, that Waeber had reported the same context to the Russian Government. However, Saionji still 
persisted that the Japanese Government would never carry out the proposed measure due to 
inconsistency with Japan’s previous announcement of non-intervention policy in Korea. 
Satow replied that it was very important for the Japanese Government to endeavour in the line they 
had previously announced to foreign powers.104 Inoue believed that it would be desirable for the 
Japanese Government to accept the request from foreign representatives and take responsibility for 
the safety of the King. He also concerned that another power would take over the role of the King’s 
protector unless Japan stepped into this matter. However, in the end, Itō disagreed with Inoue’s 
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opinion and refused to approve what Inoue had suggested.105   
Therefore, Satow sent to London an additional telegraph to correct that it was Inoue who had 
suggested the removal of the Korean guards. However, unfortunately to Hillier, London only received 
the telegraph that had been sent on 12 November in time.106 London only received a letter that 
contained the summary of a conversation between Satow and Saionji and Satow’s separate opinion 
that “the Japanese Government appeared anxious that British Consul-General in Seoul should have 
instructions to that effect given him”. Due to limited information, London told William Nelthorpe 
Beauclerk, the new British Charge d’affaires in Beijing, that he should instruct Hillier to “telegraph for 
instructions in the event of Hillier’s foreign colleagues wishing him to join in exercising pressure upon 
the representative of Japan”.107 London emphasised that Hillier should not urge upon the Japanese 
minister in Korea while they were in the military seizure of the country because such action might 
relieve Japan of their full responsibility to maintain order.108  
Of course, Hillier was very unhappy with London’s instructions. In his reply, Hillier emphasised that 
his efforts made throughout discussions with regard to the current events of Korea were consistent 
with the instructions that London had given. He also pointed out that he and his foreign colleagues 
had consistently argued that Japan should assume full responsibility for the restoration of order within 
the country since they were in the military occupation of Korea. He again clarified that his suggestion 
about the removal of Korean guards from the palace had been duly approved by Japanese Special 
Envoy Inoue Kaoru and Japanese Minister Komura Jutarō.109 On the other hand, Satow was satisfied 
that London’s instructions to respect Japan’s military occupation of the country would prevent Hillier 
from exercising pressure upon the Japanese Minister in Seoul.  
This disagreement amongst the Foreign Office in London and British representatives in the region 
was remarkable. From the perspective of London and the British Legation in Tokyo, Japan was still an 
important strategic partner against Russian advance. Therefore, when they were reported by Hillier 
that the Russian minister was playing a leading role in confrontation against the Japanese minister, 
they were alarmed that the Russian minister might be taking advantage of the Japanese engagement 
in the events and warned the British consul-general in Seoul not to take joint action with him. However, 
Hillier, who well understood the situations of the country, saw the murder a significant challenge to 
the independence of the country. Therefore, he strongly appealed to the Japanese side to maintain 
order in the country while he contained himself from joining the American and Russian ministers, who 
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vigorously challenged the Japanese presence in the country. Hillier’s stance was consistent with 
Britain’s policy in Korea at a national level. However, London put weight on the British interests at a 
regional level and accepted the suggestions from the British Legation in Japan. Moreover, the rank of 
the representative in Seoul was consul-general, which was affiliated to the British Legation in Beijing. 
Therefore, without the support of the British minister in Beijing, Hillier’s opinion could not be as 
influential as Satow’s. 
On 19 November, Satow informed Saionji that Hillier had been instructed not to interfere with the 
Japanese authorities in Seoul, who was responsible for the maintenance of order in the country. 
However, Saionji denied that the presence of Japanese forces in Seoul did not mean the assumption 
of full responsibilities to restore order in the country. Satow again reminded that Japan would be seen 
as responsible for not having stopped it with all the means at the Japanese authorities in Seoul.110 
Apparently, Japanese acting Foreign Minister Saionji, “who seldom ventures to speak on his own 
responsibility”,111 did not directly answer him with regard to the proposals. However, it seems that 
Satow’s advice for the Japanese Government influenced their Korea policy. On 26 November, King 
Kojong issued a new decree, announcing the restoration of Queen Min to her former status, the 
revocation of all decrees that had been issued on 8 October, the dismissal of the Minister of War and 
the Chief of Police, who were the key participants of the attack on palace and the immediate arrest of 
other offenders of the attack on 8 October.112 Interestingly, foreign representatives showed slightly 
different reactions to the Decree. American Minister Sill and Russian Charge d’affaires revealed great 
satisfaction with the King’s announcement also stated that they had never recognised the previous 
decrees of 8 October as approved by the King. On the other hand, Japanese Minister Komura showed 
his satisfaction with the measure, but he also stated that his Government did not refuse to recognise 
the previous decrees from 8 October. British Consul-general Hiller did not mention about the 
recognition issues, but he simply told King Kojong that he was happy to see the King taking such 
measures to recapture his lost authority. Hiller believed that these measures were the most 
satisfactory by far and hoped the King would be able to maintain the power.113  
It is worth noting that most of the proposals that had been suggested by foreign representatives 
were given effect, except for the dismissal by the Japanese garrison of Japanese-drilled Korean palace 
guards. Hillier certainly believed that the authority of the Japanese Legation was sufficient to repress 
any resistance against the measures they favoured.114 Judging from the previous discussions amongst 
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foreign representatives, Komura agreed with the proposals of his colleagues on the ground that such 
measures would be advisable in order to relieve the King’s concern about his safety within the palace. 
Furthermore, he believed that such measures would help Japan keep the Korean government under 
its influence.115  
However, the Japanese Government eventually decided to approve some of the proposals that had 
been made by foreign representatives in Seoul once Saionji was warned by Satow with regard to 
Japan’s responsibility to maintain order and peace while being in military occupation of Korea. The 
Japanese authorities firmly refused to disband the Japanese-drilled Korean guards by Japanese troops. 
However, the Japanese Legation approved of the removal of Minister of War Cho Hee-Yon and Chief of 
Police Kwon Hyong-Jin, who allegedly threatened King Kojong after they had found out that the King’s 
appeal to foreign representatives in Seoul for protection.116 
There may be several reasons why the Japanese Government changed its mind. First, the Japanese 
Legation might be conceived that the dismissal of War Minister Cho Hee-Yon would be sufficient to 
secure the King’s safety. The Japanese-drilled Korean troops were obviously the participants of the 
incident, but they still remained under the command of Japanese officers throughout the attack. Thus, 
the Japanese authorities possibly believed that the change of the War Minister would be sufficient to 
keep the guards under control. Furthermore, the Japanese Government might be seriously worried 
about the consequences of the forceful disbandment of the Korean guards despite the foreign 
preventatives’ confidence in a peaceful outcome. Therefore, it was apparently the best measure the 
Japanese Government could take. 
Before long, it was proven to be the right decision for the Japanese side to maintain the presence of 
Korean troops at the palace. In the early morning of 28 November 1895, King Kojong’s supporters 
attacked the palace and attempted to rescue the King from the palace under the occupation of the 
pro-Japanese Koreans. However, the plot had been leaked to the Korean and Japanese authorities 
beforehand and the well-prepared palace guards successfully repulsed the attack.117 Some of the 
participants were American missionaries and the key figures of Korean participants had been seeking 
refuge at the American and Russian Legations since the outbreak of the murder of Queen Min. 
However, American Minister Sill and Russian Minister Waeber persisted that they had not been aware 
of the plot beforehand.118 Itō and Saionji were satisfied that it was right to reject the proposal to 
disband the Korean guards because they successfully defeated the attack against them. 119 
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“Hansŏngshinbo”, a Seoul-based Japanese newspaper, even attempted to take advantage of the failed 
attempt and heavily criticised foreign participants in order to cover up the Japanese murder of Queen 
Min.120 Hillier believed that it was unwise that Sill and Waeber had allowed Korean refugees to stay 
within their legations.121 
Therefore, as Hillier said, King Kojong’s Decree proclaiming the removal of two most notorious 
ministers from the Korean Cabinet was the most satisfactory for the British side.122 In terms of the 
Korean internal affairs, it was a favourable measure for the British consulate because those two 
Koreans had threatened the safety of the King by the Japanese-drilled Korean troops under his 
command. Meanwhile, it was also acceptable to the Japanese Government, who had preferred not to 
disarm the Japanese-drilled Korean troops by the Japanese garrison. Furthermore, unlike his American 
and Russian colleagues, Hillier was reluctant to interfere with Korea’s domestic affairs as actively as 
they did. Britain’s Korea policy was shaped up by Britain’s point of view on the independence of Korea, 
which would be favourable to British interests within the country, and the worldwide strategic rivalry 
between Britain and Russia. Thus, when the situation of the country became favourable to British 
interests, Britain did not raise further question but left Korean affairs “to quiet down”.123 
 
Britain’s understanding of the situations of Korea in the early 1896 
 
At the beginning of Year 1896, Seoul seemed settled and quiet under the influence of the Japanese 
authorities: Japan was still a predominant power in military terms and pro-Japanese high-ranking 
officials remained in power. However, unlike in Seoul, anti-Japanese sentiment rapidly arose outside 
the fortress of the capital. The tension was sparked by King Kojong’s proposed order for palace guards 
to cut off the hair-knot. In the Korean society, where Confucianism was predominant, it was 
traditionally believed that men should not cut their hair because hair was also seen as part of one’s 
body that had been given by his parents. Therefore, cutting the hair-knot was viewed as a disobedient 
action to their parents. Furthermore, since it was widely believed that the hair-knot cutting had been 
forced by the Japanese authorities, the violent uprisings particularly targeted Japanese authorities or 
their Korean supporters.  
British diplomats and military officers were also aware of the changes of the political conditions in 
the country. By January 1896, British Consul-General Hillier was convinced that the situations of the 
Korean affairs became satisfactorily settled and that no further disturbance was likely to happen in the 
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near future. Therefore, after discussing about the necessity of the presence of marine guards at the 
consulate with the American Minister and the Russian Charge d’affaires, he reached a conclusion to 
withdraw them from the current British consulate.124 At this point, American Minister John M. B. Sill 
was already arranging the withdrawal of his guards. Although Russian Charge d’affaires Karl Ivanovich 
Waeber was still reluctant to take the same measure as the American Minister did, he also agreed with 
his colleagues that there was no immediate threat to the Korean Court or Government. However, 
because they all believed that the current Korean Government lacked any sufficient stability to prevent 
further disturbances in the future; it seemed favourable to maintain the presence of foreign warships 
at Chemulpo despite the withdrawal of marine troops from the capital.125 
Vice-Admiral Alex Buller at Hong Kong also shared a similar view. He understood that top-knot was 
as important to a Korean as ‘a pigtail was to a Chinaman’ and believed that the enforcement of the 
cutting of top-knot would possibly lead to a nationwide disturbance.126  He also reported to the 
Admiralty that King Kojong was still in fear of his life despite the relatively settled situations and still 
wished Europeans to visit him daily and their guards to remain at their premises. Therefore, he 
concluded that ‘Korea was still in an unstable condition and it would be desirable to maintain a vessel 
of war at a Korean port to report proceedings.127 Therefore, Hillier decided that it would be desirable 
to reduce the number of marine guards of the consulate down to fifteen but to keep a vessel of war 
at Chemulpo in preparation for any unexpected disturbances.128  
His decision clearly shows that he did not foresee any disturbance at least inside the capital in the 
near future. Only before less than a month, the political state of the country completely changed 
overnight. In the early morning of 11 February, King Kojong and the Crown Prince successfully deceived 
the palace guards and left for the Russian Legation. King Kojong’s asylum to the Russian Legation, also 
known as ‘Agwanp'ach'ŏn’ in Korean, shifted power from the pro-Japanese party to the pro-Russian 
party. 
Considering the fact that Russian troops were deployed to Seoul just one day before the execution 
of King Kojong’s flight to the Russian Legation, the Admiralty assumed that King Kojong and Russian 
representatives had previously arranged the incident.129 According to Russian sources, it was King 
Kojong who secretly approached to the Russian side for the plot. Immediately after the arrival of 
Russian Charge d’affaires Alexei de Speyer, who was appointed to replace Waeber, King Kojong sent 
him a note via Yi Pom-Jin, Acting Agriculture Minister who was already taking refuge at the Russian 
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Legation since the outbreak of the murder of Queen Min. In his note, the Korean King revealed his 
unhappiness with the current situations of the Korean Court as well as his hope for help from the 
Russian side to see “brighter days with her collaboration”.130 Afterwards, on 12 January 1896, he had 
his first audience with King Kojong. The audience seemed nothing different from those that Western 
representatives would have after their appointments to the country.131  However, when Alexey Speyer, 
newly appointed Russian Minister to Korea, was about to leave, King Kojong secretly slipped him a 
note, explaining his continuous efforts to search for the Queen and his reluctance to reveal her 
whereabouts “until the overthrow of the present government by the Russians”.132 Later on 2 February 
1896, King Kojong again sent Yi Pom-Jin to Speyer in order to discuss about the protection of King 
Kojong and his Crown Prince at the Russian Legation. King Kojong argued that he and his son were 
surrounded by the traitors, who would be willing to ‘destroy them’ whenever any disturbance occurred 
in the capital.133 At first, Speyer thought that the plot was too dangerous to accept. However, Yi Pom-
Jin insisted that the King was prepared to take the risk if the Russian Legation agreed with the proposal. 
Yi also told him that it would be much more dangerous for the King to stay in the palace than to risk 
his life by running to the Russian Legation. Speyer was also convinced that the presence of the King at 
their legation would be a great advantage for his country. Therefore, he agreed to provide protection 
to King Kojong after his escape from the palace.134  
It seems obvious that King Kojong made such an unexpected decision because of immense threat in 
the Court. However, it is also important to understand on what basis the Russian Legation in Seoul 
agreed with the Korean King’s ambitious plan. Before his arrival to Seoul, newly appointed Russian 
Charge d’affaires Speyer stopped over in Tokyo and had conversations with Western diplomats and 
Japanese high-rank officials with regard to the state of Korea. On 17 December 1895, he was told by 
Japanese acting Foreign Minister Saionji that the Japanese Government had friendly sentiment 
towards the Russian Government and that they realised that it was inevitable to reach an agreement 
with Russia for the suitable solution of the Korean question. Saionji also suggested that it would be 
desirable for Speyer and Japanese Minister Komura to discuss the settlement of current issues with 
regard to the Korean affair. In his conversation with German Minister Felix Freiherr von Gutschmid, 
Speyer told the German Minister that he was prepared to work in co-operation with the Japanese 
Government and to keep in touch with Japanese representatives in Korea.135 Speyer believed that the 
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Japanese Government endeavoured to do their duty in maintaining the independence of Korea in 
accordance with the Japanese Government’s previous announcement that had been issued after the 
murder of Queen Min. 
However, upon his arrival in Seoul, Speyer realised that the situation of the nation was quite different 
from what he had expected. After witnessing that King Kojong’s power was so limited that he even 
had to secretly slip a note to Speyer in order to avoid the attention of pro-Japanese Korean statesmen, 
on 14 January 1896, he reported to St. Petersburg that the situation of the country was very different 
from what the Japanese Government had asserted.136 Furthermore, since it became clear that direct 
Russian intervention was what King Kojong wanted, Speyer asked to St. Petersburg for instruction with 
regard to the overthrow of the current regime in Korea.  
When he was asked to clarify the main purpose of the plan on the following day, he argued that 
Japan would take over Korea if Russia refused to act.137 Additionally, he asserted that Russian troops 
should be deployed to Seoul in order to balance off the Japanese troops stationing in the capital. In 
response, St. Petersburg showed no objection in principle to Speyer’s idea of supporting King Kojong 
and the anti-Japanese party in Korea. However, St. Petersburg clearly refused the idea of sending 
Russian troops equal in number to Japanese troops stationing in Korea because Russia did not want to 
face new complications in the region at that time.138  
London and British representatives in the Far East also noticed Speyer’s anti-Japanese sentiment. On 
23 January, in Tokyo, Japanese acting Foreign Minister Saionji mentioned to British Minister Satow 
about Speyer’s telegraph to the Russian Government, which stated that King Kojong was “still kept a 
prisoner in his Palace” and that “the Japanese Government intended to carry off the Crown Prince to 
Japan”.139 Saionji argued that the relationship between King Kojong and his ministers had improved 
even though the King was still in confinement and that neither the Japanese Government nor their 
minister resident in Seoul had any plan to bring the Crown Prince to Tokyo.140 Saionji insisted that the 
new Russian minister tried to give a false impression to St. Petersburg with regard to Japan’s policy in 
Korea. 
Furthermore, Saionji also pointed out that Waeber did not move to Mexico even though he had been 
appointed a new Russian Minister to the country on 11 September 1895. In December 1895, he was 
ordered by the Russian Government not to leave the country upon the arrival of his successor.141 
Therefore, although Speyer reached Seoul on 8 January 1896, Waeber and Speyer co-worked as the 
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representatives of Russia under the approval of their government. While French Minister Pascal 
Lefèvre simply believed that it intended to help Speyer fully understand the current situations of the 
country, American Minister Sill was alarmed that ‘Russia might assume a very active role in the Korean 
affairs in the spring, when the Vladivostok harbour would become ice-free.142 Therefore, from the 
Japanese point of view, Russia’s decision to keep Waeber and Speyer in Seoul must have looked hostile 
to Japanese interests in Korea because the Japanese Government was already aware that Waeber had 
severely criticised Japan’s policy in Korea since the murder of Queen Min in October 1895. 
Furthermore, Speyer’s alleged report to St. Petersburg proved that he shared the same view as 
Waeber’s.  
His view on the question of Korean independence was clearly displayed in conversation with Hillier, 
where he talked about his previous dialogue with Japanese Minister Komura at the American Legation 
in Seoul after his arrival in early February. When he was asked by Japanese Minister Komura to talk 
freely on the question, he expressed his impression on the Korean question.  
 
“Previous to my arrival in this country, I heard much of the independence of Corea which the 
Japanese Government claimed to have established, and I was prepared to find when I got here 
that this boasted independence of Corea was more or less existent. […] I convinced myself that 
the theory of Corean independence was a farce and I feel inclined to regret that the Russian 
Emperor has been made a party to this farce by burnishing me with Letters of Credence to a 
sovereign who was virtually a prisoner in the hands of his Ministry. […] I soon realised that the 
King was mere automation, afraid to open his mouth. […] The Cabinet were subordinate to the 
will of the Japanese Minister, who had the power to control their actions as he pleased and was 
the only foreign Representative whose voice had any weight with the King or whose advice would 
not compromise His Majesty in the eyes of his Ministers. Corean independence is non-existent, 
and it was useless for the Japanese to pretend that it did exist. […] it was more or less an insult 
to the ordinary intelligence to expect anyone to accept the Japanese declaration of non-
intervention in the affairs of this country. “143 
 
Speyer argued that the Russian Government should pay more attention to Korea and take more an 
active role in the Korean affairs because of its significant ‘geopolitical propinquity’ to Russia. He 
pointed out that Russia and Japan were the powers most interested in Korea and stated that it would 
be desirable if they could reach a mutual understanding with regard to the Korean affairs. However, 
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he strongly asserted that “it was time for Russia to intervene” and thought that “Russian intervention 
would not be objected to any other Power”.144   
It is noteworthy that this conversation was made on 8 February, only 3 days before the Korean King’s 
flight to the Russian Legation. As is previously mentioned, King Kojong already slipped a note to Speyer 
and asked for asylum and protection at the Russian Legation on 2 February. Unlike the previous 
decision, St. Petersburg approved the King’s asylum at the Russian Legation on a basis that the 
presence of the Korean sovereign at their legation would be very beneficial to Russian interests in the 
country and that the Korean King’s voluntary action would be more desirable than Speyer’s previous 
plot to balance off Japanese influence by dispatching Russian troops to Seoul. 145  The Russian 
Government also decided to send the Russian cruiser Admiral Kornilov to Chemulpo to provide military 
support for the plot. 
On 3 February, King Kojong thanks Speyer for approving his asylum at the Russian Legation and 
informed the Russian Legation of their preparation on a daily basis.146 On 6 February, since the Russian 
cruiser Admiral Kornilov arrived at Chemulpo, the Russian Legation prepared for the Korean King’s 
escape from the palace, which would happen on the following day. However, King Kojong thought that 
the presence of Russian marine guards at the Legation was insufficient to assure his safety even though 
the Russian Legation had already increased the number of the guards up to 40.147 Therefore, Speyer 
asked the cruiser Admiral Kornilov to send more troops to the capital and in response the Russian 
cruiser dispatched approximately 4 officers, 100 sailors and a 0.45 inch Maxim gun to the Russian 
Legation in the morning of 10 February 1896, just one day before the outbreak of the King’s flight to 
the Russian Legation.148 The Russian detachment used 42 donkeys to carry military supplies for next 3 
weeks.149  
 
The Korean King’s refuge at the Russian Legation 
 
When it was reported to the British consulate that more than 100 of Russian troops landed on 
Chemulpo and headed to Seoul on the same day, Hillier asked to Waeber why the Russian detachment 
was on its way to Seoul even though the Russian Legation had already increased the number of troops 
up to 40 a few days ago. Waeber and Speyer answered that the decision had been made because of a 
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growing concern over the rise of Korean insurgents.150  
When King Kojong was forced by the pro-Japanese Cabinet to introduce the removal of the top-knot 
at the beginning of the year, it provoked many local Koreans who saw the top-knot as a symbol of the 
country’s traditional customs and initiated the nationwide anti-Japanese military uprising. By the time 
of the early February 1896, the Korean rebels had successfully defeated the national troops and 
reached only 20 miles away from the fortress of the capital.151 Waeber and Speyer pointed out that 
the number of insurgents was rapidly increasing and that they were coming closer to Seoul day by day. 
They emphasised that the Japanese Legation would only focus on protecting their nationals in Korea 
if the insurgents seized the capital because the Japanese Government had already announced its 
intention not to interfere with the Korean affairs. 
Waeber and Speyer even advised Hillier and American Minister Sill to increase the number of guards 
at their legations.152 Hiller understood the rebels were rapidly approaching to Seoul and that they even 
killed Japanese telegraph officers and cut off the telegraph lines between Seoul and Busan. 
Nevertheless, Hiller agreed with Komura’s view that the Korean rebels were very unlikely to attempt 
to conquer the capital. 153  He and Sill believed that the Russian ministers were taking “a rather 
exaggerated estimate of the situation” but they asked their vessels of war at Chemulpo to prepare to 
send troops if required.154 They even repeated the advice that it would be desirable to strengthen a 
guard at their legations while they were dining with Hillier, Sill and Komura.155 The Russian ministers 
hinted that they should be prepared for the Korean King’s flight to the Russian Legation, which would 
happen in the morning of the following day but Hillier did not immediately understand why they were 
consistently suggesting the strengthening of the guard. 
Therefore, Hillier was completely unaware of the plot until 9 am, 11 February 1896, when he was 
reported that King Kojong and the Crown Prince were currently in the Russian Legation. At 10 am, 
Waeber visited Hillier and told him that Foreign Minister Kim Yun-Sik was replaced with Yi Wan-Yong, 
who was taking asylum at the American Legation since the murder of Queen Min and capable of 
speaking in English.156 Waeber refused to answer Hillier’s question on how King Kojong managed to 
have escaped from the palace but by far Hillier was aware that the King and the Crown Prince were in 
two Korean ladies’ sedan chairs when they arrived in the Russian Legation at 7.30 am on the day.157 In 
response to King Kojong’s letter of invitation, which was circulated by Foreign Minister Yi Wan-Yong, 
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Hillier came to the Russian Legation at noon. Before his audience with the King, Speyer welcomed 
Hillier and other foreign representatives and explained why King Kojong had fled for the Russian 
Legation. He stated that “the state of affairs in the palace had become so intolerable that the King had 
thrown himself on Russian protection”.158 Waeber argued that the King’s request could not be withheld 
and also revealed his hope that the King would return to his palace before long.159 
Afterwards, Hillier and his other Western colleagues went to see the King in a different room. King 
Kojong also explained the reason why he left for the Russian Legation was because “his position in the 
palace became so dangerous and intolerable”.160 He also asked them to support the Russian Minister 
in difficult situations. Interestingly, while Hillier and other Western colleagues expressed their 
satisfaction that the Korean King and the Crown Prince were in safety, American Minister Sill not only 
showed his satisfaction with King Kojong being in good health, but also guaranteed his sympathy and 
devotion in helping Waeber.161 It may hint the different views on Western intervention in the Korean 
affairs shared amongst foreign ministers, especially between American and Russian ministers and 
other foreign representatives. Since Queen Min had been murdered by Japanese assassins, American 
and Russian ministers consistently showed their dissatisfaction with the predominant Japanese 
influence and took a very active part in appealing to the Japanese authorities for taking responsibility 
of the maintenance of peace and order in the country. Therefore, although Sill worried about possible 
popular violence within the city or insurgents’ attack to the capital as a consequence of the incident,162 
he might be convinced that the presence of the Korean King at the Russian Legation would balance off 
the Japanese influence in the near future. 
After the audience with King Kojong, Hiller and Sill decided to call for guards to their legations, which 
Waeber and Speyer had continuously insisted since the day before King Kojong’s flight to the Russian 
Legation.163 At first, he hesitated to take their advice because he believed that the general public had 
friendly feelings towards Westerners and it seemed very unlikely that Koreans would commit any 
violence against them. However, he was aware that Koreans were currently so excited with the incident 
that it would easily cause any panic in the city, which might lead to violent disturbances.164 Therefore, 
at 1 pm, Hillier sent a telegram to Commander Francis N. Pelly, the captain of the British vessel of war 
“Porpoise” at Chemulpo, and informed him that King Kojong took refuge at the Russian Legation and 
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it was a “critical state of affairs”.165  Hillier also asked him to dispatch 15 guards to the British consulate 
in the morning of the following day. In his letter to Pelly, he explained that “the situation of the country 
became serious since Korean insurgents had defeated the national troops and has approached within 
20 miles from the city”.166  
Apart from possible uprisings and attacks that could be caused by Koreans, he also suspected Russia’s 
intention in providing asylum to the Korean sovereign at the Russian Legation. Hiller mentioned that 
140 men of the Russian guard would take an important role in protecting the capital from such 
disturbances. However, Hillier thought that the number of the Russian guard was “unnecessarily large” 
and that “the demonstration has probably more behind it”.167 British naval officers and the Admiralty 
also believed that the Korean King’s refuge at the Russian Legation had been previously arranged on a 
basis that the Russian guard landed on Chemulpo on the day before the King’s flight.168 Therefore, at 
6 pm on the same day, Pelly landed one officer and 15 marines on Chemulpo and they arrived in Seoul 
in the morning of the following day.169 A house of Finance Advisor and Chief Commissioner of Korean 
Customs John McLeavy Brown, which was located next to the gate of the British consulate, was lent to 
be used for their temporary accommodation.170 
While the British Consulate-General took precautions against possible disturbances that could 
happen as a consequence of the King’s refuge at the Russian Legation, King Kojong took radical 
measures to bring back power into his hands. First of all, King Kojong pardoned Yi Jae-Sun, Yi Min-Kung, 
Yi Chung-Gu, Chon Woo-Ki, Noh Hung-Kyu, Ahn Kyung-Soo, Kim Jae-Pung and Nam Man-Ri, most of 
who mainly took part in the Ch'unsaengmun Incident, a failed attempt to rescue King Kojong from the 
palace in November 1895.171 Meanwhile, King Kojong dissolved the current Cabinet and replaced most 
of the ministers with his loyal followers as below: 
 
 Park Chung-Yang: Prime Minister, Acting Minister of Home Affairs, Acting Minister of 
Household 
 Yi Wan-Yong: Minister of Foreign Affairs, Acting Minister of Education, Acting Minister of 
Works 
 Cho Byung-Jik: Minister of Justice 
 Yi Yun-Yong: Minister of War 
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 Yoon Yong-Koo: Minister of Finance 
 Ahn Kyung-Soo: Commissioner-General of the Police172 
 
The overthrow of the Korean Cabinet clearly intended to remove Japanese influence within the 
Korean Court. Most of the ministers who were discharged by King Kojong were those who had actively 
took part in or supported the Japanese murder of Queen Min. For example, former War Minister Cho 
Hee-Yon was one of the major participants in the plot. Furthermore, some of the newly appointed 
officials were those who had been discharged from office immediately after the Queen had been killed. 
Ahn Kyung-Soo, the newly appointed Commissioner-General of the Police, was in the same position 
when the Queen had been killed on 8 October 1895. Therefore, King Kojong obviously wanted to 
remove the pro-Japanese ministers or subordinates of the Japanese Legation from the Government.  
However, although the new Cabinet were clearly anti-Japanese, it is still difficult to define that the 
new Government, which was made as a result of King Kojong’s flight to the Russian Legation, were 
pro-Russian. For example, Yi Pom-Jin, who had taken refuge at the Russian Legation since the murder 
of Queen Min and played a very important role as a messenger between King Kojong and the Russian 
Legation, was not immediately appointed to any position in the Korean Government on 11 February. 
On 22 February, 11 days after King Kojong’s refuge at the Russian Legation, Yi Pom-Jin was eventually 
appointed as the Minister of Justice.173 However, only after a month, Yi Pom-Jin was newly appointed 
a secretary to the Korean Legation in the United States and thus he had to leave the Korean Cabinet.174  
There are mainly two reasons why Kojong’s new Cabinet was anti-Japanese and pro-American to a 
lesser extent but not pro-Russian. Firstly, the Russian Legation was unwilling to give an impression that 
Russia was trying to exert the exclusive and predominant influence in Korea. Although Speyer and 
Weaber had a clear intention to balance off the Japanese influence in the country by granting asylum 
to the Korean King at the Russian Legation and the Russian Government approved the plot in hope 
that the presence of the sovereign at their legation would be enormously beneficial to their interests 
in the country, it was obvious that other foreign representatives would be provoked if Russia would 
vigorously take advantage of the favourable situation.175 In a conversation between Hillier and Speyer 
on 13 February, Speyer argued that the only reason why the Russian Legation offered asylum to King 
Kojong was to rescue the King from fear and threat that had been imposed by his Cabinet with the 
backing of the Japanese Legation.176 Speyer insisted that Russia only took responsibility for granting 
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asylum to the King and that “neither Speyer or Waeber had interfered, nor would interfere, in the 
slightest degree in the arrangements which the King had made, or might see fit to make, for securing 
his independence and ruling the country with Ministers of his own selection”.177  
Secondly, not many pro-Russian Koreans were included in the new Cabinet because it was not Speyer 
but Dr. Horace Allen, secretary of the American Legation, whom King Kojong consulted with regard to 
the new formation of the new Cabinet immediately after his arrival in the Russian Legation. Speyer, 
who took a very active part in King Kojong’s refuge at the Russian Legation from the beginning, was 
very reluctant to give any guidance on the Korean Government at this point because he refused to 
engage with Korea’s domestic affairs. Therefore, the new Cabinet included several key members of the 
pro-American party. For example, Park Chung-Yang and Yi Wan-Yong were the Korean Minister to the 
United States and his secretary in the Korean Legation in Washington D.C., where they served between 
1887 and 1888. New War Minister Yi Yun-Yong was a brother of Yi Wan-Yong.178 Therefore, thanks to 
the cautious approach of the Russian Legation and the advice from Dr. Allen, King Kojong was able to 
form the anti-Japanese Government that could be supported by Russian and other foreign 
representatives in principle. 
After his audience with King Kojong at the Russian Legation, Hillier found that the King’s decrees had 
been posted in the street, which announce that King Kojong had appealed to foreign representatives 
for protection and sought for asylum at the Russian Legation. In the decrees, he proclaimed that his 
previous decree with regard to the degrading of the status of Queen Min was abolished immediately 
because they had been forced against King Kojong’s will.179 Additionally, King Kojong promised that the 
national troops who had been deployed to suppress insurgents would be called back and granted 
amnesty to all prisoners except those who had played a key role in the murder of Queen Min, such as 
Cho Hee-Yon, Yoo Kil-Jun, Chang Bak, Kwon Hyung-Jin, Yi Du-Hwang, Wu Bom-Son, Yo Bom-Rae and 
Lee Jin-Ho.180 In a separate order issued to the War Ministry, King Kojong mentioned as “traitorous 
leaders” and called upon the Ministry of War, officers and soldiers to “cut off instantly their heads, 
present them, waiting upon the King at the Russian Legation”.181 
However, before long, Hillier became seriously concerned about the possible consequences of the 
decrees. Hillier learned that former Prime Minister Kim Hong-Jip and former Minister of Works Chung 
Byung-Ha were arrested by the police in the palace before noon on 11 Febrauary and soon sentenced 
to beheading.182 After cutting off their heads, the police threw their bodies into the street and then 
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people dragged them into the city centre, where they “kicked, stabbed and stroke the corpses as they 
went”.183 He thought they were executed “doubtlessly with the approval of the King”.184 However, 
afterwards he was told by a friend of Foreign Minister Yi Wan-Yong that they were killed by the police 
without the King’s order. It was true that the Police arrested Ministers Cho and Chung and brought 
them to the head-quarter of the Police. However, when another group of the policemen were taking 
former Home Minister Yoo Kil-Jun to the head-quarter, Japanese troops rescued him from the police 
forces and brought him to the Japanese garrison near the palace. In fear of Japanese troops’ attack to 
the Police head-quarter, the police killed them without the King’s approval and threw their bodies into 
the street.185  
Hiller believed the captives should be given a fair and open trial even though they were condemned 
as traitors. Furthermore, after witnessing that the excited mob had mutilated the bodies of the 
beheaded ministers in the middle of the street and killed Japanese nationals, he was convinced that 
such brutal and bloody measures would only make the situations even worse. Thus, when Waeber 
visited Hillier on 12 February 1896, Hiller told him his concern about the King’s decree and warned 
that it could be exploited in order to disgrace the Russian Legation. Waeber explained that he had 
been unaware of the royal degree but assured that he would look into the matter.186 
Four days later, on 16 February 1896, Hillier received a printed copy of the translation of the revised 
decree from Foreign Minister Yi Wan-Yong. In his letter, the Foreign Minister explained that the degrees 
had been made in a hurry and thus mistakes were inevitable when wording them. He also argued that 
the degrees might have been posted by unauthorised persons and that it could have misguided the 
public.187 In the revised decree, King Kojong also repeated the same excuses as the Foreign Minister 
did. About the death of former Ministers, he persisted that at first it was intended to give them a fair 
trial in accordance with the laws. However, he emphasised that it was not the police but the mob that 
killed the two ministers. Hillier seemed unimpressed with King Kojong’s argument, but he hoped that 
the King’s alleged disapproval of the murder would prevent the further happening of “such 
barbarities”.188 
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Despite his viewpoint that the Russian Legation would only offer asylum to the Korean King and 
refrain from interfering with Korea’s domestic affairs, this case clearly shows that Waeber was 
sufficiently powerful to influence the Korean Government. However, Hillier seemed convinced that it 
was favourable that Waeber was advising the Korean King and his ministers because “it was hopeless 
to expect that the King, or any ministers be selected, could govern the country without foreign advice, 
enforced, if necessary, by insistence”.189 He believed that the situation of the country would become 
much more desperate if the Russian Legation withdrew their protection and left the King alone.190  
One of the examples that made Hillier pleased with the Russian presence was the empowerment of 
John McLeavy Brown, who was a British national, the Chief Commissioner of Korean Customs and the 
financial advisor. On 1 March, thanks to Waeber’s suggestion, McLeavy Brown was given absolute 
power to keep the Ministry of Finance and the Treasury under his full control. Hillier thought that the 
promotion of McLeavy Brown was the assurance of Russian Minister Waeber that “he had no intention 
of using the influence he now possessed for the pursuit of an exclusive policy”.191 
He also believed that it was a “step in the right direction” for the Korean Government to give him 
absolute power to control the Treasury because the financial situation of the country was miserable. 
Due to corruption and waste, the Government was seriously “close on bankruptcy” and McLeavy 
Brown estimated that it would only take less than 6 months to exhaust the Treasury if the Government 
continued to spend money at the current rate. Before his appointment to the position, the annual 
budget used to be allocated to each Department in advance and it usually ran out immediately after it 
reached the department. McLeavy Brown stopped the inefficient system of distributing money in 
advance and refused to grant any unreasonable request for extra money.192 Despite the financial 
difficulties, McLeavy Brown’s tight control over the expenditures and revenues of the Treasury 
expanded with the support of King Kojong and Waeber. 
Furthermore, since King Kojong came under the Russian protection, the situation of Seoul became 
settled down before long. Because the telegraph line between Seoul and Busan was cut off by the 
insurgents outside the capital, the Japanese Legation only took a passive approach and 500 men of 
Japanese troops stationing in the capital remained calm despite the sudden political change. 193 
Furthermore, despite the continuous rumour that insurgents approached within a few miles from the 
fortress of Seoul, the British Consulate-General in Seoul and British vessels of war at Chemulpo were 
convinced that the insurgents were very unlikely to attack the capital. There were mainly two reasons. 
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Firstly, the insurgents were in principle anti-Japanese. Since the insurgents were very unhappy with 
the Japanese murder of Queen Min and the hair-cutting order, they hardly approached to Seoul or 
treaty ports, where foreign troops and vessels of war stationed.194  Although the local insurgents 
controlled the large areas outside the capital, they selectively attacked Japanese nationals residing or 
travelling in the countryside.195 
Secondly, King Kojong’s decrees appealed to the insurgents. Hillier doubted whether the King’s 
proclamation to retreat national forces would settle down the uprisings. However, in March, it was 
reported that the news of the King’s refuge at the Russian Legation, followed by the decrees, eased 
locals and probably served to stop an uprising, especially Wonsan and the north of it.196 Therefore, in 
mid-March, when Captain James Forsyth visited Seoul, he “found everything quiet, both in town and 
neighbourhood”. 197  In April, Forsyth was convinced that the situation became good enough to 
withdraw 7 soldiers from the consulate guard and Hillier agreed with his idea on a condition that at 
least one vessel of war should remain at Chemulpo.198  
Despite the positive effects of the Russian protection given to King Kojong, Hillier was continuously 
concerned about the King’s possible departure from the Russian Legation. When King Kojong and the 
Crown Prince left for the Russian Legation, the Queen Dowager and Crown Princess lodged at 
Kyŏngun'gung Palace, which was located next to the British Consulate-General. Therefore, when it was 
rumoured that King Kojong would move to Kyŏngun'gung in a few days’ time, Hillier worried that the 
British Consulate-General and the premises of the English Mission would be desirable places for them 
to seek for asylum if a sudden disturbance occurred.199 By the end of March, it was believed that King 
Kojong would be more likely to stay at Kyŏngun'gung if he left the Russian Legation because the King 
was reluctant to return to the main palace, where he had suffered the loss of Queen Min and faced 
continuous threats from the Japanese authorities and their Korean subordinates.200 Therefore, Hillier 
and Forsyth worried about the possible situation that they could be asked by the Korean King for the 
British protection in the event of a sudden excitement after his move to Kyŏngun'gung.201 Hillier’s 
concern with regard to the King’s possible move to Kyŏngun'gung was consistent with Britain’s policy 
on Korea. Britain was aware that their interest in the country was marginal in comparison with those 
of Russia or Japan. Therefore, they wanted to maintain their engagement with Korea’s domestic affairs 
at a limited level.  
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London’s Response to the Korean King’s Flight to the Russian Legation 
 
The news of King Kojong’s flight to the Russian Legation not only shocked foreign representatives in 
Seoul, but also alarmed Westminster. On 18 February 1896, in the House of Commons, Member of 
Parliament (hereafter MP) Griffith-Boscawen asked to George Curzon, the Under-Secretary of State for 
Foreign Affairs whether the Foreign Office had the detailed information on the landing of Russian 
troops on Chemulpo and the Korean King’s refuge at the Russian Legation. He then asked whether 
British, American and French troops also landed on Seoul; and also asked why he took refuge at the 
Russian Legation.  
Curzon confirmed that Russian troops landed on Chemulpo on 10 February and King Kojong took 
refuge at the Russian Legation on the following day. He also reported that a British guard was 
subsequently dispatched to the British Legation and that the Foreign Office had no information on 
whether other Western troops had landed. He also explained the reason why the King took refuge at 
the Russian Legation was due to the political situation in Seoul and the danger to himself and his 
family.202 On 20 February, MP Ellis Ashmead-Bartlett asked whether Russia’s agreement not to occupy 
any port in Korea when Britain withdrew from Korea in 1886 was still valid and Curzon confirmed that 
the Russian Government’s agreement “not to occupy Korean territory under any circumstances 
whatsoever” was still binding.203 On 27 February, when MP Albert Rollit questioned whether Russian 
troops had occupied Seoul or any part of Korea, Curzon answered that no Russian occupation of Seoul 
or any part of Korea had taken. He confirmed that approximately 150 Russian sailors were protecting 
the Russian Legation and 500 Japanese soldiers were stationing in Seoul.204 
These questions and answers show what the British Government’s primary concern was: possible 
Russian occupation of Korean territory. In April 1885, Britain occupied a small island that was located 
in the mouth of the Korean Strait. The isles were called “Kŏmundo” or “Port Hamilton”. The seizure 
intended to check a possible Russian southward advance from the Vladivostok harbour to the Korean 
Peninsula and the Pacific Ocean. After two years of the British occupation, Britain and Russia reached 
an agreement that Russia would never occupy any part of Korea under any circumstances and then 
Britain withdrew from Port Hamilton in February 1887.205 Therefore, Westminster wanted to check 
whether the landing of Russian troops and the Korean King’s flight to the Russian Legation were the 
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violation of the agreement between Britain and Russia. Judging from the questions and answers, the 
Foreign Office and Westminster obviously believed the Korean King’s refuge at the Russian Legation 
would not lead to the Russian occupation of Seoul or any part of Korea. 
It indicates that Britain would actively interfere with the Korean question only when the territorial 
integrity of the country was threatened by Russia. On 19 February, Japanese Minister Katō Takaaki 
visited Salisbury and had a conversation as to the recent Korean King’s flight to the Russian Legation. 
Katō argued that the King’s refuge had been clearly pre-arranged with the Russian Minister and asked 
what opinion the British Government had with regard to this event. Salisbury answered that the 
incident might not be very significant because only few men have been landed. Furthermore, when 
Katō revealed his personal view that Russia might want an ice-free port in the Far East, Salisbury 
answered that “Britain could offer no objection as long as Russia merely sought a commercial 
outlet”.206 However, Salisbury assured that the British Government would change the attitude if Russia 
intended to fortify a port or to seize any foreign territory.207 
Japanese Minister in Berlin Aoki Shūzō showed a more detailed view on the Korean question. On 20 
February, Aoki pointed out that the Russian Far Eastern fleet already became so strong that Japan 
could not stand alone against them. He continued to argue that the proposed Trans-Siberian Railways 
would eventually place the Liaodong Peninsula, Beijing and Korea under the sphere of Russian 
influence. Thus, he insisted that Britain, Japan and China should reach an agreement to deal with the 
Russian advance. He believed that British officers and engineers would be able to modernise the 
Chinese navy and communication technology while Japanese officers could re-organise the Chinese 
army. He thought that the co-operation amongst three countries would enable China to check a 
Russian advance into Manchuria in a short time.208 Aoki believed that the intervention should be taken 
immediately because the Russian plans for the domination of the region was already close to the 
execution.209 
Although it was not the official view of the Japanese Government, Aoki’s suggestion showed how 
Japanese statesmen understood the current situations of the region: Japan was not strong enough to 
stand alone in face of a possible Russian advance into Manchuria and Korea and Britain was crucial to 
separate China from Russian influence and to form a three-party alliance against Russia. However, as 
Salisbury mentioned, Britain was not interested in any confrontation against Russia unless Russia 
intended to occupy any foreign territory or to fortify a harbour. On 3 February 1896, British Prime 
Minister Balfour already stated that “from regarding with fear and jealousy a commercial outlet for 
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Russia in the Pacific Ocean which should not be ice-bound half the year, I should welcome such a result 
as a distinct advance in this far distant region”.210 Due to the British Government’s indifference as to 
the Russian advance to Korea, the Japanese Government realised that a mutual agreement between 
Russia and Japan would be more desirable since Britain was uninterested in supporting Japan.211  
Therefore, considering the British Government’s principle with regard to the Korean affair, Salisbury’s 
suggestion for the international recognition of Korean neutrality in late April was completely 
unexpected. On 28 April, Salisbury sent the following telegraph to Satow in Tokyo: 
 
By harbouring the King of Korea, Russia practically exercises a Protectorate, but she would find 
inconvenience in declaring such an arrangement at present. A suggestion has been made that 
Russia, in order to prevent Japan from questioning her present proceedings, may lead the King 
of Korea again to declare himself China’s vassal. Having regard to this possibility, do you think 
that the Japanese Government would be disposed to agree to a declaration of Korean neutrality, 
if such a proposal were advanced?212 
 
In response, Japanese Foreign Minister Mutsu Munemitsu asked Britain to answer four questions: 
whether Britain would take the initiatives entirely; what powers have been approached; whether other 
countries had given Britain any encouragement; and what is Britain’s opinion on Russia’s possible 
attitude to the proposal. When the suggestion was made, the Japanese Legation in Seoul was very 
close to reaching a modus vivendi with the Russian Legation in Seoul and thus Satow believed that 
Japan would not take part in such a proposal unless a successful result was guaranteed.213 
On 4 May, Mutsu again said that the proposal for Korean neutrality was “somewhat as a surprise”, 
considering Britain’s indifferent attitude to a possible Russian advance towards ice-free ports or 
Japan’s suggestion for international agreement against Russia. Mutsu admitted that Korea had friendly 
feelings towards China but argued that it was very unlikely that Korea would return to a vassal of China 
because it should have already happened if Russia actually wanted it.  
Furthermore, he asserted that Japan would be exposed to the risk of a Russian protectorate over 
Korea if Japan came into the negotiations but failed to receive sufficient international support. 
Therefore, he asked Salisbury to answer his four questions before discussing the suggestion with the 
Japanese Cabinet.214 Satow also stated that Japan had an impression that Britain was not interested in 
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the affairs of Korea. Britain had ignored Japan’s to receive Britain’s support in the matter. For example, 
after the Japanese Government had announced their non-interference policy in Korea after the 
murder of Queen Min, Japan also asked to the British Government for their view with regard to Japan’s 
announcement, but Japan received any reply. Moreover, Balfour’s speech on Russia’s ice-free ports 
and Salisbury’s answer to Katō with regard to King Kojong’s refuge at the Russian Legation encouraged 
such an impression.215 
On 7 May, Satow telegraphed to Salisbury that Mutsu had been looking forward to an answer to his 
questions from Salisbury.216 However, on 9 May, Salisbury simply replied that “it is not at present in my 
power to give such an engagement as is suggested”.217 To clarify the attitude of Salisbury, Japanese 
Minister in London Katō visited Salisbury and asked about his opinion with regard to the Korean 
question. Salisbury told him that “interested powers should concert with the object of finding a 
remedy”.218 However, he asserted that Britain should participate to a lesser extent even though Britain 
was one of the interested powers. He argued that China, Japan or Russia should take the initiatives in 
negotiation with other neighbours and also revealed his personal opinion that Russia did not seem to 
have an immediate design of swallowing Korea.219 Mutsu, who was disappointed with Salisbury’s 
answer, immediately telegraphed Komura in Seoul and instructed him to sign the modus vivendi.220 
Salisbury’s ill-prepared proposal for the international recognition of Korean neutrality clearly shows 
Britain’s willingness to avoid too much engagement in the Korean affairs. The Japanese Government 
was ready to scrap their modus vivendi with the Russian side and to take the British offer if it was 
favourable. However, until last minute, Salisbury refused to take too much responsibility for the 
negotiation and Mutsu had nothing but negotiating a mutual agreement exclusively with the Russian 
Government. Salisbury’s efforts to bring out an international agreement with regard to the Korean 
neutrality mean that Britain was still unhappy with a Russo-Japanese agreement or a possible Russian 
protectorate over Korea. On the other hand, Mutsu’s anxiety to assure Britain’s firm support for the 
scheme also reveals that the Japanese Government was willing to obtain Britain’s assistance in the 
matter of Korean questions.221 However, British interest in Korea was not sufficiently large enough to 
vigorously convince the Japanese Government in this issue and Britain was still satisfied with the 
maintenance of the status quo. 
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Chapter 2: Anglo-Korean Relations after Kojong’s Refuge at 
the Russian Legation, 1896-7 
 
Min’s Special Mission to the Coronation Ceremony of the Russian Tsar 
 
King Kojong’s flight to the Russian Legation in February 1896 completely changed the status quo 
in Korea. Since their victory over China and the subsequent murder of Queen Min in 1895, Japan 
almost placed Korea under their complete control. However, before long, the Korean King fled from 
the Japanese-occupied palace for the Russian Legation and Russia was enabled to influence the Korean 
Court thanks to the royal presence at their premise. While facing Russian advance to strengthen their 
foothold in Korea by taking advantage of the Korean King’s presence, Japan sought for Britain’s help 
to balance off the Russian penetration and to defend their special interests in the country. However, 
Britain was reluctant to put pressure upon the Russian side on behalf of Japan. Therefore, without 
Britain’s help, Japan had no option but negotiating with Russia to defend their interest in the country. 
While Japan was being forced by Russia to reach an agreement to secure their mutual interest in 
the country, Kojong was willing to challenge Japan’s dominant position in the Korean politics with the 
help of Russia. Although Japan held a dominant position in the country in economic and military terms, 
Kojong learned from the Triple Intervention of 1895 that Japan would not want to risk any conflict 
against Russia. Therefore, once he was under the protection of the Russian side, Kojong swiftly 
announced the reshuffle of the Cabinet and the new appointment of pro-Russian chargé d’affaires s 
immediately after his flight to the Russian Legation. It was also crucial to obtain Russia’s military and 
economic aid because it would not only strengthen their influence enough to balance off Japanese 
penetration into the country but also to fasten the westernisation of Korea’s administration and 
military forces, which would eventually enable the country to maintain its independence against other 
hostile powers. 
One of the most symbolic measures, taken by Kojong to achieve so, was his decision to send a 
special envoy to the coronation of Nicholas II. On 11 March, Min Yong-Hwan was appointed to the 
post of Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary for the coronation ceremony and he 
departed from Seoul on 1 April.222 One of the main purposes for the special mission to the coronation 
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was to proclaim Korea’s independence to the world because it was believed that “every country from 
all the five continents will send special representatives to offer their congratulations”.223  
The appointment of Min Yong-Hwan as the special mission was made approximately only two 
months prior to the coronation to be held on 26 May in St. Petersburg. The assassination of former 
tsar Alexander II and the accession of Tsar Nicholas II were already informed by Russian chargé 
d'affaires Waeber in November and December 1894 but the Korean Court did not mention any 
attempt to send a special representative to the coronation ceremony until March 1896.224 However, 
some pro-Russian figures, such as Yi Pom-Chin and Ou Yoon-Joong, had already prepared for such kind 
of mission to enhance Korea’s relations with Russia, which had been the main objective of Korea’s 
foreign policy since the end of the Sino-Japanese War of 1895.225 For instance, on 9 January 1896, two 
months before the official appointment of Min Yong-Hwan as a special envoy, Yun Chi-Ho was asked 
by Yi Pom-Chin if he would like to join in a special mission to St. Petersburg and later on 26 January, 
Yun Chi-Ho told Ou Yoon-Joong that he wanted to go to St. Petersburg and Ou asked him not to 
mention it to anyone.226 Considering Japan’s dominant influence in the Korean Court since the murder 
of Queen Min, it was almost impossible to send such kind of special mission to St. Petersburg. 
Therefore, after Kojong had escaped from the Japanese-occupied palace and his safety was secured 
by the Russian Legation, the Korean Government could eventually plan to send a special 
representative to the Russian capital.227  
British Consul-general Hillier also believed that the appointment of a Korean envoy for the 
coronation ceremony was made with either “suggestion” or “approval” of Waeber. Hillier was also 
convinced that the special mission was intended to stress ‘the independence and autonomy of Korea’, 
which had been consistently emphasised by Waeber since Kojong’s flight. Apart from its diplomatic 
meaning, Hillier also argued that the special mission was a public acknowledgement to the Russian 
Government for their protection and assistance upon the Korean Government, which had been 
provided by the Russian chargé d’affaires in Seoul.228 Hillier did not give further comments on Min 
Yong-Hwan’s mission to St. Petersburg after his departure from Chemulpo on 1 April. In the same 
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report, he briefly mentioned that he would visit St. Petersburg, Berlin, Paris, London, Washington and 
San Francisco.229 
While Min Yong-Hwan was on his journey to St. Petersburg in April 1896, Hillier reported some 
activities from the Russian side. On 15 April, Hillier reported about three parties of Russian officers 
travelling in Korea but the report was focused on the decrease of the number native insurgents, who 
had risen against the introduction of the so-called top-knot Edict of January 1896.230 He also reported 
that the Russian Government had approved the Korean Government’s proposal to purchase 3,000 
rifles and 600,000 rounds for ammunition, which would be delivered by a Korean steamer from 
Vladivostok. In the same report, he also mentioned that the number of Korean troops had been 
increased by 2,000 men and the forces were under the supervision of Russian officers. However, 
despite the clear fact that Russian officers were taking over the charge of Korean troops, Hillier 
believed that the expansion of the Russian authority was “imperative” because the Korean army under 
the current circumstances were “a useless and undisciplined rabble”, led by officers who lacked “the 
most elementary knowledge of military science”.231 While Japanese officers troops were withdrawing, 
Hillier was convinced that Russia played its role to provide the protection and guidance required for 
the maintenance of the Korean administration. 
Despite Hillier’s opinion that Min’s special mission was merely a diplomatic gesture, the Korean 
Court and the Russian Government were expecting something more than just a moral support. Korea 
was not the only Asian nation who sent a special mission to St. Petersburg. From the Russian 
perspective, the coronation ceremony was a very good excuse to invite three Asian nations to discuss 
the Far Eastern concerns without causing any suspicion from other Western powers. The Chinese 
Government sent Li Hongzhang as a plenipotentiary to discuss Manchurian questions regarding the 
establishment of railways and the lease of Port Arthur. The Japanese Government also appointed 
Yamagata Aritomo as an ambassador plenipotentiary to reach an agreement about the Korean 
questions with St. Petersburg.232 
On the other hand, Kojong instructed him to negotiate an agreement with the Russian Government 
to attain military and economic aid. After attending the coronation ceremony on 24 May as an 
ambassador extraordinary, Min had a meeting with Lobanov to discuss about Min’s request to present 
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his credentials to the tsar on 5 June. During the interview, Min told Lobanov that he had been 
authorised to discuss the following five proposals; 
 
1. Guard for the protection of the King until the Korean army be drilled into a reliable 
force. 
2. Military instructors 
3. Advisors: One for the Royal Household to be near the King; one for the Ministry; one 
for mines, railroads, etc. 
4. Telegraphic connections between Russia and Korea on terms beneficial to both; an 
expert in telegraphic matters 
5. A loan of 3 million Won to cancel the Japanese debt233 
 
Afterwards, Min gave a memo to Lobanov, which said; 
 
“... Koreans, feeling the wrong [the Japanese murder of Queen Min] deeply, look to Russia for 
help - hence the five requests. Russia is the only country which Korea expects to take up the 
responsibility single-handed. Russia’s help would place the government of Korea on a firmer 
basis.”234 
 
The message was obvious: the Korean Government wished to attain Russian support to balance 
off Japanese influence by ‘fighting barbarians with other barbarians’. On the following day, when Min 
could have an audience with the tsar, he once again emphasised the importance of Russia’s help to 
the country; 
 
“It is now in the power of Russia to enable Korea to have a stable government. A joint influence 
of Russia and Japan would breed factional intrigues among Korean officials and produce irritating 
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complications between Russia and Japan. Under such an agreement, either war or in probable 
peace, Korea would be the sufferer. May your Majesty never consent to such an arrangement.”235 
 
Despite Min’s sincere wish to obtain Russian support, the Russian Government seemed rather 
uninterested in the Korean Government’s proposals. After two days from their arrival in Moscow, 
Stein translated the five requests into Russian language and handed the memorandum to Dmitrii 
Kapnist, the director of the Asiatic Department and asked him to show it to Lobanov so that the 
Russian Foreign Minister would be able to discuss their requests during the meeting with the Korean 
delegation. However, Lobanov was unaware of Min’s proposals until the beginning of the meeting. 
Furthermore, even the tsar was reluctant to immediately promise that the Russian Government would 
provide the help that had been requested by the Korean side. Instead, the tsar notified the Korean 
party to discuss the matter with Lobanov and Sergei I. Witte, the Russian Minister of Finance.236 On 7 
June, Min met Witte in hope that he would agree to the proposals. Witte assured him that “Russia is 
fully resolved to keep Korea in order and peace, not allowing Japan or any other country to take or 
trouble Korea”.237 However, he also emphasised that it was not the right time for Russia to take an 
aggressive approach to the Korean questions because the construction of the Trans-Siberian Railway, 
which would significantly enhance the country’s influence in the Far East, was not complete yet.238  
On 13 June, Min met Lobanov again to discuss the proposals. After revealing the tsar’s willingness 
to protect the independence of Korea from Japanese threats, Lobanov rejected Min’s idea of hiring 
many Russian military instructors by saying that “they might come into conflict with the Japanese 
soldiers at Seoul”, he gave the following answers to Min; 
 
1. Our government intends to send an officer to examine into the military affairs of Korea 
and the advisability of sending out Russian instructors. 
2. As for the loan, the Minister of Finance is going to send an expert in financial matters 
for the purpose of examining carefully the condition of the Korean finance and of the state of 
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commerce and agriculture of the country. Upon his report shall depend the willingness or 
unwillingness of our government to advance a loan to Korea. 
3. In regard to the telegraphic connections between Russia and Korea, we are willing to 
connect a Seoul line with the Vladivostok line.239 
 
Being unhappy with Russia’s disagreement with the hiring of military advisor, Min met Kapanist at 
the Foreign Office on 16 June. In this meeting, Min insisted that the guard would be the most 
important of the five requests and questioned why the Korean Government was not allowed to hire 
as many military instructors as they wanted. Kapanist answered that the deployment of the Russian 
guard at the palace would cause political problems, which would turn out to be dangerous rather than 
helpful to the safety of Kojong.240 Instead, Kapanist offered two options; that the Korean King might 
stay in the Russian Legation as long as he would want; or that Kojong would return to his palace 
without a guard but with the full moral assurance of Russia that nobody should harm him.241 Kapanist 
further refused to assure any possibility that Russian troops would enter the palace for the protection 
of the king or send a large number of instructors. Therefore, Min bitterly asked to the Russian 
Government for a written statement of answers to his requests. On 30 June, he received the written 
letter from Lobanov, which stated the following; 
 
1. The King may stay in the Russian Legation as long as he wants. In case he should return 
to his palace, the Russian Government would answer for his safety. A guard will remain in the 
Legation at the disposal of the Russian chargé d’affaires at Seoul.  
2. For military instructors, the Russian government will send an experienced officer of 
high standing to Seoul to negotiate with the Korean Government on the subject. His first object 
in view shall be the organisation of a Korean guard for the King. Another experienced man will 
be sent to examine into the economic conditions of Korea and to find out necessary financial 
measures. 
3. These two confidential officers may act as advisers, under the guide of the Russian 
chargé d’affaires at Seoul. 
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4. The question of the loan will be taken into consideration when the financial condition 
of Korea and its needs be fully known. 
5. Russia consents to connect the landlines of Korea with those of Russia and will give all 
possible assistance to the realisation of the project.242  
 
Comparing with the original proposals made by Min, it is obvious that the Russian Government 
partially agreed to the requests. The request for a Russian guard to the palace, which had been 
emphasised as the most significant matter amongst them, was rejected by the Russian Government. 
The loan proposal was also agreed only if the financial condition of the country would be fully 
examined. The number of Russian advisors was also reduced to two. The only proposal that was 
accepted without any objection was the connection of telegraphic lines between Russia and Korea. 
The agreement was so disappointing that even Min believed that his diplomatic mission to St. 
Petersburg was a complete failure.243 
There are two main reasons why Min failed to achieve its original aims. The first was the shift of 
Russian interest from Korea to Manchuria since 1895. After Russia’s diplomatic victory over Japan in 
the Triple Intervention, the Chinese Government was convinced that they would need a military 
alliance with other power in case of future collisions with Japan. Before the first Sino-Japanese War, 
Britain and China saw each other as an important strategic partner. However, after Britain had not 
shown any support for the Chinese side during the war and the Triple Intervention against Japanese 
concession, China sought a new military partner and Russia was the most suitable one because unlike 
France, whom China fought over Vietnam in the 1880s, or Germany, who shared no border with China, 
Russia was able to deploy its troops to the Chinese territory in case of war.244 
On the other side, Russia now became interested in the lease of Port Arthur, an ice-free port at 
the end of the Liaodong Peninsula. Witte especially wanted to place the region under the sphere of 
Russian influence by constructing the Trans-Siberian Railways through Manchuria and connecting it to 
Port Arthur and Vladivostok. Therefore, even though Russia was interested in gaining an ice-free port 
in Korea since the 1880s, Russia’s focus of the Far Eastern policy moved from Korea to China and St. 
Petersburg also took a possibility of an alliance with China into consideration.245 Therefore, when Li 
Hongzhang visited St. Petersburg for the coronation ceremony, both parties signed a secret alliance, 
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which stipulated their mutual military cooperation if Japan invaded Russia, China or Japan. The Russo-
Chinese alliance also allowed the Russian Government to construct the Trans-Siberian Railways 
through Heilongjiang and Jilin, which would be connected to Vladivostok.246  
The second was the Moscow Protocol, signed between the Russian and the Japanese Governments. 
Since Manchuria became Russia’s primary strategic concern in the Far East, it was necessary for Russia 
to compromise with the Japanese Government to maintain their current interest in Korea. Japan also 
believed that they could not afford any full-scale war against Russia over the dominance of Korea at 
that time, especially since the Russian influence was significantly increased after Kojong’s flight to the 
Russian Legation in Seoul in February 1896. Therefore, after negotiations between the Russian and 
Japanese ministers in Seoul, which resulted in the Waeber-Komura memorandum was signed on 14 
May, the arrangement was further discussed between Lobanov and Japanese ambassador 
plenipotentiary Yamagata Aritomo. On 9 June, both parties signed the Moscow Protocol, which stated 
the following clauses; 
 
Public articles 
1. The Russian and Japanese governments, with a view to removing financial difficulties 
of Korea, will advise the Korean government to curtail superfluous expenditures and to 
establish a balance between expenditures and revenues. If, as the result of the urgency of some 
reforms, it will be necessary to resort to foreign loans, the two governments will assist it by 
common efforts. 
2. The Russian and Japanese governments will try to leave it entirely up to Korea, insofar 
as the financial and economic condition of the country permits, to form and maintain 
indigenous armed forces and police in a number sufficient for the maintenance of general 
order without foreign assistance. 
3. In order to facilitate communication with Korea, the Japanese government will retain 
the management of the telegraph lines now in its hands; the establishment of telegraphic 
communication between Seoul and her own border is granted to Russia; these lines can be 
redeemed by the Korean government when it will have the necessary funds for it.  
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4.  Should the above require more exact and detailed definition or if other questions arise 
requiring negotiations, the respective representatives of the governments will be instructed to 
come to an amicable agreement regarding such matters. 
 
Secret articles 
1. Should the tranquillity and order in Korea be disturbed or seriously endangered as the 
result of some internal or external cause and should the Russian and Japanese governments, 
by common accord, judge it necessary to come to the aid of the local authorities by means of 
sending troops in addition to the number necessary for the security of their nationals and the 
protection of their telegraph lines, the two imperial governments, desirous of preventing any 
collision between their armed forces, will determine the sphere of action reserved for each in 
such a way as to leave a space free of occupation between the troops of the two governments. 
2. Until the formation in Korea of the necessary forces, mentioned in article 2 of the 
public clauses of the present protocol, the provisional arrangement signed by State Counsellor 
Waeber and Mr Komura regarding the rights of Russia and Japan to maintain an equal number 
of troops in the kingdom remains in force. As for the personal security of the king, the 
procedure established for this purpose will likewise be preserved until the formation of an 
indigenous detachment especially intended for this service.247  
 
When Min met Lobanov and discussed his five proposals for the first time on 5 June, Lobanov was 
already very close to reaching an agreement with the Japanese side. Lobanov and Yamagata discussed 
a variety of issues to deal with Korean questions and to recognise each other’s influence in the 
country.248  The signing of the Moscow Protocol was very important for the Russian government 
because it enabled Russia to check Japan’s influence that had been dominant since the murder of 
Queen Min of 1895. Furthermore, the Russian government could ensure the territorial integrity and 
independence of Korea. The Moscow Protocol also stipulated that both governments should take joint 
action in the country and Russia’s exclusive rights to protect the Korean King at the Russian Legation. 
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Therefore, comparing to the significance of the Moscow Protocol, Min’s proposal was a neglectable 
concern.249  
Furthermore, once Lobanov signed the Moscow Protocol, which prohibited unilateral military 
action in the country, the acceptance of Min’s proposals for military and economic aid would violate 
the Russo-Japanese agreement and eventually lead to a fresh confrontation against Japan. Lobanov 
or Kapanist refused to give a clear answer to Min’s request for a Russian guard at the Korean palace 
but insisted that such an intervention would lead into a political turmoil or international conflict.250 
The Russian Government also refused send a large number of military advisors for the organisation of 
the Korean army. Min’s request for a Russian loan of three million Won was also difficult to approve 
not only because it would violate the Moscow Protocol, but also because the Russian government was 
financially struggling with the construction of the Trans-Siberian railways and their treasury was 
already relying on a French loan.251  
 The British Government vaguely assumed that Min might have signed a political agreement with 
the Russian Government when British ambassador at St. Petersburg Nicholas Roderick O’Conor called 
on Min Yong-Hwan and met him in St. Petersburg. According to his report, Min confessed that “he 
was confused by all he saw” and “feared that he was too old to understand the western system of 
administration and life”.252 Min also felt sorry that the country was in a dangerous situation and he 
was useless to do anything to help the Korean King.253 Considering the date of the report, O’Conor 
might have had this conversation in the mid-June, when Min failed to persuade the Russian 
Government to accept their proposals with regard to a guard and military advisors. By then, Min 
realised that the Russian Government would not want to be a protector of the nation any more. His 
conversation with O’Conor indicate his bitter disappointment with the Russian side. 
Although the British Government did not realise that Min and Lobanov reached a secret agreement 
regarding the sending of advisors and telegraphic lines, they were aware that the Russian and 
Japanese ministers in Seoul started a negotiation to settle the current confrontation in the country.254 
The articles of the Waeber-Komura memorandum were kept in secret even after the signing on 14 
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May. However, British minister at Tokyo Ernest Satow managed to gain some information about the 
agreement and drew a conclusion that it was only of a provisional character and it was only meant to 
avoid any collision between the armed forces of the two governments stationing in Korea. He also 
assured London that the paper would contain nothing that could probably affect British interests in 
the country. 255  It seems likely that Satow believed the Waeber-Komura memorandum was only 
required to solve the current local issues. 
However, when it was reported that Lobanov and Yamagata had concluded a definite arrangement 
regarding Korea, London was anxious to find out the details of the agreement. 256  Immediately 
afterwards, British diplomats in Japan and Europe contacted Japanese statesmen, including Japanese 
Foreign Minister Aoki Shūzō and Vice-Foreign Minister Hara Takashi, and asked them what terms had 
been agreed with the Russian Government in justification that the British government was just 
naturally curious of what arrangements had been made regarding Korea, on account for Britain’s 
commercial interests in the country.257 
Obviously, when Satow was informed of the Lobanov-Yamagata protocol, it was almost two weeks 
after the agreement had been concluded. However, Japanese diplomats insisted that nothing definite 
had been settled yet. For instance, when Aoki was asked by British ambassador in Berlin Martin 
Gosselin about a possible agreement between the two governments, he admitted that the 
arrangement had been briefly mentioned during meetings but denied that anything had been 
settled.258 Hara also gave Satow a similar statement that nothing had been settled.259 
There might be various reasons why the Japanese government was reluctant to share the details 
of their agreement with the Russian Government. Tokyo might have been still disappointed with the 
lack of British support when Japan was struggling with the increase of Russian influence in Korea. For 
instance, in April 1896, London suddenly suggested the international recognition of Korean neutrality 
to the Japanese government, but they refused to take a leading role when the Japanese government 
seriously asked to do so. However, it seemed more likely that the Japanese government simply did 
not want to reveal the terms of the arrangement. Especially, the first clause allowed Russia and Japan 
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to interfere with the financial administration of Korea, which was already under British influence via 
Financial Advisor and Chief-Commissioner of Korean Customs John McLeavy Brown. 
Thanks to the signing of the Russo-Japanese protocol and Russo-Chinese alliance that were signed 
during the visit of Asian representatives, Russia successfully strengthened its foothold in the Far East 
without making too much commitment to the negotiations with the Korean Government. Because 
Russia wanted to increase their influence in Manchuria by avoiding any further collision with Japan 
over the region, the Russian government rejected any military-related proposals from Min, which 
would probably cause another conflict over the Korean peninsula. From the Korean point of view, the 
secret agreement between Min and Lobanov was a bitter failure since they could not obtain Russia’s 
military protection to the King. However, on the other hand, the Min-Lobanov agreement justified 
Russia’s intervention by granting them the rights to send military and economic advisors. 
 
The Increase of Russia’s Influence in Korea 
 
Since the Korean administration and army were under the Russian influence, Russian firms started 
to exploit their dominant position in the country and attempted to obtain concessions. On 22 April 
1896, the Korean Government granted the mining concession of opening gold mines in Hamgyŏng 
Province to Russian nationals.260 According to the terms of the agreement, the Russian company 
should pay 25% of the gold or gold dust that were obtained from the mine.261 From other foreign 
businessmen’s perspectives, the 25 per cent royalty was so high that it would leave no profit for the 
concessionaires or too little profit to attract other investors into the venture. Therefore, it was 
generally believed that Russian companies had gained the mining concessions mainly for their political 
advantages and the monopoly of mining rights.262 
Of course, Russia was not the only power that was seeking for concessions from the Korean 
Government. A French firm showed its interest in making bid for the right to construct a railway from 
Seoul to Ŭiju, a city near the Chinese border while Japanese capitalists were willing to obtain a railway 
concession that would connect Seoul and Busan. An American firm was asking for the right to establish 
a railway line between Seoul and Chemulpo. A German party openly revealed its interest in railway 
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and mining concessions as well. Despite the objection from local communities, whose interests would 
be seriously affected if those concessions were granted to foreign firms, foreign representatives were 
quite confident that those firms would eventually obtain the rights for railway construction and 
mining.263 Britain was no exception to the scramble for Korea. When Alfred Burt Stripling, a British 
national and a foreign advisor to the Korean Police Department who had resided in Korea since 1883, 
applied for the grant of mining concession, Hillier asked to British minister in Beijing Claude Maxwell 
MacDonald for instruction as to what extent he should support the application from a man with 
limited resources.264  
Amongst many applications from foreign firms, one application from a French company, backed 
by French Consul Victor Collin de Plancy, was particularly outstanding due to the scale of its demands. 
In addition to the construction rights of a railway line between Seoul and Ŭiju, the French firm also 
requested its mining rights within 20 miles wide on either side of the railway line.265 Waeber criticised 
that the French proposal was far too excessive. However, despite his heavy criticism of the French 
offer, Waeber did not reject it even though he had enough power and influence in the Korean Court 
to do so. 266  Furthermore, Waeber even revealed his wish that the gauge of the railway to be 
constructed by the French firm should be the same as that in use on the Russian railways but such 
kind of regulation was never imposed upon the American firm.267  Therefore, McLeavy Brown, who 
was generally in charge of the finance and customs of the country, believed that Collin de Plancy and 
Waeber might be working together in this scheme and that “Russian schemes are being promulgated 
under a French disguise”.268. 
The signing of the Min-Lobanov secret agreement on 30 June was the turning point of Russia’s 
Korea policy. During the arrangement negotiations in Russia, Min failed to attain Russia’s military 
protection or a loan of three million Won to clear off the Japanese debt. However, what the Russian 
Government agreed with the sending of one military advisor and one economic expert who would 
examine the current military and financial situations of the country.  
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The first was the arrival of D. D. Pokotilow, the director of the Russo-Chinese Bank in Shanghai. 
Since Pokotilow came to Seoul in order to investigate into the financial status of the Korean 
administration before offering a loan of three million Won, the British Consulate-general in Seoul 
correctly assumed that the loan offer had been requested by Min Yong-Hwan during his visit to 
Russia.269 As was discussed previously, the main purpose of the proposed Russian loan was to pay off 
the remaining due of the Japanese loan of 1895, which had been forced by the Japanese Government 
in order to keep the Korean government under the control by financial means. Japan and Korea agreed 
that the loan should be repaid half-yearly at Tokyo and the Korean Government was expected to repay 
all the loan by no later than December 1898 or December 1899. 
Therefore, when British Vice-Consul at Chemulpo William Henry Wilkinson heard of the Russian 
loan offer, he was convinced that it would easily free the country from its financial duty to Japan. 
However, meanwhile, he doubted “whether she would be wise in doing so at the cost of strengthening 
the hold of Russia”.270 The terms of Russia’s proposed loan were very similar to those of the current 
loan agreement with Japan, which included the same amount of money and the same half-yearly 
instalment to repay the debt. However, the only difference was the period for redemption. In the case 
of the proposed Russian loan, the period should not be shorter than twenty-five years.271 The Russian 
loan clearly intended to reduce Japanese influence upon the Korean Government by repaying the 
Japanese debt so as to release the Korean Government from financial obligation to the Japanese 
Government 
However, despite Russia’s ambition behind the loan offer, McLeavy Brown was convinced that 
Russia would be a better creditor of the Korean Government than Japan.272 He did not mention the 
reason why he preferred Russia to Japan as a creditor, but he might have believed in Russia’s 
announcement to respect the independence of Korea and their efforts to persuade other foreign 
powers. Moreover, thanks to the Franco-Russian alliance of 1894, Russia had access to Europe’s banks 
and markets and therefore the Russian Government had better financial options to support the 
Korean Government than Japan did. 
Nevertheless, before long, McLeavy Brown started to doubt if the Russian offer had any intention 
rather than the repayment of the Japanese debt. That doubt was triggered by the appointment of Min 
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Yong-Hwan as Minister Plenipotentiary to Great Britain, Germany, Russia, Italy, France and Austria in 
January 1897.273 Although Min was meant to cover diplomatic duties with various European powers, 
John Jordan, then acting British consul general in Seoul, assumed that his main diplomatic missions 
would be exercised in St. Petersburg because of Min’s previous experience to visit St. Petersburg as 
Minister Plenipotentiary and his current War Minister title that required close partnership with the 
Russian Legation and their military officers.274 Jordan believed that Kojong’s diplomatic plan was to 
revive the country’s failed attempts to raise its profile in the international society by diplomatic 
activities in the 1880s, when Korea was struggling with China’s claim for suzerainty over the country. 
He also pointed out that the reason why Kojong’s diplomatic manoeuvres failed was because of the 
lack of financial resources and predicted that they would have the same problem again since the 
financial situation had not been significantly improved since then.275 
McLeavy Brown, who oversaw the country’s financial administration, also thought that this mission 
was an “act of folly” and tried to persuade the King that the mission should be aborted. Despite such 
criticism, Waeber did not give any objection to the mission when Kojong asked him for any suggestion 
or advice. McLeavy Brown thus blamed that Waeber had been encouraging the King to spend an 
excessive amount of money for such an expensive but decorative diplomatic mission. McLeavy Brown 
suspected that Waeber might deliberately attempt to create deficit in the Korean finance, which 
would make the Korean Government eventually accept the Russian loan offer.276 Furthermore, by 
February 1897, Jordan was also convinced that “there is absolutely no necessity for a loan at the 
present time” if the Korean Government continued to manage its financial affairs in the present 
conditions. Apparently, there was a balance of 1,800,000 Won in the treasury and it was sufficient to 
pay off the instalment of Japanese loan for December 1898.277 British diplomats in Seoul believed that 
the proposed loan intended to place the country under the Russian influence regardless of Korea’s 
financial situations. 
Japanese minister in Seoul Katō Masuo was more anxious about the proposal of the Russian loan. 
Because the terms of the Russian loan offer were very similar to the existing agreement with Japan, 
the customs revenue of Korea would be held as security if the Russian loan was eventually accepted 
by the Korean Government. However, Katō stressed that the customs revenue could not be pledged 
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for any other purpose until the Japanese loan was paid off under the current agreement regarding the 
Japanese loan.278 As was instructed by the Japanese Government, he demanded an explanation from 
Waeber of the Russian Government’s intention behind the loan offer. In response, Waeber 
emphasised that neither he nor the Russian Government had any link with the loan offer and argued 
that it was only a commercial scheme that had been initiated by the Russo-Chinese Bank.279 Katō 
already knew that the Russian Legation imposed a high level of pressure upon the Korean Government 
to accept the loan. However, Katō did not put further questions to Waeber regarding the offer of a 
Russian loan after the Korean Finance Minister assured that there was a balance of more than 
2,000,000 Won in the treasury and that the Korean Government would request a Russian loan only if 
their financial situations required such measure.280 Thus, the offer of a Russian offer was indefinitely 
postponed.  
While the offer of a Russian loan was meant to increase its financial influence in the country, the 
sending of military officers aimed to take over the control of the nation’s military forces. In the late 
October 1896, when Envoy Extraordinary Min Yong-Hwan returned from St. Petersburg through 
Siberia and Vladivostok, a detachment of Russian officers and non-commissioned officers, led by 
Colonel Dmitrii Vasil'evich Putiata, accompanied Min in all his journey and arrived at Chemulpo. The 
nominal objective of the military mission was to drill and organise the Korean army, which would be 
a fundamental condition for Kojong’s return to the palace. However, Jordan had no doubt that their 
real intention was to “strengthen and perpetuate the semi-protectorate with Russia has established 
over this country”.281  He also believed that what this Russian mission wanted was a Russian-drilled 
force, who would protect the Korean King after his departure from the Russian Legation. By doing so, 
Jordan thought that the Russian-drilled guard would serve as an “equally effective and a less overt 
machinery for controlling the Korean administration”.282 
Although the number of the Russian military officers was not as high as Min Yong-Hwan had 
expected during his negotiations with Lobanov, Kojong seemed satisfied with the arrival of these 
Russian officers. On 14 November 1896, when Jordan had an opportunity to look at a rough plan of 
Kyŏngun’gung Palace, Kojong’s new residence, he found that a block of several buildings was assigned 
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to two Russian lieutenants and ten Russian non-commissioned officers.283 Kojong clearly wanted to 
have them within the palace and probably even expected to provide the protection for the safety of 
the King in case of emergency. In November 1896, the Korean army had 7,500 men, 4,000 of whom 
be stationed in Seoul. However, due to consistent uprisings outside Seoul, half of them were sent to 
suppress the insurgents. Russian officers kept approximately 800 men under their command and they 
would be replaced by a fresh unit returning to Seoul. The Russian mission and the Korean Ministry of 
War were looking forward to drilling the whole army through this rotation system.284  
Despite his suspicion of the real intention of the Russian military mission, it is worth noting that 
the British consulate-general in Seoul did not show any objection or joint appeal to the Russian 
Legation. Jordan believed that Korean troops were very undisciplined and poorly equipped. Therefore, 
although Jordan was aware that the Russian-drilled Korean forces could be their tool to take the 
Korean King as hostage and control the Korean Government in case of emergency, Jordan had to admit 
that the reorganisation of the current army would much more important to provide the sufficient 
protection for the King at his palace, which would be a significant step to stress the independence of 
the country. 
Furthermore, later in June 1897, according to the report by Captain Mercer on the Korean army, 
he pointed out that the quality of the troops was significantly improved since the arrival of Colonel 
Putiata and his officers.285 Putiata inspected the current troops and selected the best officers, non-
commissioned officers and soldiers and organised them into a regiment with about 900 men of all 
ranks. Afterwards, their old-fashioned rifles were all replaced by new Berdan rifles purchased from 
Vladivostok. Then the reorganised Korean troops went through a series of personal training, squad-
company-battalion level drills and shooting range.286 Mercer believed that the outcomes were very 
impressive. Since the Korean army had a good supply of recruits, the Russian officers selected only the 
strongest and best volunteers. Therefore, he believed that the reorganised Korean troops were 
physically good and capable of performing their duties.  
Despite such achievements, Mercer also reported some limitations of the mission. Firstly, by June 
1897, the Russian officers managed to drill the only one regiment that had been reorganised by 
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themselves even though the Korean Government had an ambitious plan to train the whole army 
gradually. Secondly, he also believed that the troops had discipline issues because the Korean soldiers 
did not seem to feel “the necessity for vigilance and smartness when on their posts”.287 Thirdly, the 
Korean army did not have any artillery or any knowledge of how to use artillery. The lack of artillery 
regiments would severely limit the operational capacities of the Korean army in case of war.288 Lastly, 
he pointed out that the greatest problem of the Korean army was “the corruptness and cowardness 
of the native officers” and he showed his opinion that the Korean officers could not be improved 
significantly “however much they are trained in peacetime”.289 However, in general, Mercer believed 
that the Russian military officers did a great job to train the Koreans, “by nature a timid race”, so that 
the army were now able to be excellent guerrilla forces with the knowledge of the country.290 
Seeing what happened after the arrival of Russian financial and military advisors, it is obvious that 
their activities in Korea intended to increase the influence of the Russian Government in the country. 
The offer of a Russian loan not only aimed to release Korea from their financial obligation for the 
Japanese Government but also wanted to financially force the Korean Government to rely on the 
Russian side for next 25 years. The Russian military mission brought about 900 strongest native troops 
in Seoul and organised into a regiment armed with new rifles and then formed a good relationship 
with the troops while training them in Russian. British diplomats in Seoul worried that these measures 
would significantly strengthen the Russian presence in the Korean Government, which had been 
already enhanced by hosting Kojong at their legation since February 1896. 
These actions were against the main principle of Britain’s Korea policy at that time: to maintain 
the independence and autonomy of Korea by reforming its administration and finance. Thanks to 
McLeavy Brown’s management of the Korean customs and treasury, the financial situations of Korea 
had been greatly improved since 1896 and thus the proposed Russian loan, together with Waeber’s 
toleration of Kojong’s extravagant expenditures, was only seen by British diplomats as a plot to exploit 
the improved finance of the country and to make the Korean Government reliant on the Russian 
support. 
However, despite the ambitious actions from the Russian Government, the British consulate-
general in Seoul did not overtly appeal or object to such schemes until the Japanese Government’s 
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opposition stopped the Russian Legation from pushing the matter further. British representatives in 
Korea were reluctant to take any pre-emptive measure to stop such activities as the loan offer or 
military mission until they were duly executed. In case of the military mission, British diplomats and 
military officers were convinced that the Russian-drilled would be an “equally effective and a less overt 
machinery for controlling the Korean administration”. 291  However, when they believed that the 
modernisation of the Korean army was more urgent than the concern of the Korean troops falling 
under the control of a Western power, they did not oppose to it. Britain’s such responses were in line 
with their ‘non-interference policy’, which was the other fundamental principle of their Korea policy. 
 
Kojong’s Return to the Palace and the Change of Korea’s Foreign Policy 
 
The Russian Government significantly increased its influence in the country and challenged Japan’s 
dominant position by taking advantage of the presence of Kojong at the Russian Legation. Before 
fleeing to the Russian Legation, Kojong felt that his life and safety were threatened by the Japanese 
garrisons next to the palace and pro-Japanese ministers within the Korean Court, some of whom had 
been involved in the murder of Queen Min in October 1895. Therefore, Kojong had no willingness to 
leave the Russian Legation unless he was guaranteed any military guard from Russia, who was 
currently offering the protection of Kojong’s safety. 
As is discussed earlier, when Min Yong-Hwan was sent as Minister Plenipotentiary to the Russian 
capital and negotiated with Lobanov to obtain a Russian guard to protect the palace for the King; 
military advisors to reorganise the Korean army; a Russian loan to pay off the Japanese debt; and the 
connection of telegraphic lines between Korea and Russia. Lobanov, who was in talks with Yamagata 
over Korean questions, had no intention to offer any military protection outside the Russian Legation 
in fear that it would eventually violate his agreement with Japan. Min Yong-Hwan consistently argued 
that the Russian guard was the most important one amongst his five proposals and that the guarantee 
of Russian military protection was crucial for the safety of the Korean King. Despite Min’s persistence, 
Lobanov only assured that the Korean King would be allowed to stay at the Russian Legation as long 
as he wanted and promised that the Russian Government would send the military mission to re-
organise and drill the native troops until they could protect the Korean King at the palace.  
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It is not a coincidence that in mid-August 1896, Kojong requested McLeavy Brown to supervise and 
plan the repair work of Kyŏngun’gung Palace. Kojong announced that the main purpose of the repair 
of Kyŏngun’gung Palace was “to provide a temporary resting place for the Queen’s remains and 
wherein her son the Crown Prince may with safety attend to the prescribed rituals”.292 However, since 
Kojong must have been reported that Russia was unwilling to provide a palace guard for the protection 
of Kyŏngbokkung Palace by then, the real intention of the repair work was to have a residence in the 
foreign district of the Korean capital, surrounded by foreign legations including the British consulate-
general.293 To Jordan, the next question would be whether Kojong would ask for a Russian guard “by 
personal fears or external pressure”. He believed that Korea’s reliance upon Russia would be 
continuously strong if the Russian government agreed with the request. Otherwise, Russia would lose 
the advantage of hosting the Korean King as well as its influence upon the Korean Court. Meanwhile, 
he also worried that the Korean King would take refuge again at nearby legations including the 
American or British buildings if any threatening incident occurred at his residence after his departure 
from the Russian Legation.294   
Jordan was unaware of the Min-Lobanov agreement that had been already concluded on 30 June. 
Russia already refused to provide a Russian guard at Kyŏngbokkung Palace, where he had resided 
before his refuge at the Russian Legation, in fear that it would cause another conflict with the Japanese 
Government. Therefore, when Kojong issued his intention to repair Kyŏngun’gung Palace, Kojong was 
already aware that he would not have a Russian guard next to his Kyŏngbokkung Palace. That is why 
Kojong particularly wanted this palace to be repaired because it was in Chŏngdong District, a foreign 
quarter where Kojong would take refuge at a foreign legation much easier. 
After the completion of the expansion work of Kyŏngun’gung Palace at the end of 1896, Kojong 
had his first New Year reception for foreign representatives outside the Russian Legation for the first 
time since his flight but it was reported that Kojong would not move into this palace until the spring 
of the year. Jordan hinted that the King’s return to the new palace was delayed because there was a 
still large party that wanted Kojong to stay at the Russian Legation.295 However, later in the early 
February 1897, Kojong firmly decided to move into the new palace and even stayed overnight at the 
Kyŏngun’gung Palace on 1 February, which was the first time for Kojong to stay outside the Russian 
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Legation since his refuge in the previous year. Jordan also assured Korean high-rank officials that the 
new palace and its neighbourhood would be of no danger to the King when he was asked about the 
safety of the area.296  
Waeber was unhappy with Kojong’s decision to return to the new palace. When Kojong’s decree 
with regard to the return to the royal palace was handed to Waeber for his approval, Waeber opposed 
to the plan on the basis that it was too early for the King to move out of the Russian Legation and 
expose himself to possible danger.297 However, Putiata’s military mission had successfully drilled the 
Korean palace guard and thus by mid-December 1896 they were able to assume the protection of the 
palace under the charge of Russian non-commissioned officers.298 The improvement of a Russian-
drilled guard ironically justified Kojong’s will to return to the palace. However, it was still satisfactory 
for Russia because they could maintain their dominant influence upon the Korean Government thanks 
to the Korean troops under the charge of their military mission.299  
On the other hand, Kojong was under the pressure of Korean officials and public, who had 
consistently demanded that the King should immediately leave the Russian Legation “for the sake of 
the royal ancestors and the subjects who were seriously worried about the fate of the country”.300 
Since the Russian government refused to offer any military protection of Kyŏngbokkung Palace during 
Min’s negotiations with Lobanov, his only other option was Kyŏngun’gung Palace. By taking up his 
residence at this palace, he could show to foreign representatives and his people that the King stepped 
out of the Russian Legation to strengthen the independence of the country. Also, since the new palace 
was surrounded by foreign residences and legations, any hostile party against the King would have to 
risk possible foreign interventions if they planned any attack similar to the murder of Queen Min. 
Furthermore, if such incidents happened, then the King would be able to take refuge at the British or 
American legations next to the palace.  
Furthermore, he was willing to move into Kyŏngun’gung Palace soon because the construction of 
the palace was almost complete. After his overnight stay at the palace, he was so pleased with the 
new palace that he announced a decree encouraging the construction work, “which had been 
postponed due to the cold weather during winter season” and also stating he would take up his 
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residence at Kyŏngun’gung Palace “when it gets warmer and flowers start to blossom”.301 Moreover, 
when Cho Byung-Shik asked him for his return to Kyŏngun’gung Palace on 11 February, Kojong refused 
Cho’s request on the ground that “the construction has not been finished yet”.302 Having based on 
these factors, British representatives were also convinced that the King would move into 
Kyŏngun’gung Palace “sometime in March or early in April at the earliest”.303 However, despite their 
expectations, on 18 February Kojong suddenly announced his attention to return to Kyŏngun’gung 
Palace and on 20 February he moved into the new palace and issued a decree to appeal to the nation. 
In his decree, Kojong announced that he had moved to the new palace “satisfy the hearts of the 
people”, who had become “anxious over their staying in a foreign legation”.304  
By then, Kojong maintained a close relationship with Waeber. For instance, when Kojong 
appointed Min Yong-Hwan as Minister Plenipotentiary to Great Britain, Germany, Russia, Italy, France 
and Austria in January 1897,305 McLeavy Brown told him that this mission was an “act of folly” because 
it would impose too much financial burden.306 Despite such criticisms, Kojong insisted on sending a 
mission to Europe because of the rumour that the Russian Government had wanted to replace Waeber 
by Speyer. Min Yong-Hwan was to be instructed by Kojong to persuade the Russian czar that Waeber 
should remain in Seoul.307  
However, Kojong’s reliance upon Waeber was questioned when on 26 February Japanese Foreign 
Minister Okuma Shigenobu released the Waeber-Komura memorandum and Lobanov-Yamagata 
protocol that had been signed in 1896. On 18 February, Okuma informed Satow that the Japanese 
Government had decided to release the Lobanov-Yamagata protocol because “it was not a very 
important document and [the Japanese Foreign Minister] saw no reason why it should not be given to 
the world”.308 Even though Okuma argued that the Russo-Japanese agreements were insignificant, 
they were sufficiently powerful to make Kojong feel betrayed by whom Kojong had always seen as “a 
friend of Korea”.309 Kojong was a refugee at the Russian Legation when Waeber and Komura signed a 
memorandum in Seoul and Min Yong-Hwan was negotiating over a Russian support for the 
 
301 2 February 1897, Vol. 35, Kojong Silok. 
302 11 February 1897, Vol. 35, Kojong Silok. 
303 Satow to Salisbury, 18 February 1897, FO 405/73.  
304 Extract from “The Independent” of February 25, 1897, FO 405/73.  
305 11 January 1897, Vol. 35, Kojong Silok. 
306 Jordan to MacDonald, 14 January 1897, FO 405/73.  
307 Jordan to MacDonald, 18 January 1897, FO 405/73.  
308 Satow to Salisbury, 18 February 1897, FO 405/73. 
309 Jordan to MacDonald, 10 March 1897, FO 405/73. 
79 
 
independence of the country while Lobanov and Yamagata was discussing about the fate of Korea. 
Therefore, Japan’s release of the Russo-Japanese agreements clearly gave an impression that Russia 
was not a protector of the nation but another hostile power to exploit the country.310  
The Korean Government was so shocked by the existence of secret agreements between Russia 
and Japan and approached the representatives of both countries for an exploration of the reasons 
why both Governments had decided to start negotiations on issues that would eventually affect the 
integrity of Korea without consulting its government. In response, on 2 March, Japanese minister Katō 
replied that the main objective of the agreements was not to affect the independence of Korea but to 
“strengthen and consolidate” the integrity of the country and a week later, the Korean foreign minister 
replied that the terms and clauses of the agreements should not be considered as in any way 
restraining the freedom of action which the Korean Government possessed as an independent 
state.311  
Despite the Korean Government’s official announcement consenting to the agreements between 
Russia and Japan and acknowledging their good will to maintain the independence of the state, the 
existence of the secret agreements enraged Kojong and Korean ministers. Waeber argued in defence 
of his action that the agreement had successfully reduced the number of Japanese troops in Korea 
from 3,500 to 1,000 and stipulated that at least 200 of 1,000 should be military policemen instead of 
soldiers.312  However, it was also undeniably true that the agreement stipulated the despatch of 
Russian troops into the country, which could pose additional threat upon the Korean Government in 
favour of the Russian Government. 
Since then, Russia, once a friend of Korea, became a potential threat to the country and the foreign 
policy of the Korean Government was also adjusted accordingly. The Korean Government started to 
look for a new foreign Power who would check the penetration of Japan and Russia since both 
countries had now become “two evils”.313 In March 1897, immediately after Kojong’s return to the 
palace, it was Great Britain whose support the Korean Government wanted to have. Kojong believed 
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that Great Britain was “amongst the first to open up intercourse with his kingdom and whose political 
and commercial interests in the peninsula gave her a claim to a voice in Korean affairs”.314  
Therefore, on 28 March, when British Minister in Beijing Claude MacDonald visited Seoul and had 
an audience with Kojong, he revealed his hope for MacDonald to report to London his willingness to 
obtain Britain’s sympathy and support for the continuing independence of the country. Kojong also 
asked if the British Government would be interested in making an appeal to other Great Powers for 
an international guarantee that would secure the position of Korea as an independent state. 315 
Kojong’s suggestion seemed similar to Britain’s proposal for an international guarantee to neutralise 
the Korean Peninsula, which had been already suggested by Salisbury to the Japanese Government in 
April 1896, a month before the signing of Waeber-Komura memorandum that had stipulated mutual 
agreements between Russia and Japan regarding Korea. Even though London had once considered 
the international guarantee of the country independence, the neutralisation of Korea was not actively 
pushed forward by the British Government due to lack of preparation and Britain’s reluctance to 
interfere with Korean affairs, which might eventually result in an international conflict against other 
parties concerned. Jordan still believed that the Korean Government was expecting to secure an 
international guarantee for the independence of Korea, to which he believed that it would be 
“premature, and perhaps unwise, to attach much importance”. Amongst many difficulties, Jordan 
especially mentioned “the incapacity of the Koreans themselves for self-government”, which he 
thought to be the foundation of the country’s independence.316 
MacDonald, who shared the same point of view as Jordan’s, assured that the British Government 
had the greatest interest in the maintenance of the integrity of Korea, but he carefully declined that 
London would take such an action as securing an international guarantee. MacDonald emphasised 
that no foreign power would strive to threaten the independence of Korea if Kojong kept reforming 
and improving the administration of the country and show the world that “his kingdom was being 
governed on progressive lines”.317 MacDonald ensured that Kojong might depend on Britain’s friendly 
sympathy and goodwill if he continued to benefit his people by running a “stable and progressive 
government”. MacDonald’s opinion on Kojong’s suggestion for the international guarantee of Korean 
independence indicates that from the British perspective Korea had not reached a level to self-govern, 
which was the crucial foundation of Britain’s Korea policy, and believed that any form of international 
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guarantee would be pointless if the state was too weak to resist other foreign powers’ offers and 
threats. 
A conversation between MacDonald and Japanese Minister in Seoul Katō Masuo on the next day 
also provides additional understanding of Britain’s Korea policy. During his conversation, MacDonald 
admitted that commercial rivalry existed between British and Japanese merchants in the Korean 
market since both countries shared the foreign trade of Korea. Despite the existing commercial rivalry, 
MacDonald and Katō agreed that two governments were equally interested in the maintenance of the 
independence of Korea for the foreign trade. They also consented that both governments were 
expecting Korea to establish and maintain a stable administration that would “enable the country to 
gradually work out its own development”. 318  MacDonald particularly underlined that “British 
influence”, which indicates the role of McLeavy Brown, had successfully improved the financial 
administration of the country and empowered it to strengthen its independence in reality.319 Katō 
disagreed with MacDonald’s opinion that British stance towards Japan had been very friendly. It is 
possibly because of Britain’s hesitation and reluctance to support Japan’s position in previous 
international events, including the Triple Intervention of 1895 and Russo-Japanese agreements 
regarding Korea in 1896. However, apart from them, Katō acknowledged that both governments 
shared the same interests and that British influence played a positive role in the maintenance of the 
independence of Korea.  
MacDonald’s conversations with Kojong and Katō clearly demonstrated the key elements of 
Britain’s Korea policy: the maintenance of Korean independence was desirable for Britain’s interests 
in the country and it would be achieved by establishing a stable, progressive and self-governing 
administration. They were the main principles of their Korea policy since the end of the Sino-Japanese 
War of 1895. However, as of March 1897, there are two points worth noting. Firstly, British national 
McLeavy Brown was employed by the Korean Government as a financial advisor and assumed full 
control over the Korean treasury. Thanks to his successful management, the financial condition of the 
country was significantly improved, which was very advantageous to run a stable government and to 
enhance the independence of the country that would be also helpful for British interests in Korea. 
Secondly, British and Japanese representatives recognised that both governments shared the 
same interests in the country. Since the end of the Sino-Japanese War, Britain and Japan shared a 
similar strategic interest in Korea, which was to balance off Russian influence from the Korean 
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peninsula. However, when Korean Queen Min was murdered by Japanese assassins, British 
representatives accused the Japanese Government of seriously undermining the integrity of Korea. 
Moreover, when Japan was overwhelmed by a steep increase of Russian influence, which had been 
encouraged by Kojong’s flight to the Russian Legation in February 1896, Japan was forced to have 
bilateral negotiations with Russia regarding Korean questions because of Britain’s reluctance to 
interfere with it. However, by this point, Japan’s stance on Korea policy became closer to that of Britain: 
the maintenance of Korean independence by reforming the Korean Government in a progressive way.  
 
 
4. Russia’s Attempt to Reduce British Influence in the Korean Government: The Case of McLeavy 
Brown 
 
John McLeavy Brown, the chief of the Korean Customs and a financial advisor for the Korean 
Government, was a significant figure for the maintenance of British interests in the country. Since he 
was authorised by Kojong to assume full control over the financial administration of the Government 
in the early 1896, McLeavy Brown effectively controlled the expenditures of the government and 
introduced new taxes on luxury goods. Thus, in his first year, McLeavy Brown successfully managed to 
achieve a surplus revenue income and placed the financial administration in a more stable position.320  
Sound financial condition was crucial for the establishment of a stable government, which Britain 
believed was key principle for the maintenance of Korean independence. Moreover, McLeavy Brown 
took advantage of his position as the controller of the Korean finance and provided important advices 
for British interests. For instance, when foreign firms were attempting to acquire railway concessions 
connecting Seoul to various important cities in the country, McLeavy Brown urged British Consul-
General Hillier to join in the scramble for railway concessions and suggested to demand a railway 
concession from Seoul to Mokpo, a port town at the southwest end of the peninsula closely located 
to the country’s most fertile area, on the basis that the treaty port would be open to foreign trade 
shortly and Britain would certainly obtain the railway concession.321 
However, despite his remarkable achievements, McLeavy Brown’s position in the Korean 
Government soon faced a serious challenge from the Russian side, which had stemmed from the 
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question of Russia’s military scheme. In the early 1897, Colonel Putiata proposed a re-organisation of 
6,000 Korean troops under the charge of 160 Russian military officers, which was approved by Waeber 
and Russian War Minister Petr Semenovich Vannovskii. The scheme aimed to eventually drill 40,000 
Korean soldiers over next three years.322 This re-organisation scheme was in a very large scale and 
very different to the Russian Government’s reluctant attitude towards the Korean Government’s 
request for military officers and guard for the protection of the Korean King during Min’s special 
mission to the coronation ceremony in 1896, The complete change of Russia’s military mission policy 
emanated from the change of situations in Manchuria. Russia’s request to the Chinese Government 
for the construction of railways in Southern Manchuria was continuously rejected by Li Hong-Zhang, 
who believed that it would be an immense threat to the integrity of China if Russia was granted the 
railway concessions that would connect Port Arthur to their Trans-Siberian Railways.323 Therefore, 
Russia turned their eyes back to Korea and took more assertive policies to strengthen their position in 
the country. 
On 25 April, Japanese minister Katō noticed that Russian chargé d’affaires Waeber had made a 
proposal to the Korean Government, for the employment of 160 Russian military officials in relation 
to the reorganisation of the Korean army and visited the British Consulate-General to discuss with 
Jordan about the matter. Katō revealed his concern about the serious consequences of the re-
organisation of the Korean army on such a large scale and asked to Jordan if he would be interested 
in joining in his appeal against the Korean Government for stopping the introduction of the scheme. 
Jordan, who personally believed that such a huge scheme of military re-organisation was “unnecessary 
and not warranted by the present financial condition of the country”, declined to take a joint action 
with the Japanese minister because the matter should be discussed between Russia and Japan in 
accordance with the Lobanov-Yamagata protocol.324    
Having been rejected by the British consulate-general, Katō had an audience with Kojong on 26 
April and urged the King to refuse the Russian re-organisation offer even by giving him an example of 
a Japanese-drilled Korean force, which was established with small help from foreign officers and 
seriously threatened the safety of the Korean King. Kojong said that he was incapable of rejecting the 
great pressure posed by the Russian chargé d’affaires upon him. Despite Katō’s assurance that his 
government would take full responsibility if Kojong refused the Russian scheme, Kojong still denied 
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taking an action to reject the Russian offer and instead told him that he would leave it to the decision 
of the Korean Cabinet.325  
The Korean Cabinet failed to consent to the acceptance of the Russian military re-organisation 
offer because majority of the Cabinet opposed against the Russian proposal. Despite the Cabinet’s 
general opinion, Shim Sang-Hoon, the Finance Minister and acting War Minister with his well-known 
pro-Russian inclinations, did not reject the Russian offer with the employment of 160 officers but 
suggested a compromise with the engagement of three officers, ten non-commissioned officers, one 
doctor, one saddler and three musicians. However, Katō declined the compromised offer from Acting 
War Minister Shim and argued that the matter should be duly discussed between the Russian and 
Japanese Governments, whereas Waeber warned the Korean Government that the Russian Legation 
would stop providing military protection for the stability of the Korean politics if the proposal was 
rejected.326  
In the end, Kojong approved the Russian re-organisation in a modified form and thus Acting War 
Minister Shim wrote to Waeber that the Korean Government would be interested in the engagement 
of 21 Russian officers and civilians about the re-organisation of the Korean army.327 Waeber replied to 
Shim that he would hand over the application to the Russian Government.328 In response to Katō’s 
continuous objections that the introduction of the Russian re-organisation scheme would violate the 
Lobanov-Yamagata protocol, the Russian Government assured Tokyo that any action regarding 
Russian instructors would not be taken until the arrival of Roman Romanovich Rosen, the newly 
appointed Russian chargé d’affaires to Japan, in Tokyo.329 
It is worth noting that Shim’s letter had not been delivered via the hands of Korean Foreign 
Minister Yi Wan-Yong, who was the leader of the Cabinet members against the Russian military 
scheme. Yi was very unhappy with Kojong’s approval of the engagement of Russian instructors and 
upset with the way Acting War Minister Shim had delivered his letter without consulting him.330 
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Foreign Minister Yi even revealed his willingness to resign from his current position, which Kojong 
declined to accept it.331 
Kojong’s approval of the Russian military scheme seems inconsistent with the sudden change of 
his attitude towards Russians immediately after the release of the Russo-Japanese agreements 
regarding Korean affairs. However, it should be noted that Kojong was very reluctant to accept the 
original plan including 160 Russian officers and he only accepted the offer when the number of 
Russians was reduced to 21. Meanwhile, he also refused to reduce the voice of the anti-Russian 
cabinet members. Since Kojong relied upon a Russian-drilled palace guard, they were probably 
Kojong’s limited manoeuvres to check the increase of Russian influence as much as possible.  
Despite the Russian Government’s assurance that the matter would be only discussed after the 
arrival of the new Russian chargé d’affaires to Japan in Tokyo. However, everything changed when a 
dozen of Russian officers and non-commissioned officers landed at Chemulpo on 27 July 1897, before 
the arrival of the Russian chargé d’affaires to Japan. The thirteen Russian instructors were believed to 
drill 3,000 Korean soldiers. Adding 1,000 men of the palace guard, who had been already re-organised 
by Russian instructors, 4,000 Korean troops in total would be placed under the charge of Russian 
officers and non-commissioned officers. Katō reminded Waeber of the promise made by the Russian 
Government that the deployment of the instructors would not be undertaken until the arrival of the 
new Russian chargé d’affaires but Waeber argued that the Russian instructors were invited by the 
Korean Government as an independent state, who “had a perfect right to make a selection for the 
purpose from any nationality it pleased”.332 
Russia’s unilateral decision to send a group of Russian officers to the Korean Government also 
seemed to have been linked to Colonel Putiata’s tour of inspection along the Korean coast with an 
intention to choose some available places to build the forts. Although the Korean Government refused 
to offer a lease of a governmental steamer for his tour and the Russian military mission subsequently 
suspended the proceeding of the tour for now, the British representative in Seoul started to fear that 
the actual objective of Russia’s Korea policy was to construct the fortification of the Korean coast for 
the use of Russians. Jordan was particularly worried because the Korean authorities were heavily 
reliant on the suggestion of Russian military mission.333  
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Furthermore, Russia attempted to remove McLeavy Brown from the position of financial advisor 
and appoint a new Russian advisor to the job. On 12 June 1897, Mikhail Nikolaevich Muraviev, the 
Russian Foreign Minister, already instructed the Russian legation in Seoul to ensure Kir Alekseevich 
Alekseev to be appointed as a financial advisor in the Korean Government.334 On 9 August, McLeavy 
Brown received a message from Kojong and noticed that Alekseev, a relative of the wife of Russian 
chargé d’affaires Waeber, would assume the control over the Korean Treasury. Jordan also worried 
that Finance Minister Shim Sang-Hoon, who was the official chief of McLeavy Brown, was the main 
figure who propelled the acceptance of the Russian military re-organisation and believed that Shim 
would try to replace McLeavy Brown for the interest of the Russian side in the near future.335 Kojong 
told Jordan that he personally had no intention to discharge McLeavy Brown because of his 
outstanding achievements but Jordan warned Kojong that the British Government would resent if 
McLeavy Brown’s position was interfered by any chance.336 
Therefore, when Alekseev arrived in Seoul and was introduced as financial advisor by Alexey 
Speyer, the new Russian chargé d’affaires  to Korea, to Kojong on 6 October 1897, Jordan reported to 
British Minister to China Claude MacDonald that McLeavy Brown’s position was being seriously 
threatened and that “such removal would very seriously affect British interests”. 337  London 
immediately authorised MacDonald to instruct Jordan to “warn the King that Her Majesty’s 
Government would be seriously displeased if Mr. Brown were to be so removed”.338 Speyer argued 
that the new Russian financial advisor was appointed in response to the request of the Korean 
Government, which had been made during Min Yong-Hwan’s visit to the coronation of the Russian 
tsar in 1896, as an independent state.339  
Jordan believed that “no success will attend any opposition to the scheme”340 but he requested 
for an audience with Kojong to warn about the discharge of McLeavy Brown, which was consistently 
rejected by Korean Foreign Minister Cho Byung-Shik. In his conversation with Jordan, Foreign Minister 
Cho admitted that the Korean Government was in a very difficult situation between having McLeavy 
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Brown, “whom they could not well dispense”, and having Alekseev, “whom they could not refuse to 
accept”. 341  Jordan asserted that the Korean Government was free to appoint Alekseev in any 
appropriate position if it would not interfere with the position of McLeavy Brown. However, it was 
clearly unacceptable to the Russian side, who were willing to affiliate the Korean financial 
administration to that of the Russian Government.342 
The appointment of Alekseev was not made by the Korean Government until the beginning of 
November 1897 and Jordan believed that the delay was caused by a confrontation between the 
Korean Foreign Office, who were backed by Kojong and the Russian Legation, and the Finance 
Department, who had been successfully managed by McLeavy Brown.343 Kojong’s support for the 
Foreign Office, who were pushing forward the replacement of McLeavy Brown, seemed inconsistent 
with his previous conversation with Jordan, where he revealed his intention not to dispense McLeavy 
Brown from the current position. However, when Jordan had an audience with Kojong on 26 October 
1897, Kojong admitted that he had been in an unprotected situation when he had agreed to several 
requests from the Russian Government.344 For instance, on 25 October, only a day before Jordan’s 
audience with Kojong, Speyer visit the Korean palace and warned Kojong that he would mobilise the 
palace guard and lock down the palace gates unless Kojong complied with the replacement of McLeavy 
Brown.345  
Kojong even secretly advised Jordan to avoid the termination of McLeavy Brown’s contract by 
refusing to accept any letter stipulating it to the writer. Jordan followed Kojong’s advice and returned 
the letter to the Korean Foreign Minister when he found it on his way back to the British Consulate-
General after his audience with Kojong.346 Meanwhile, London also instructed British Ambassador to 
Russia Sir Edward Goschen in St. Petersburg to ask to the Russian Government a question regarding 
the pressure imposed upon the Korean Government by the Russian chargé d’affaires  to dispense 
McLeavy Brown on 27 October.347  In his conversation with Alexander Konstantovitch Basily, the head 
of the Asiatic Department of the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Goschen was told that the Russian 
financial expert had been sent at the invitation of the Korean Government but Basily denied that his 
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department had never instructed to obtain the dismissal of McLeavy Brown.348 Thus, Goschen told 
him that Russian representative in Seoul had clearly misinterpreted Basily’s instruction if what he said 
were true and then asked if Basily would instruct Speyer by telegraph to suspend further action to 
dismiss McLeavy Brown. Goschen did not believe that Basily would take such a measure but he hoped 
that the record of Basily’s language regarding the matter might be useful for Jordan to make an appeal 
to Speyer as well as to the Korean Government.349  
It is uncertain if the Russian government did not instruct Russian chargé d’affaires Speyer to repel 
McLeavy Brown from the Finance Department. However, Basily’s statement was consistent with 
Waeber’s suggestion to the Russian Foreign Ministry that it would be advisable to appoint Alekseev 
as a foreign advisor of the Household Office, not of the Treasury.350  Furthermore, Alekseev also 
privately admitted that he had not come to Korea to succeed McLeavy Brown.351 However, since 
Speyer, who had successfully helped Kojong leave for the Russian legation in 1896, was appointed as 
the Russian chargé d’affaires to Korea only a month before the arrival of Alekseev and vigorously 
pushed forward the conclusion of his contract, it seems likely that the Russian government was at 
least prepared to tolerate Speyer’s active attempts to take over the control of the finance of the 
Korean Government.352  
However, despite Jordan’s efforts to defend the position of McLeavy Brown, Korean Foreign 
Minister Cho Byung-Sik and Russian chargé d’affaires Speyer signed a contract for the engagement of 
Alekseev on 6 November 1897. According to the terms of the contract, Alekseev was authorised to 
assume the absolute control of the Korean Maritime Customs and the financial administration of the 
Korean Government.353 This contract was eventually approved by Kojong and announced via the 
Gazette on 16 November.354 Although Alekseev’s contract had been officially approved and he had 
been empowered to take the charge of the country’s finance, McLeavy Brown was still not officially 
dismissed from his position, which seemed to be the least action Kojong could take for now. However, 
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even if McLeavy Brown still attended his office daily, the Korean staff members were not allowed to 
make any conversation with him.355  
British Minister to China and Korea Claude MacDoland was very concerned that the withdrawal of 
current staff members at the Korean customs would cause a serious damage to British trade.356 
However, on 3 December, MacDonald assumed that the British Government could not make any 
further effort to support McLeavy Brown’s in maintaining his position and asked to London for 
instructions regarding McLeavy Brown.357  In response, London replied that further representation to 
the Russian Government would not be necessary but he urged McLeavy Brown to refuse his 
resignation and instructed MacDonald to claim a proper compensation for the unilateral termination 
of his contract.358 Following this instruction, McLeavy Brown determined to refuse his resignation even 
though Alekseev frequently suggested that the Korean Government was willing to compensate for his 
dismissal.359 Furthermore, McLeavy Brown deliberately delayed to return a large sum of money on the 
account of Korean custom revenues, which had been deposited in various banks in his name, to buy 
more time for negotiations between McLeavy Brown and Alekseev for a compromise.360 As a result, 
on 21 December, both parties reached an agreement in a modified form, which stipulated that the 
control of the Korean Customs would be retained by McLeavy Brown but he should act under the 
supervision and approval of Alekseev in important matters.361 It also ended the affiliation of the 
Korean customs to the Chinese customs since  Alekseev assumed the right to manage and supervise 
the Maritime Customs.362 
It might be Russia’s triumph over British presence in the country because British advisor McLeavy 
Brown lost his right to exclusively control the Korean treasury as well as the Korean maritime customs 
and he had to allow a Russian chief to supervise his management of the country’s finance. However, 
considering Russia’s dominant influence in the country, including a Russian-drilled palace guard and 
the presence of pro-Russian figures in the Korean Government, which had been in place since Kojong’s 
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refuge at the Russian Legation in 1896, London’s response to Russia’s attempts to remove McLeavy 
Brown from his financial advisor position must be praised as a successful manoeuvre to defend British 
influence and their interest in the country. 
It was especially crucial for Britain to maintain the control of the Korean customs management 
because of their interest in the trade of Korea. According to Jordan, the export of British cotton 
products to Korea was remarkably larger that the export of the same goods to Tunis. Therefore, Jordan 
believed that Britain’s commercial interest would be significantly challenged if the control of the 
Korean customs was assumed by other foreign powers. Particularly, since McLeavy Brown had taken 
charge of the Korean customs, the import of British cotton goods steeply increased. In 1897, out of a 
total £516,829 of Korea’s import, approximately £300,000 were of British cotton products made in 
Manchester.363  He even suspected that the French Legation was secretly supporting the Russian 
Legation in hope of assuming or co-managing the Korean customs in case if McLeavy Brown was 
dismissed. He believed that the French Legation would attempt to boost their trade with Korea at the 
expense of British goods.364 British missionaries were also very worried about the possible dismissal 
of McLeavy Brown. They believed that they had enjoyed privileges to establish settlements outside 
the treaty ports thanks to the tolerance of the Korean authorities, which they believed to have 
stemmed from McLeavy Brown’s successful service in the Korean Government.365  
It is also important to pay attention to the presence of British warships in the Korean waters 
between December 1897 and January 1898. It was reported to the Admiralty that nine Russian 
warships landed at Chemulpo on 2 December.366 London immediately advised the Admiralty to send 
an equal number of British warships to Chemulpo and forwarded Lord Salisbury’s opinion that the 
fleet should stay at the port at least for a week or ten days.367 After several correspondences between 
the Foreign Office and the Admiralty to count; the exact number of Russian warships at Chemulpo, 
the Admiralty confirmed that there were six Russian warships as of 17 December and sent seven 
British warships to confront them.368 The landing of Russian warships at Chemulpo might be related 
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to the German occupation of Jiaozhou on 14 November 1897 and Russia’s counteraction in accordance 
with the Russo-Chinese alliance of 1896.369 
However, the Foreign Office obviously saw the presence of Russian warships as an immense threat 
and sent British warships “with the object of preventing the Korean Government and people from 
assuming that Russia has any special rights in the waters of that country”.370 When Kojong was so 
surprised by the presence of such a large number of British warships that he asked if the British naval 
force had occupied Port Hamilton, Jordan told him that the presence of the British fleet was “intended 
to manifest and accentuate the interest which the British Government continued to take in the affairs 
of Korea”.371 Jordan even wished to use the presence of the British fleet to put pressure upon the 
Russian Legation for the better terms of Alekseev’s proposal regarding the position of McLeavy Brown 
if the information on the approach of the British warships had reached him at least a few hours earlier 
before signing the modified contract on 17 December.372 It indicates that at this time Britain was 
prepared to afford military support if any hostile power was willing to threaten the integrity and 
independence of the country despite the non-interference principle of their Korea policy. 
It is also worth noting that Japan stood on the British side and helped to deal with Russia’s attempt 
to replace McLeavy Brown. Earlier in March 1897, when British minister to China Claude MacDonald 
visited Seoul, he and Japanese minister Katō Masuo agreed that both governments shared the same 
interests in the maintenance of Korean independence.373 When the dismissal of McLeavy Brown was 
rumoured, Katō told Jordan that the removal of McLeavy Brown from the Korean Government would 
be “most injurious to the best interests of Korea and to produce the financial collapse and consequent 
political complications”.374 He also ensured Jordan that the Japanese Government had instructed him 
to “use every endeavour against the appointment of Alekseev in place of McLeavy Brown”. 375 
Considering the fact that Britain was reluctant to take a joint action when Japan was appealing against 
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Russia’s military re-organisation scheme, Anglo-Japanese co-operation reached a new level by jointly 




Chapter 3: The Russo-Japanese Rivalry in the Empire of Korea, 
1898-1900 
 
The Assumption of Emperor Title by Kojong  
 
On 20 February 1897, after almost a year of asylum at the Russian Legation, Kojong eventually 
returned to Kyŏngun’gung. Kojong’s decision to leave the Russian Legation was made by mainly two 
reasons. As is discussed in previous chapter, Kojong returned to the royal palace because of his 
dissatisfaction with Russia’s Korea policy. Despite Kojong’s request for a wide range of military and 
economic support for the modernisation of the Korean Government, Russia was reluctant to offer 
such aids in fear that their obvious actions to interfere with Korean affairs would eventually provoke 
Japan. Yet, Russia was willing to maximise their influence by the appointment of Russian advisors. 
Thus, having challenged Japanese influence by his asylum at the Russian Legation, Kojong had to 
reduce Russian influence upon the Korean Court by removing himself from the Russian Legation. In 
addition, the Korean public and high-rank officers also demanded the return because Kojong’s stay 
at a foreign establishment was widely seen as a national humiliation and the infringement of Korean 
independence.  
 
Previous Attempts to Proclaim the Status of Emperor 
 
Kojong’s return to the royal palace encouraged Koreans to call for a further step towards the 
independence of Korea by assuming the title of an emperor. Traditionally, the kings of Chosŏn 
Dynasty respected their tributary status in a relationship with China and recognised it by only using 
the term ‘emperor’ for Chinese rulers. However, since Korea signed treaties with foreign powers 
from 1876, all of which stipulated that ‘Korea was an independent state’, the assumption of an 
emperor title started to be discussed. It was mentioned for the first time on 4 December 1884, when 
Kim Ok-Kyun initiated the Kapshinchŏngbyŏn (Kapsin coup) to overthrow a conservative regime and 
to subsequently establish a progressive government. Two days after the coup, his party, 
Kaehwadang (Enlightenment Party), announced fourteen political principles, one of which stipulated 
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the end of a tributary relationship with Qing China.376 Kim Ok-Kyun apparently considered the 
acceptance of emperor title would be an explicit way to achieve it.377 The question of emperor title 
also arose as to how the sovereign of Korea should be addressed during the ratification of the 
Austro-Korean Treaty of 1892.378  
Apparently, it is 1894 that Kojong and the Korean Court started to seriously consider the 
adaptation of emperor title. On 29 July, just before the outbreak of the Sino-Japanese War, Japanese 
Minister Ōtori Keisuke suggested the formal introduction of emperor title.379 Although Kojong and 
the Korean court declined the suggestion, later in January 1895, Kojong modified a royal regulation 
regarding the styles of address and changed the previous form ‘Chusang Chŏnha (His/Her Royal 
Majesty) into ‘Taegunju P'yeha (His/Her Imperial Majesty), which should be only used for an 
emperor.380 It implicates that both Korea and Japan were interested in establishing an imperial 
status in Korea at that time even though their objectives might vary.381  
The change of the title was again discussed on 15 October 1895, right after the Japanese 
Assassination of Queen Min and the following reshuffle of the Korean Cabinet. Yun Chi-Ho, then Vice 
Minister of Foreign Affairs, described the discussion of the matter in his diary. 
 
At 4 p.m., a meeting of all the Ministers and Vice Ministers was called in the Cabinet to 
discuss the advisability of changing the title of ‘King’ to that of ‘Emperor’. Messrs Cho [Hee-
Yon], Kwon [Hyung-Jin], Chung [Byung-Ha] advocated the step very strongly. Kwon said that 
this was absolutely necessary to make the people to realize their independence of China. I told 
them that while neither Japan nor China would honor Corea an iota more for putting on the 
imperial title, we would evoke the ridicule of the sensible. The Minister of F.O. [Kim Yun-Sik] 
and the Prime Minister [Kim Hong-Jip] agreed with me but they dared not oppose the majority 
– supported the Army Officers [Wu Pom-Son, Yi Tu-Hwang]. Mr. So Kuang Pom made himself a 
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goose by saying that none should assume the title of an Emperor who has no dependencies. 
The Proposition was carried to receive the sanction of His Majesty at about 6 p.m.382 
 
Yun’s diary clearly demonstrates that the change of the royal title was supported and promoted 
by Korean young officers and pro-Japanese ministers, who had actively involved themselves in the 
assassination of the queen for the Japanese side. Furthermore, because the Korean Court and 
Cabinet were under occupation by Japanese troops since the incident, it is obvious that these Korean 
ministers and officers pushed forward the policy on behalf of Japan.  
A correspondence by British Consul-General Hillier hints that the change of the title had been 
originally planned by the Japanese. Just like the pro-Japanese Korean officers and minister, former 
Japanese Minister Miura Gorō and the local Japanese newspapers also argued that it would be 
necessary of “demonstrating to the Korean nation and the world at large the complete 
independence of Korea and her equality with her two great neighbours”.383 Russian Minister Waeber 
also confirmed that he had been told by Kojong that some Cabinet ministers in favour of Japan had 
forced him to approve the proposal.  
Waeber strongly opposed to the promotion of the king’s status to that of emperor and refused to 
recognise it as well as any other policies pursued by the current Korean Government, who were 
clearly under the strong influence of Japan. Although Hillier did not as strongly protest as Waeber 
did, he shared the same view as Waeber’s that the status as King would be sufficient to underline 
the Korean independence because all European sovereigns whose governments concluded treaties 
with Korea were designated as ‘King’ or ‘Queen’ in the same manner. Hillier pointed out that the 
abolishment of the title ‘King’ would be accepted by other European Powers when Qing China and 
Korea negotiated a new treaty recognising the complete independence of Korea by removing the 
current title ‘Wang’, which could be interpreted as a ‘Tributary Prince’ in Korea’s traditional 
relationship with China.384  
What particularly concerned Hillier was not the change of the status but a potential threat to 
Kojong or the Crown Prince, which might be caused during the ceremony of the title announcement. 
He was aware that the Japanese-drilled Korean guards, under the command of Cho Hee-Yon, 
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encircled the Council Chamber and stopped ministers from leaving until they agreed with the 
proclamation of emperor title, which Kojong obviously did not intend to obtain under such 
circumstances.385 Furthermore, when it was announced that the ceremony for the announcement 
would be held without the presence of the Crown Prince, who had been never apart from Kojong in 
fear of personal safety since the Japanese assassination of Queen Min, Hillier shared the same view 
with Waeber and American Minister Sill that the ceremony might be exploited by conspirators not 
only to harm Kojong and the Crown Prince, but also to lead a large gathering to tragic results.386 
Therefore, they decided to tell Japanese Minister Komura Jutarō to exert his authority, “which he 
undoubtedly possesses”, upon those pro-Japanese Korean officers in charge of the security of the 
palace.387 Komura answered that he had been instructed by the Japanese Government not to 
recognise the proclamation of the emperor title and assured that he would do everything he could 
do to prevent the ceremony. As he promised, he had a meeting with Cho Hee-Yon and forced him to 
abandon the ceremony in excuse of foreign representatives’ disagreement.388  
Despite what he said, Komura had to discourage the proclamation of emperor title because they 
could not risk further confrontation against foreign representatives by proceeding with the 
announcement. It is worth noting that the assumption of emperor title was proposed right after the 
murder of Queen Min, who had vigorously intervened in political affairs by inviting foreign Powers to 
balance off Japanese influence. If Japan successfully forced Kojong to accept the emperor title and to 
subsequently announce Korea’s complete independence from any foreign Power, then the killing of 
Queen Min could have been justified as an elimination of a threat to the integrity of the nation. 
However, foreign representatives knew Japan’s engagement in the matter from the very beginning 
of the incident and thus Japan were unable to disguise the murder as an accident by Japanese-drilled 
Korean guards.  
 
A Road to the Assumption of the Emperor Title, February – September 1897 
 
Discussions over the acceptance of emperor title were resumed in the early 1897, when Kojong 
left the Russian Legation and returned to Kyŏngun’gung palace, and the political circumstances were 
much favourable for the Korean Court to pursue the proclamation of the emperor title than before. 
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One of the most prominent differences was the lack of strong foreign presence surrounding Kojong. 
Unlike October 1895, when the royal palace was practically seized by pro-Japanese troops and 
officers and the physical safety of Kojong was insecure, Kojong was relatively free from foreign 
aggression as of February 1897. His asylum at the Russian Legation not only damaged Japanese 
influence within the Korean Government, it also led both Russia and Japan to reaching an agreement 
to solve the current bilateral confrontation over Korea. The Romanov-Yamagata agreement of 1896 
stipulated that both Governments should recognise the status quo within the country and that 
Russia should offer protection to the safety of Kojong if he were to return to the palace in the future. 
Such conditions enabled Kojong to pursue more independent foreign policies.  
It should be also reminded that Kojong had gradually taken several steps towards the complete 
assumption of the emperor title since 1894. Traditionally in Northeast Asia, the sovereigns of the 
tributaries of Chinese Empires not only had to address themselves as ‘Wang’ (Kings or Prince), but 
also they had to use Chinese era names for official records to recognise the suzerainty of a Chinese 
empire.389 Therefore, if a tributary attempted to deny Chinese suzerainty and proclaim 
independence, both Ch’ingje (the self-proclamation of emperor) and Kŏnwŏn (the introduction of an 
era name) must be conducted. As is already discussed, Kojong changed the form of address of king 
and changed it into that of emperor, ‘Taegunju P'yeha’ on 12 January 1895 even though he was 
reluctant to officially take a full title of emperor.390 Meanwhile, Kojong aimed to abolish the use of 
Chinese era names after the outbreak of the Sino-Japanese War. On 30 July 1984, Kojong announced 
the abolition of Chinese era names for official use and introduced a new era name ‘Kaeguk’, where 
years were numbered from the beginning of Chosŏn Dynasty in 1392.391 Subsequently, on 30 
December 1895, when Kojong abolished the Lunar Calendar as part of his reforms, he introduced a 
new era name called ‘Kŏnyang (the introduction of the Western Calendar)’ and completed the 
replacement of Chinese era name with a new Korean era name.  
Kojong’s reforms regarding the form of address and the abandonment of Chinese era names 
clearly show his clear intention to become an emperor as well as his cautious approach to achieve it.  
Thus, once Kojong left the Russian Legation for Kyŏngun’gung Palace and became less dependent on 
foreign influence, he eventually planned to raise the status of sovereign by assuming the title of 
emperor (Ch’ingje) and establishing a new era name for the emperor (Kŏnwŏn). Interestingly, since 
May 1897, approximately three months after Kojong’s return to the palace, high-ranking officials in 
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the Korean Government sent up memorials to the Throne, which called for the official assumption of 
emperor title. Whenever Kojong received such memorials regarding the title assumption, he 
officially condemned that such suggestions were “very wrong”.392 
Kojong’s responses to the memorials seem inconsistent with his subtle yet determined approach 
towards the assumption of emperor title, which he had shown by modifying the form of address and 
changing the era name. However, according to Maech'ŏnyarok, it was Kojong that manipulated high-
ranking officials to submit those memorials to claim that there was a strong demand from the 
Korean Government for the assumption of the title of emperor.  
 
…Since the Year of Ŭlmi (1895), the [Korean] Government understood Kojong’s willingness to 
become an emperor and thus suggested the assumption of the title to the King. However, other 
foreign ministers, including those from Russia, France and the United States, said it should not 
happen and even Japanese Minister Miura Gorō advised the King to wait further for a right 
moment.  
Afterwards, since Miura Gorō committed crime [the assassination of Queen Min] and hence 
left the country, the [Korean] Government again raised an issue and started to prepare a 
ceremony [for the assumption of the emperor title]. However, other foreign representatives 
strongly opposed to our plan and the Russian Minister even warned that “Russia would terminate 
its diplomatic relationship if Korea announced to be an empire”. At that time, Kojong felt 
threatened but also determined that he would lose face if the title assumption was disturbed at a 
very close stage to completion. Thus, he secretly advised some loyal officials to continuously send 
up memorials calling for the title assumption. In that way, he wanted it to look as if he 
surrendered to other officials’ endless demands against his will.393  
 
The statement is consistent with what had happened since 1894, such as the change of the form 
of address into that of emperor. Moreover, it is also true that many foreign representatives in Seoul 
opposed to the Korean Government’s plan to assume the emperor title, especially when the Korean 
Government was clearly forced by Japan to announce the assumption of the emperor title. Even 
without Japanese interference, most foreign representatives believed that the assumption would be 
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an unnecessary step since their treaties with Korea recognised Kojong as the head of the nation. 
Thus, as Hwang Hyun argued in his record, Kojong’s manipulation of his officials and the following 
rejections of the memorials aimed to give an impression to foreign ministers that the assumption of 
emperor title was inevitable due to popular demand.  
Although those memorials to the throne were sent up at Kojong’s covert requests, they are very 
useful to understand how Kojong and his officials justified the assumption of emperor title why he 
was so eager to obtain the title. The most important reason was its significance as a symbol of 
complete independence. Most of those memorials clearly mentioned the relationship between the 
independence of the nation and the title of emperor. For instance, Yi Choe-Yong argued in his 
memorial on 1 May that;  
 
We are currently living the era of independence thanks to your majesty’s great mercy and 
magnificent achievements. We thus already run an imperial system by royal letters and edicts, but 
your majesty remains in the status of king. Although King and Emperor are widely used in the 
same manner these days, in my humble opinion, all servants and subjects believe that there is no 
other proper title than emperor.394 
 
On 9 May, Kwon Tal-Sop also wrote a memorial to the throne, stating the importance of 
emperor title to represent the nation’s independent status.  
 
Generally, ‘Cha’ of ‘Chaju (self-reliance)’ and ‘Tok’ of ‘Tongnip (independence)’ mean that 
everything is entirely done by one’s will without asking to or relying on others. Thus, the sovereign 
of our independent nation must be addressed an emperor but why is your majesty not stepping up 
to the grand and precious status of emperor? I am not able to read your majesty’s mind but is 
your majesty hesitating because of what would happen to the nation’s dignity?395 
 
On top of that, Kang Mu-Hyong submitted a memorial to the king, which pointed out how 
different the emperor title was in Northeast Asia that that in the Western hemisphere.  
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Currently, Western Powers use such terms as ‘emperor’, ‘king’ or ‘president’. Although it is said 
there is no level of difference amongst those titles, in East Asia, there has always been a hierarchy 
between emperors and kings.396 
 
Previously, Kojong already faced opposition from foreign representatives when the Korean 
government attempted to introduce an emperor title in October 1895. Western diplomats were 
sceptical of the title assumption because they thought it would not change the much of Korea’s 
international status.397 Pro-Western Korean intellectuals, such as Yun Chi-Ho, also believed that 
becoming an empire would not make Korea more respectable.398 Kang’s memorial clearly aimed to 
argue against them and justified that the acceptance of emperor title would be still critical in the 
international politics of East Asia. These memorials show that, unlike Western diplomats and 
progressive Koreans, Kojong and high-ranking officials were convinced that the independence of 
Korea could not be achieved without stepping up to the same level as Qing China or Japan in the 
international politics of East Asia by the emperor title.  
While openly rejecting all requests made by high-ranking officials, Kojong started to prepare his 
government for the assumption of emperor title. On 14 June 1897, Kojong established ‘Saryeso’, a 
new office dedicated to study the history of the past in order to introduce a new system suitable for 
an empire.399 At the beginning, the office was affiliated to the Home Office and only had three other 
staff members. However, since 1 July, the office was shifted to the Central Council for the efficiency 
of the work and added fifteen more staff members, most of whom were moderate Confucian 
reformers loyal to the Korean King.400 For instance, Chang Chi-Yon, one of the newly appointed 
officials who wrote ‘Taehanyejŏn’ and ‘Hwangnye’, introducing new royal regulations and protocols 
for the emperor and the empire while in office, called for the uprising of the Righteous Army when 
Queen Min was assassinated in 1895. When Kojong stayed at the Russian Legation in 1896, he took 
part in writing a memorial to the throne, calling for his immediate return to the royal palace.401  
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The assumption of emperor title was accelerated by the appointment of Sim Soon-Taek as the 
Prime Minister of the State Council on 1 August 1897.402 Sim Soon-Taek was a well-known moderate 
Confucian reformer, who once resigned from the State Council when Japan forced Korea to reshuffle 
the cabinet in favour of the pro-Japanese in 1894. He won Kojong’s ultimate confidence and was 
praised by Kojong as ‘the only person who can push ahead with the changes of the royal title and era 
name’.403 Once Sim came into office at Kojong’s request in the early August of 1897, he took charge 
of a series of events that would eventually lead to the assumption of the emperor title on 12 
October 1897. 
Firstly, he was ordered by Kojong to suggest a new era name after having abolished all decrees 
issued on 15 November 1895, which had stipulated the introduction of era name ‘Kŏnyang’ and the 
cut-off of topknot.404 Sim Soon-Taek brought up two candidates for the new era name, ‘Kwangmu 
(Announcing the strength)’ and ‘Kyŏngdŏk (Celebrating the King’s virtue)’, and then Kojong chose 
the former and officially announced the first year of Kwangmu on 16 August 1897.405 When the new 
era name ‘Kwangmu’ was introduced, Kojong reaffirmed that it was necessary to strengthen the 
independent status of the nation.  
 
I will eventually restore the traditional system, uphold the ancestral law and hope to 
restructure them with my rule. I will establish diplomatic relations with other neighbours for 
friendship and co-prosperity and establish a foundation for independence. Hence, I modify the 
laws and regulations by taking current situations into account while referring to the existing 
ones.406  
 
The introduction of the new era name encouraged discussions about the assumption of emperor 
title, especially since Kojong held ritual ceremonies for the celebration of the new era name at 
Won’gudan (the altar for the rite of heaven) on 16 August 1897, the same day as the announcement 
of ‘Kwangmu’. Won’gudan was a building exclusively dedicated to the rite of heaven. It could be only 
conducted by a ‘son of heaven’, who was the Chinese emperor in the Sinocentric and Confucian 
world. Interestingly, by the time the era name ‘Kwangmu’ was introduced, Won’gudan had not been 
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officially built yet. The building of Won’gudan was officially approved after the introduction of 
Kwangmu, when Kim Ju-Hyong first suggested on 21 September 1897 that the current royal facilities 
were not suitable to host the rite of heaven despite the importance of the ceremony.407 However, in 
the past, there were several records that rituals had been occasionally performed by the kings of 
Chosŏn Dynasty at Won’gudan. For instance, in 1467, King Sejo (1417-1468) prayed at Won’gudan 
when the Crown Prince was ill for a long time. According to Sejo Sillok, two altars for the rite of 
heaven existed; one in approximately 40 kilometres south of Hanyang and the other in 40 kilometres 
north of Hanyang.408 Therefore, although the Chosŏn royal court did not officially conduct the rite of 
heaven at Won’gudan every year, it was likely that they had some specific areas or buildings 
dedicated to serve the heaven and one of these places were the Won’gudan used for the ritual 
ceremony of the introduction of the era name ‘Kwangmu’.409  
It is also worth noting that it was 12 July 1895 that Kojong had ordered the construction of 
Won’gudan for the first time, two years before the introduction of ‘Kwangmu’410. Moreover, in 1896, 
when Kojong ordered the Royal Household to set up new regulations and protocols for state 
ceremonies, he mentioned rituals at Won’gudan as well.411 It is still unclear if the construction of 
Won’gudan actually started immediately after Kojong had issued the order in 1895 because the 
original site has not been discovered until now. However, it is very clear that Kojong wanted to 
establish a new altar for a ritual that could be only allowed to an emperor in the Sinocentric world at 
that time. It also coincides with the fact that Kojong changed the forms of address within the Korean 
Court into imperial ones since 1894. More decisively, on 10 August 1897, three days before 
announcing his intention to introduce a new era name, Kojong awarded the high-ranking staff 
members of the Royal Household, who supervised the making of vessels and musical instruments for 
rituals at Won’gudan.412 These factors indicate that Kojong firmly intended and prepared for the 
assumption of emperor title before the official declaration of it on 12 October 1897.  
 
Kojong’s Official Declaration of the Assumption of Emperor Title on 12 October 1897 
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Once Kojong openly demonstrated his craving for the emperor title by holding a ceremony at 
Won’gudan, high-ranking officials again submitted memorials to the throne since 25 September 
1897. These memorials were continuously brought up to Kojong until 3 October, when he finally 
approved their proposals and announced he would become an emperor soon. These memorials 
stated various justifications about the emperor title, but they can be mainly divided into three; 
international law, Chosŏn’s legitimacy as ‘the successor of Ming China’ and the independent status 
of the nation.  
 Firstly, it was the Minister of Agriculture, Commerce and Industry Kwon Chae-Hyong that argued 
Kojong’s assumption of emperor title would not be contradictory to the principles of the 
international law. In his memorial, Kwon quoted ‘Kongbŏp'oet'ong’, which was a Chinese translation 
of ‘Das Moderne Völkerrecht der Civilisierten Staatenals als Rechtsuch Dagestellt [The Modern 
International Law of the Civilised States]’ written by Johann Caspar Bluntschli, published in 1868 and 
translated by William Alexander Parsons Martin. He critically discussed the specific chapters 
regarding the definition of emperor and argued why the title of emperor would be still desirable for 
Kojong. He stated that a decision to change a royal title from king to emperor was entirely up to a 
nation with an example of Russia, whose assumption of emperor title had been unwelcomed but 
eventually accepted by the international society. Furthermore, Kwon also pointed out that the 
emperor title should not necessarily require a vast territory or different nations within its boundary 
if Turkey or Japan, whose territories were relatively limited in comparison with Britain or France, 
were still able to claim their imperial status to the international society. Also, he argued that, even 
though ‘Kongbŏp'oet'ong’ made it clear that an emperor title was not a requirement to be equally 
treated with other empires, it would be crucial to become an emperor because Korea had been a 
vessel to the Chinese empire for centuries and such an outdated conception must be challenged.413   
While Kwon Chae-Hyong’s arguments were based on the elements of the international law, the 
Vice-Minister of Foreign Affairs Yu Ki-Hwan emphasised the origin of the term ‘emperor’ in 
Northeast Asia. Yu first pointed out that both king and emperor had been used to address the 
sovereign of a nation in Chinese history. Then, he argued that Kojong should become an emperor in 
the same manner as the sovereign of Ming Dynasty had been called because ‘Chosŏn’s system and 
civilisations were modelled upon those of Ming China’.414  He made an interesting comparison 
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between the Korean case and Western cases. He stated that the sovereigns of Germany and Austria 
became emperors because they claimed to have inherited the legitimacy of the Roman Empire. 
Then, he concluded that the same principle could be applied to Korea because Qing China and 
Chosŏn had inherited the legacy of Ming China in Northeast Asia.415  
The movement of the assumption of emperor title reached at its peak when 716 Confucian 
scholars and officials, led by the highly respected Kim Jae-Hyon, brought up a memorial to Kojong on 
29 September 1897. Due to a large number of signatories, the memorial included a variety of 
opinions in favour of Kojong’s assumption of emperor title, including international law and Chosŏn’s 
alleged legitimacy. On top of that, the memorial emphasised the necessity of an imperial title to 
underpin the independence of Korea. It stated that various Korean nations in the past, not only such 
major countries as Shilla, Kokuryo and Paekje, but also even minor nations and neighbours like 
Songyang, Kaya, Yemaek, Yŏjin and T'amna claimed their sovereigns as kings. The memorial argued 
the Korean dynasty deserved to become an empire since all those nations had been united into one 
nation, but it stated that it was Chinese empires that prevented Korea from using an imperial title.416  
Once Confucian scholars showed their firm support for the assumption of emperor title, Prime 
Minister Sim Soon-Taek and other ministers of the Korean Government officially called Kojong for 
becoming an emperor since 30 September 1897.417 Despite continuous rejections by Kojong, Sim and 
other ministers vigorously visited Kojong three times on 1 October 1897 and five times on the 
following day to argue why Kojong should become an emperor. 418 At the same time, on 2 October 
1897, even an ordinary citizen named ‘Chong Chae-Sung’ submitted a memorial calling for becoming 
an emperor. Since Kojong and Sim Soon-Taek had been preparing for the assumption of emperor 
title for a very long time, such requests made by the high-ranking officials as well as ordinary citizens 
aimed to demonstrate that Kojong’s assumption of emperor title had gained so huge support from 
all different classes of the nation that Kojong could not help but accept the demand. 
On 3 October 1897, when Sim Soon-Taek again had an audience with Kojong to persuade him 
into becoming an emperor, Kojong finally agreed with it by saying that “I unwillingly accept it 
because I cannot eventually refuse the request made by the whole nation”.419 Having once approved 
it, Kojong issued various orders regarding the assumption of emperor title in a relatively short time. 
On the same day, Kojong selected 12 October 1897 for his announcement to become an emperor, 
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which was only nine days after his approval. On 7 October 1897, Kojong proclaimed the change of 
the main hall of Kyŏngun’gung from Chŭkchodang to T'aegŭkchŏn.420 On 9 October 1897, Sajikdan, 
the altar for the rite of soil and grains, was changed into ‘Taesa’ and ‘Taejik’ to match the new 
imperial status. Also, Kojong held a ritual to inform his imperial coronation to heaven and installed 
the deceased queen as the empress on the same day.421 On 11 October 1897, Kojong announced 
that the country would be renamed as ‘Teahan’ for the following reason.  
 
“Our country inherited the lands of ‘Samhan (three ancient Korean nations including Chinhan, 
Mahan and Pyŏnhan)’ and they were unified into one nation by the mandate of heaven at the 
beginning of the dynasty. Thus, there is nothing wrong with the name of the country changing 
into ‘Taehan (Great Han)’. Moreover, other nations often called us ‘Han’ rather than ‘Chosŏn’. All 
these signs were meant for today and thus it would not even need an announcement to let the 
world know the title ‘Taehan’.422 
 
On 12 October 1897, Kojong officially became an emperor and changed the name of the country 
into the Taehan Empire. Kojong’s proclamation included all the justifications of emperor title, which 
had been continuously mentioned and discussed in previous memorials by various figures. It clearly 
stated that the country deserved to become an empire because it united all Korean nations into one. 
He also emphasised that he assumed the emperor title only because “various officials, people, 
soldiers and merchants called for it with one voice”.423 
Considering the fact that Kojong cautiously and continuously took measures for the proclamation 
of emperor since 1894, when the international order of Northeast Asia was challenged by the First 
Sino-Japanese War, it is noteworthy how thoroughly Kojong planned to become an emperor and 
raise his nation’s profile within the international society. Not only did Kojong wait for the right 
timing to avoid huge foreign influence, but he also carefully manipulated government officials and 
Confucian scholars to justify his emperor title. Continuous memorials, brought up by many figures 
from different backgrounds, provided theoretical backgrounds for the title assumption and 
demonstrated people’s general support for it.  
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British Recognition of Kojong’s Proclamation of Becoming an Emperor 
 
The British Consulate-General in Seoul was uninterested in the debates over the emperor title 
until the early October of 1897, when Kojong finally approved the assumption of emperor title after 
rejecting a series of memorials. In his correspondence sent on 5 October 1897, Jordan mentioned 
that the movement had been recently propelled by gaining a larger number of supports in last few 
days before Kojong’s approval. Jordan mentioned two main points regarding the assumption of the 
title of emperor. Firstly, Jordan saw the question of the emperor title as a domestic issue rather than 
a diplomatic concern. He argued that the assumption of the title of emperor would not change the 
independent status of Korea because ‘Taegunju’, which was the current term of address for the 
sovereign of Korea, was already recognised by other Powers as the equal counterpart to European 
sovereigns in treaties. Jordan explained that the assumption of the title of emperor would be a 
necessary step for Kojong’s own people to “emphasise their newly acquired independence”.424  
Secondly, he argued that Kojong’s assumption of the title of emperor would only upset Qing 
China, who had traditionally claimed its suzerainty over Korean dynasties. Jordan clearly mentioned 
that, although it had been initially planned by the Japanese side in 1895 right after the assassination 
of Queen Min, Japan was unconcerned about the change of the title because Japan already used the 
term ‘emperor’ to describe all other sovereigns while only the Korean sovereign was called 
‘Taegunju’ as was stipulated in their treaty with Korea.425 British Minister to Japan Gerard Lowther 
also confirmed that Japan did not take Kojong’s action seriously even though Japan had instructed 
the Japanese Minister in Korea to discourage Kojong from officially becoming an emperor.426 
However, unlike Japan, Jordan believed that the Chinese Emperor would be never willing to see their 
former vessel proclaiming “a title which he considers so exclusively his own”. In fact, snice May 
1897, when Korean officials started to bring up memorials calling for the assumption of emperor 
title, Tang Shaoyi, the Qing Chinese Consul-General in Seoul, even reported the movement in detail 
to Beijing and urged the Qing Government to take any action that could prevent foreign Powers 
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from recognising Kojong’s emperor title. 427 Yet, Jordan stated that Qing China’s stubborn attitude 
was one of the main reasons why Korea decided to take such actions.  
Therefore, since the impact of the recognition of Kojong’s title assumption would be very limited, 
the British Government clarified that they would not prevent Jordan from acknowledging the 
emperor title assumed by Kojong if other foreign representatives in Seoul did the same.428 On 10 
November 1897, within a month from Kojong’s assumption of the title of emperor, the Japanese 
Government officially informed that they would use the term ‘emperor’, regardless of whether other 
foreign Powers would recognise or not, because they had used the title to address any overseas 
sovereign.429 Afterwards, Jordan obtained the information that, on 18 December 1897, the Russian 
Czar had sent a congratulatory telegram to Kojong for his assumption of the title of emperor.430 The 
Russian recognition was later officially published in the official Gazette and taken as a “special token 
of friendly feeling on the part of Russia”.431  
Following Japan and Russia, the United States also recognised the assumption of emperor title by 
using the term in correspondences between the President of the United States and the sovereign of 
Korea. Therefore, Jordan respected the instruction given by the British Foreign Office to take the 
action followed by the majority of foreign representatives in Seoul and told Korean Minister of 
Foreign Affairs Cho Byung-Sik that he would use the new title in his future correspondences with the 
Korean Government. Jordan only informed him verbally because he was unwilling to implicate any 
special significance to it.432 Despite the verbal recognition, Kojong expressed his gratitude to Jordan 
for recognising the assumption of emperor title. Kojong interpreted it as “the interest which Her 
Majesty’s Government took in Korea” and “a token of their good-will towards himself personally”.433 
Since the main objective of Kojong’s new title was to mainly assure Korea’s new position as a 
complete independent country in Northeast Asia, Kojong also welcomed Britain’s recognition of his 
new title with pleasure.  
Coincidentally, immediately after Britain had recognised Kojong’s assumption of the title of 
emperor, the rank of the British representative in Seoul was promoted from consul-general to 
minister. On 8 March 1898, John Newell Jordan was officially appointed the British Charge d’affaires 
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in Korea and he notified the Korean Government on the following day.434 Due to the timing, the 
promotion of the rank of the British representative in Korea is sometimes interpreted as one of the 
measures taken by Britain to acknowledge Kojong’s new imperial title. However, the change of the 
rank was originally considered for a practical reason.  
The question of Jordan’s diplomatic rank was raised when he found it very difficult to have an 
audience with Kojong in October 1897. On 6 October 1897, Jordan requested a royal audience to 
Minister of Foreign Affairs Min Chong-Muk for an “urgent matter”.435 It is the same day that British 
Minister in Qing China MacDonald was authorised by the Foreign Office to instruct Jordan to warn 
Kojong that the British Government would be furious if McLeay Brown, the current chief of the 
Korean Customs and a financial advisor to the Korean Government, were to be sacked.436 Hence, 
Jordan’s “urgent matter” was very likely to deliver Britain’s official objection to the replacement of 
McLeavy Brown with a Russian advisor. Minister Min accepted Jordan’s request and informed him 
that he would see Kojong at five o’clock in the afternoon on 7 October 1897.437 However, on 7 
October, Min Chong-Muk suddenly notified Jordan that Kojong would be unavailable to have an 
audience with Jordan because he was not feeling well.438 On 8 October, Jordan once again requested 
an audience with the Korean King to Min Chong-Muk but on the following day, Min informed him 
that Kojong would meet him once the King were to be fully recovered.439 On 12 October 1897, the 
day when Kojong officially announced the assumption of his new title, Jordan reminded Min of all his 
requests that had been rejected in last few days and requested a meeting.440 Jordan wanted to have 
a private meeting with Kojong after a joint audience with other foreign representatives in Korea, 
who were to congratulate on Kojong becoming an empire.441 However, his request was once again 
denied by Min because Kojong’s audience with the Japanese Minister had been unexpectedly 
prolonged.442  
Despite all the excuses given by Min Chong-Muk, Jordan was already aware that Kojong was 
perfectly healthy to meet the United States Minister Horace Allen and the captain of the United 
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States’ Ship ‘Boston’ as of 6 October 1897. Additionally, on 7 October 1897, having Jordan’s request 
rejected, Min Chong-Muk reminded that Jordan would only claim an audience with Kojong as a 
favour due to his rank as a consul general and thus refused to give any definite date for next possible 
audience with the King.443 After his attempts to transmit his messages via interpreters also failed due 
to Russian interferences, he realised that as a consul general, it would be impossible to deliver 
Britain’s opposition to the replacement of McLeavy Brown, which would be disapproved by the 
Russian side. Although he appealed to Min Chong-Muk that his activities as the British 
representative in Korea had never been disturbed in last couple of years, London confirmed that 
audience with the sovereign could not be claimed by a British consul general in accordance with 
international protocols, unless other foreign consuls were given the same privilege.444  
It is the moment Britain realised that they would be unable to properly represent British interests 
in Korea if they kept a consul-general as the highest-ranking diplomat in the country. Previously, the 
British consul-general in Seoul was generally treated by Kojong as equal as other foreign 
representatives whose diplomatic ranks were either Chargé D’affaires or Minister Resident. Kojong 
usually had audiences at the requests of the British Consul-General and even consulted urgent and 
important issues with them in several occasions, including the Japanese murder of Queen Min or 
Kojong’s asylum to the Russian Legation. His initial decisions regarding British interests in Korea were 
also respected by the British Minister to Qing China and Korea and the Foreign Office in London, 
even though they required the former’s approval due to diplomatic formality. However, when the 
Korean Government notified that McLeavy Brown would be removed from his current position as a 
financial advisor and the Anglo-Russian rivalry became fierce in the early October 1897, Kojong took 
advantage of the low rank of the British representative to Korea and attempt to avoid a direct 
confrontation against Britain.  
Hence, British Minister in Qing China MacDonald strongly argued that the British representative 
in Seoul should have the right to request audience of Kojong especially in order to solve the question 
of the position of McLeavy Brown, which would significantly undermine the British presence in and 
out of the Korean Government.445 Salisbury and MacDonald discussed what diplomatic rank should 
be given to Jordan. Salisbury suggested if the rank of minister resident, the same rank as other 
foreign representatives from Japan, the United States, Russia and France, should be given to 
Jordan.446 MacDonald replied that chargé d'affaires, a lower rank than minister resident, would be 
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reasonable for the British representative in Korea and recommended that Jordan was qualified to 
become a chargé d'affaires to Korea.447 Considering that Britain carefully designed their diplomatic 
network in Northeast Asia by affiliating their representative in Korea to the minister resident in Qing 
China, it reflects Britain’s cautious and yet practical policy towards Korea because the rank of chargé 
d'affaires would sufficiently authorise the representative to claim an audience with the sovereign 
and yet it left a space for a further improvement, depending on the future of Anglo-Korean relations. 
On 9 March 1898, Jordan duly notified to the Korean Minister of Foreign Affairs that he had been 
appointed the Chargé d’affaires in Korea. In response, Minister of Foreign Affairs Min Chong-Muk 
and even Kojong expressed their pleasure and satisfaction to him on the same day.448  
Because of the coincidental timing, it is sometimes argued that the promotion of the British 
representative to chargé d’affaires was related to Britain’s recognition of the official assumption of 
Kojong’s new title as emperor.449 It is true that the Korean Government raised the question of the 
rank of the British representative in October 1897, when they were preparing for the assumption of 
Kojong’s new title and the announcement of the Taehan Empire. If Kojong believed it would be 
crucial to have a British chargé d'affaires or a minister resident as a gesture to recognise the 
complete independence of Korea, in the same way as they had expected from the Anglo-Korean 
Treaty of 1883, then he seems to have successfully taken it as an opportunity to force Britani to 
replace the rank of the British representative in Korea. Furthermore, since Kojong revealed his 
“satisfaction” when Jordan informed his appointment as chargé d'affaires, it is possible that to some 
extent Kojong saw it as Britain’s significant step to acknowledge the independence of Korea.  
However, at the same time, it should be reminded that the main reason why London decided to 
change the rank of the British representative in Korea was very practical. Britain did not change an 
affiliation between British Legation in Qing China and British Consulate in Korea when the First Sino-
Japanese War ended with Qing China’s humiliating defeat and the Chinese recognition of Korean 
independence. When the Korean Government under Japanese influence discussed the assumption 
of Kojong’s new title as emperor immediately after the murder of Queen Min in 1895, Britain was 
still sceptical of the proposed new title because Kojong’s current title as ‘king’ would be sufficient to 
be recognised by other countries as an equal sovereign. Britain did not appoint a chargé d'affaires 
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until when British interests in Korea were seriously challenged by external powers and a consul-
general was unable to defend those interests. 
This gap between Korea and Britain over the questions of the new imperial title and the rank of 
the British representative shows how much their expectations from each other differed at that time. 
Kojong’s assumption of the new title mainly aimed to redefine Korea’s centuries-long tributary 
relationship with the Chinese Empire and to reclaim their position as a complete independent 
country in Northeast Asia. To avoid any objection from foreign Powers, Kojong took a very cautious 
and patient approach for months by building up justifications on why Kojong’s new imperial title 
should be accepted by the international society. Kojong certainly believed that it was a crucial step 
to obtain the recognition by Great Powers of the independence of Korea through diplomacy. On the 
other hand, Britain took a remarkably practical approach towards the issues. Although Britain 
emphasised the importance of the independence of Korea, Britain believed that it would be more 
urgent to stabilise the financial situations of the Korean Government and eventually modernise 
them as a small but stable country, which should not be easily fallen into the hands of any hostile 
Power against Britain. Thus, Britain was even sceptical of Kojong’s efforts to ensure diplomatic 
successes by sending special envoys or maintaining legations overseas. This case sets an example of 
the fundamental natures of British and Korean policies to each other.  
 
Russo-Japanese Confrontation over the Lease of Korean Ports, 1897-1900 
 
Russian Attempt to Lease Chŏryŏngdo, 1897-1898 
 
Since Russia obtained the Maritime Province in accordance with the Beijing Treaty of 1860, one 
of Russia’s strategic interests in Northeast Asia was an ice-free port in Northeast Asia because 
Vladivostok, which had been fortified since the mid-1870s, was unavailable to operate a Russian 
fleet in winter. Therefore, since Korea opened its nation to the external world in 1876, Russia was 
very much interested in gaining a foothold for its fleet on the Korean Peninsula. Britain, who were 
fighting against Russian advances towards Central Asia and Northeast Asia, concerned about Russia’s 
territorial design on the Korean Peninsula. Hence, when it was rumoured that Russia and Korea 
would sign a secret agreement to gain Russia’s military support in exchange for the lease of a Korean 
port and the Anglo-Russian rivalry became fierce in Central Asia after the Panjdeh incident in 1885, 
Britain seized Kŏmundo, located in the south of the Tsushima Strait, to keep a Russian fleet from 
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Vladivostok in check. Britain withdrew from Kŏmundo in 1887, when Russia assured that they would 
not have any territorial design on the Korean Peninsula.450  
Despite the agreement, Russia attempted to build a coal depot on Chŏryŏngdo Island (now 
Yŏngdo) near Pusan in 1897. The strategic importance of Chŏryŏngdo Island was highly evaluated by 
foreign Powers as well as the Korean Government. Korea once announced that any purchase by 
foreigners of land or buildings on Chŏryŏngdo Island would be prohibited for military purpose in July 
1895. However, before long, the Korean Government had to scrap the policy due to opposition from 
other foreign representatives in Seoul, who argued that the island should not be exclusively 
occupied and used by the Korean Government.451 
On 10 April, J. H. Hunt, the first commissioner of the customs in Pusan, reported the arrival of the 
Russian cruiser ‘Mandjour’. The main purpose of their visit was to choose a space near the port, 
which they intended to use as a drill ground and a place for goal and naval supply depot.452 On 20 
April 1897, Jordan reported it to the British Legation in Beijing.453 After nearly 4 months, on 16 
August 1897, Waeber officially requested the Korean Government to designate a place for a Russian 
coal depot on Chŏryŏngdo Island on the grounds that “many men-of-war belonging to the Russian 
Pacific Squadron are constantly visiting the ports of Korea” and that “it is highly desirable that they 
should have some place at their disposal in which sufficient coal can be stored for their use”.454 
Having once obtained the intelligence of the Russian scheme, Japanese Minister Katō Masuo 
immediately appealed to the Korean Government and told Jordan his concern regarding the lease of 
ground on Chŏryŏngdo Island to Russia.  
 
… the Japanese Government views with considerable uneasiness the prospect of Russia gaining 
a foothold on Deer Island (Chŏryŏngdo Island). Its proximity to Tsushima and its strategic 
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importance in the event of a future war were, he said, considerations to which Japan could not be 
indifferent.455 
 
It is worth noting that Russia attempted to gain the ground on Chŏryŏngdo Island when they 
vigorously exerted influence upon the Korean Government thanks to Kojong’s asylum at the Russian 
Legation. Although Britain did not share the same security concern, at that time British interests in 
Korea were clearly being challenged by Russia, who aggressively attempted to replace McLeavy 
Brown with a Russian advisor. Thus, Britain and Japan, together with the United States Minister and 
the German Consul, took a joint action on this issue and formally opposed to the proposed Russian 
gaining of a land on Chŏryŏngdo Island on the grounds that “the concession of the site required by 
the Russians would absorb the larger and best portion of the ground naturally suited for a future 
foreign settlement”. In response to it, the Korean Government assured that the place designated on 
Chŏryŏngdo Island would not be transferred without consulting other foreign representatives.456 
Because of the objection from foreign representatives, the Korean Government declined the Russian 
request for a site on Chŏryŏngdo Island and even signed a protocol declaring that any portion of the 
land for a future foreign settlement would not be given to Russia without a previous understanding 
between the Korean Government and foreign representatives in Seoul.457  
Jordan did not clearly understand why the Russian Legation had wanted to announce their failure 
in obtaining a place on Chŏryŏngdo Island in such an explicit declaration. However, since the Russian 
and Anglo-Japanese sides were fiercely confronting against each other over the replacement of 
Brown at that time, Russia’s declaration likely intended to ease tension between the two parties.458 
In spite of the declaration, on 21 January 1898, the Russian warship “Sivoutch” arrived at Pusan and 
Russia resumed their approach to the Korean Government for the lease of land on Chŏryŏngdo 
Island. Jordan reminded Yi To-Chae, the Vice-Minister of Foreign Affairs who would replace Cho 
Byung-Sik on 31 January 1898, that any portion of land for a proposed foreign settlement should not 
be exclusively granted to Russia in accordance with the previous declaration.459  
Jordan, who had already seen Cho Byung-Sik acting on behalf of the Russian interests, believed 
that the new foreign minister would not respect the agreement of 1897. However, Yi To-Chae 
instructed the local authorities not to approve the purchase of the land that had been chosen by the 
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Russian side but to lease another site to the Russian naval authorities on the same terms as the 
Japanese coal depot on the island.460 Yi seemed concerned if such an acquisition of coal depot might 
lead to the establishment of an exclusive foreign concession. Yi asked Jordan about the nature of the 
German occupation of Jiaozhou in China, the French and Portuguese concessions in India. While 
trying to remove his incorrect comprehension, Jordan expressed his view that the Korean 
Government were obliged to arrange a foreign settlement in a treaty port before separating any 
land.461    
Yi To-Chae held a meeting of foreign representatives to discuss the questions of foreign 
settlements in treaty ports, including Chŏryŏngdo Island. As Jordan believed the meeting was 
“evidently intended to block the Russian scheme for the acquisition of a site for a coal depot” on 
Chŏryŏngdo Island, the meeting was held without the presence of the Russian and French 
representatives.462 While United States Minister Allen Horace and German Consul Ferdinand Krien 
expressed their dissatisfaction that the Korean Government had not taken their objection to the 
Russian lease into consideration, Yi To-Chae assured that the Korean Government had not yet 
decided on anything regarding the proposed lease of an excessively large area on Chŏryŏngdo 
Island. Yi To-Chae agreed with Japanese Minister Katō, who suggested that the Korean Government 
would circulate letters to foreign representatives, stating they were prepared to issue a site for a 
foreign settlement in Pusan, and then foreign representatives would organise a meeting to consider 
the offer.463 Yi To-Chae and other foreign representatives were convinced that Russia would be 
unable to solely press upon the Korean Government in this way. 
However, despite their efforts to prevent Russia from exclusively obtaining the lease on 
Chŏryŏngdo Island, Russia managed to obtain the approval of their lease proposal on 25 February.  
On 16 February, Min Chong-Muk, the Minister of Treasury, was temporarily appointed an acting 
Foreign Minister while Yi To-Chae was unavailable to conduct his duty because of his illness. Min 
Chong-Muk was a well-known “Russian partisan”, who actively engaged in the attempted dismissal 
of McLeavy Brown from his office. Jordan had worried that “the advantage will be taken of the 
opportunity to have both questions [one about the site for a coal depot on Chŏryŏngdo Island and 
the other about the sites of Russian Consulates in Chinampo and Mokpo] settled to the satisfaction 
of the Russian Legation”.464 
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While the Japanese and British representatives were unable to take any action towards the 
question of the lease on Chŏryŏngdo Island due to the confusion caused by the appointment of the 
acting Foreign Minister, on 25 February, Min Chong-Muk wrote to the Japanese Minister that the 
proposed scheme of a foreign settlement on Choryongdo Island was only provisional and required to 
be confirmed by foreign representatives. He argued that no consensus on the establishment of a 
foreign settlement had been made due to the absence of the Russian and French representatives in 
a previous meeting and hence he asserted that “the Korean Government has absolute rights over 
the land”.465 Once Min Chong-Muk denounced his predecessor’s proposal for a foreign settlement, 
which had already been discussed with other foreign representatives, he notified the Russian Chargé 
d’affaires that the site for a coal depot would be leased to Russia. In his letter to the Russian 
Legation, he expressed that he was “ashamed that it has not yet been concluded” and that “Korea is 
on more friendly terms with Russia than with any other country, and therefore I will grant special 
favours and enter into a still closer relationship”.466  
On the following day, Japanese Minister Katō contacted all foreign representatives in Seoul and 
called for a meeting to discuss the matter urgently. In response to Katō’s circular, Russian Chargé 
d’affaires Alexis de Speyer expressed his understanding that the meeting would be held on the 
condition that “Russian rights over the ground selected should not be discussed at the 
conference”.467 On 28 February, the meeting was held by the representatives of the United States, 
Japan, France, Germany and Britain, where the Russian Chargé d’affaires did not attend because he 
was “too busy”. Most of them reached a conclusion that a larger area of a site should be granted to 
a foreign settlement on Chŏryŏngdo Island. Katō notified the following to Min Chong-Muk.  
 
“After the full consideration of the circumstances, (…) it was finally agreed that the proposal of 
the Foreign Minister [Yi To-Chae] for the allotment of a foreign settlement on the north-eastern part 
of Deer Island should be accepted, but it was considered that the area of the proposed site, as 
marked in the plan which accompanied his Excellency’s dispatch, was insufficient to meet the present 
requirements and provide for the commercial development of the port. The foreign Representatives 
therefore decided that the Korean Government should be requested to give effect to the obligations 
imposed upon it by the Treaties concluded with foreign Powers, and to allot on the same scale as 
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that recently adopted at Chenampo and Mokpo, an area of 900,000 square metres (225 acres), as 
the site of a general foreign Settlement on the north-east end of Deer Island.”468 
 
Katō’s letter clearly points out that the Korean Government was obliged to allocate a foreign 
settlement in Pusan, which had been open to foreign trade for several years without any allotted 
settlement for foreigners, in accordance with the Treaties with Western Powers, regardless of Min 
Chong-Muk’s stance on the matter. Also, they called for the expansion of a foreign settlement to the 
same scale as others recently granted at the new Treaty ports, which would include the site already 
occupied by a Japanese coal depot and the other site requested by the Russian Legation for a similar 
purpose.469 Although Russian Chargé d’affaires Speyer did not take part in the discussion, he 
subsequently gave his assent to the decision and made it a formal joint action taken by all foreign 
representatives in Seoul.  
The decision should be seen by Russian and other foreign representatives as a favourable 
compromise. From the Russian perspective, they managed to gain the ground they had initially 
demanded for a coal depot without avoiding any further conflicts against other foreign 
representatives. For other foreign representatives, it was also a successful result because it realised 
the establishment of the foreign settlement on Chŏryŏngdo Island, which had already been 
discussed with Yi To-Chae. Of course, American and British representatives previously appealed to 
the Korean Government when the Russian Legation had applied for the lease of a site for a coal 
depot on Chŏryŏngdo Island in 1897. However, when the Russian Legation resumed their proposal 
for the lease of the site on Chŏryŏngdo Island, the United States Minister Horace Allen was unable to 
take any aggressive action because the United States Government would not oppose to the lease of 
the grounds to Russia, even though he shared the opinion of the British and Japanese 
representatives that “nothing should be done until arrangement had been made for the selection 
and the determination of a suitable settlement area”.470 At that time, Japanese Minister Katō’s 
stance regarding the issue was also unclear and did not intend to actively protest against the Russian 
scheme because Japan had already occupied a coal depot on the island.471 Thus, this agreement was 
the most satisfactory and practical decision for them to make it a part of a foreign settlement. 
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From the British perspective, it was not only the successful containment of Russian penetration 
into the Korean Peninsula but also the acquisition of a foothold for Britain’s commercial activities. 
When Russian Chargé d’affaires Nikolai G. Matunine, the successor of Speyer, asked Jordan not to 
offer any opposition to his negotiation with the Korean Government over the lease of the site, 
Jordan answered the following. 
 
“I told M. Matunine that I had never offered any opposition to the establishment of a Russian 
coal depot as such. What had appeared to me and some of my colleagues as objectionable in the 
Russian proposal was that it would absorb the best part of the only ground which was practically 
available for a foreign settlement at Fusan, and that the interests of trade had, in my opinion, a 
prior claim. (…) 
Fusan might possibly some day become of more commercial importance than it was at 
present, and the Corean Government was under a Treaty obligation, which it had hitherto 
neglected to fulfil, of providing a site for a foreign Settlement.”472 
 
Matunine expressed his pessimistic view about the future of Pusan by telling Jordan that his 
contention was “rather theoretical than practical”. Matunine argued that British merchants would 
hardly settle in Pusan and that Masanpo, a port approximately 60 kilometres west of Pusan, would 
become the focal point even if the trade of southern Korea increased.473 His remark on the foreign 
settlement in Pusan must have stemmed from his dissatisfaction with the joint proposal by foreign 
representatives to make the Russian site included within the foreign settlement. Speyer, his 
predecessor, once frankly informed the United States and the Japanese representatives that the 
grounds Russia had demanded at the new Treaty ports were intended not only for a consulate, but 
also for a goal depot, barracks and other military requirements.474 However, once it became a part of 
a foreign settlement, a foreign country’s allotment within it should not be used for hostile military 
purposes. Jordan admitted that his view on the prediction of the commercial development in Pusan 
might be proven to be correct in the future. At this point, Britain’s only commercial interest in Pusan 
was the import of British goods, which was mainly conducted by Chinese merchants who had a 
separate settlement of their own.475 However, in defence of his support for the establishment of the 
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foreign settlement, Jordan argued that he should not assume that British merchants would be never 
interested in settling in Pusan and pointed out that the first British company was established in 
Chemulpo, whose reputation was similar to that of Pusan until very recently.   
On 29 May 1898, Cho Byung-Sik, who was appointed the Foreign Minister on 15 April 1898, 
informed all foreign representatives in Seoul that the Korean Government had agreed to the request 
for the allotment of an area of 900,000 square metres for the foreign settlement, which would be 
the same scale as those granted at Mokpo and Chinnampo.476 Russia’s attempt to obtain the lease of 
a site for a coal depot and other military facilities was challenged and stopped by other foreign 
representatives, especially those of the United States, Japan and Britain. It is also worth noting that 
how Britain dealt with Russia’s penetration into Korea. When Russia attempted to exclusively gain a 
part of the Korean territory to serve their own purposes, Britain brought up the Treaties that Korea 
had signed with other foreign Powers to counterargue against Russia as well as to force Korea to 
respect the Treaty by granting the same privileges as those of Russia. In addition to its political 
effect, Britain’s approach to claim Treaty ports also helped Britain gain a foothold for their 
commercial activities in the area. 
 
The Change of Russia’s Korea Policy, 1898 
 
Russia’s failed attempt to gain an exclusive area for a coal depot on Chŏryŏngdo Island 
exemplified the changes of the international politics of Northeast Asia, which was caused by the 
German occupation of Jiaozhou in November 1897. Since Germany participated in the Triple 
Intervention of 1895 to prevent Japan from taking the Liaodong Peninsula, Germany became 
interested in gaining a port in Northeast Asia in order to operate the Cruise Division for East Asia, 
which had been created in 1894, without relying upon coal supply provided by Britain and Japan. 
With support from Knorr Hollmann the Chancellor, Germany made a list of eight possible ports for 
acquisition. It included Jiaozhou Bay and Wei-hai-wei on the Shantung Peninsula; Amoy Island, which 
had served as a makeshift base for the German Navy since the 1860s; Swatow between Amoy Island 
and Hong Kong; Mirs Bay in the north of Hong Kong; Chusan Islands in the south of Shanghai; 
Montebello Island off the southern coast of Korea; Penghu Islands off the Japanese-occupied 
Taiwan.477 
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Since the acquisition of other seven ports would be likely to provoke such neighbouring powers 
as Russia and Japan, Germany chose Jiaozhou Bay as their primary target because other Powers 
showed less interest in the port. Jiaozhou Bay also had great strategic importance because it was 
located between Beijing and Shanghai, where Germany would be able to control the traffic between 
the two major cities. Also, Jiaozhou Bay was on the south coast of the Shantung Peninsula, where 
German Catholic missionaries mainly resided and operated. Therefore, Jiaozhou Bay would be an 
ideal place for Germany to protect and support their missionaries in the region.478 Germany 
cautiously waited for the right pretext for the occupation of Jiaozhou Bay until 1 November 1897, 
when two German missionaries, Franz Nies and Richard Heule, were murdered in a small village in 
southwestern Shandong. Once the news was heard, Germany deployed their squadron and on 14 
November, the German fleet entered Jiaozhou Bay. 
In response to the German seizure, Qing China invited Russia to directly intervene in order to 
neutralise Germans in Jiaozhou Bay. In accordance with the secret Russo-Chinese Alliance of 1896, 
Qing China also offered the temporary seizure of a Chinese port as a countermeasure against the 
German occupation. Having received the information, Russian Foreign Minister Mikhail N. Muraviev 
suggested that Russia should occupy either Talienwan or Lüshun on the Liaotung Peninsula. 
Although the Russian Tsar favoured the occupation of an ice-free port on the Liaotung Peninsula or 
on the north-western coast of Korea, the Russian Navy preferred the ports on the southern coast of 
Korea because they believed that it would be more appropriate for their Pacific fleet to operate. 
Moreover, Russian Finance Minister Sergei Witte argued that Russia should not take any 
compensation for the occupation of Jiaozhou because Russia had already defended the integrity of 
China when Japan had claimed the Liaotung Peninsula as part of their reparation from Qing China. 
Witte believed that it would be an inappropriate move for Russia to take. Since his ministers failed to 
reach a consensus due to their different, the Tsar decided not to occupy Lüshun at this point.479  
However, Muraviev believe that this opportunity should not be wasted and hence persuaded the 
Tsar that Russia must occupy a Chinese port on the Liaotung Peninsula before Britain would do. 
Thus, the Tsar changed his mind and duly accepted the Chinese invitation on 11 December 1897 and 
Russian troops arrived in Lüshun on 19 December 1897. Once Russia anchored their squadron at 
Lüshun, they attempted to strengthen their position in the Liaotung Peninsula by taking advantage 
of the German occupation of Jiaozhou Bay. On 6 March 1898, Germany successfully obtained the 99-
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year lease of Jiaozhou Bay in return for an Anglo-German loan to complete the full payment of 
reparation to Japan, which had been demanded as a consequence of Qing China’s defeat in the Sino-
Japanese War of 1894-5. Russia also insisted that the lease of Lüshun and Talienwan should be 
granted on the same terms as the German lease. Consequently, on 27 March 1898, Qing China 
signed an agreement to grant the lease of Lüshun and Talienwan for 25 years and approved that 
Lüshun would be an exclusive naval port for Russian fleets whereas Talienwan should strictly remain 
as a trading port open to all other nations. Additionally, Russia was granted the rights to build 
branch railway lines that would connect the least territories with the network of the Chinese Eastern 
Railway Company.480  
Japan saw the Russian acquisition of the lease of Lüshun on the Liaotung Peninsula as an 
opportunity to settle the question of Korean affairs with the Russian Government. By the beginning 
of 1898, Japan already coped with Russia’s aggressive policies towards Korea. For instance, then 
Japanese Minister to Russia Hayashi Gonsuke, mentioned that the Russian attempt to dismiss 
McLeavy Brown was a very hostile action to place under “the Corean financial administration under 
the control of a Russian Agent”.481 Thus, since Russia obtained a stronghold in Manchuria, which 
would be less significant to Japan’s interests, then Japanese Prime Minister Itō Hirobumi aimed to 
reach an agreement based on the so-called ‘Man-Kan Kōkan (the Exchange of Manchuria and 
Korea)’, where Japan and Russia would admit each other’s special interest to their favoured 
territories. Russia also realised that they should make a compromise on their Korean policies to ease 
tension against Japan. After a successful negotiation by the representatives of both Governments, 
Japanese Foreign Minister Nishi Tokujirō and Russian Minister in Tokyo Roman Rosen signed a 
protocol on 25 April 1898, which stated the following: 
 
The Imperial Governments of Japan and Russia definitively recognize the sovereignty and entire 
independence of Corea, and mutually engage to refrain from all direct interference in the internal 
affairs of that country.  
Desiring to avoid every possible cause of misunderstanding in the future, the Imperial 
Governments of Japan and Russia Mutually engage, in case Corea should apply to Japan or to 
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Russia for advice and assistance, not to take any measure in the nomination of military instructors 
and financial advisers, without having previously come to a mutual agreement on the subject.  
In view of the large development of Japanese commercial and industrial enterprises in Corea as 
well as the considerable number of Japanese subjects resident in that country, the Imperial 
Russian Government will not impede the development of the commercial and industrial relations 
between Japan and Corea.482  
 
The main objective of the Nishi-Rosen Protocol was to prevent either from obtaining dominant 
influence within the country. However, the protocol mainly recognised Japan’s current special 
interest in Korea and stipulated that Russia should not send any instructors and advisors without a 
consensus from the Japanese Government. Therefore, it was a successful agreement for Japan to an 
extent that it enabled Japan to defend their current position in Korea, even though Russia 
significantly improved their standing in Northeast Asia by gaining the lease of the ports on the 
Liaotung Peninsula.483  
While Russia’s Korea policy was compromised with Japan by the Nishi-Rosen Protocol, Russia 
faced a surge of anti-Russian sentiment, led and organised by the Independence Club 
(Tongnip'yŏp'oe’ in Korean). The Independence Club was established in 1896 by Soh Jaipil, also 
known as Philip Jaisohn. He was one of the main conspirators of the Kapsin Coup of 1884, a failed 
attempt to overthrow the Korean Court and to establish a progressive administration. Immediately 
after the failure of the coup, Soh Jaipil fled to the United States via Japan for safety in 1885 and 
eventually gained an American citizenship in 1890. Soh Jaipil was unable to return to Korea until 
1895, when a charge of treason against the Korean Court was pardoned by Kojong. Once he came 
back to Korea in December 1895, he was appointed by Prime Minister Kim Hong-Jip an advisor to the 
State Council in January 1896. He strongly believed that the enlightenment of the Korean public is 
the uppermost urgent matter and that a medium between the Korean Government and Korean 
people would be desperately necessary; for the Korean Government to inform the public of their 
progressive policies; and for the Korean people to deliver their opinions to the Government. 
Although the Kim Hong-Jip Cabinet, who initially agreed with the establishment of a newspaper 
agency, was overthrown after Kojong’s flight to the Russian Legation in February 1896, the new 
administration led by Park Chung-Yang still favoured the idea of a Korean newspaper as a 
countermeasure against ‘Hansŏngshinbo (Seoul Newspaper)’, published by Japanese residents in 
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Seoul and sponsored by the Japanese Foreign Ministry.484 Hence, with governmental subsidies, he 
launched a newspaper called ‘The Independent (Tongnipshinmun)’ on 7 April 1896, which was the 
first private newspaper in the history of Korea. After its successfully launch, Soh Jaipil and his 
reformist colleagues realised that a political organisation would be necessary to materialise their 
political agenda. Hence, on 2 July 1896, they established The Independence Club, which mainly 
aimed to achieve the nation’s independence, civil rights and self-strengthening reforms.485  
At the beginning, The Independent took a friendly stance with the Korean Government and 
focused on interpreting their new policies to the public. However, since August 1897, when Russia 
pursued their aggressive policies by sending military instructors and financial advisors, The 
Independent started to criticise the Korean Government for allowing the imperialist and expansive 
policies of foreign Powers without standing against them. In December 1897, when the 
confrontation between The Independent and the Korean Government reached its peak, the 
newspaper was almost forced to stop publishing.486 
Jordan also noticed the rise of anti-Russian sentiment and the activities of The Independence 
Club. On 24 February 1898, Jordan commented on an open memorial that criticised the Korean 
Government’s current reactions to the aggressive policies by a foreign Powers, which obviously 
implied Russia. In the memorial, signed by 135 prominent members of the Independence Club 
including former Foreign Minister Yi Wan-Yong, they stated that an independent and sovereign state 
should; firstly, “not lean upon another nation nor tolerate foreign interference in the national 
administration”; and secondly, “help itself by adopting a wise policy and enforcing justice 
throughout the realm”.487 In his report, Jordan explained that the Independent Club approximately 
had 2,000 members, some of whom were educated in the United States. Although Jordan thought 
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“the language of its spokesmen is occasionally extravagant and even grotesque, and their motive 
always not above suspicion”, he believed that “a considerable proportion of the signatories of the 
present Memorial are thoroughly in earnest, and realise most keenly the helpless condition into 
which their country is gradually drifting”.488 Jordan saw the memorial as a clear sign that the high-
ranking officials and intellectuals correctly understood how aggressive Russia’s recent policies were 
and yet how weakly Kojong reacted against them. 
Jordan also took the attempted assassination of Kim Hong-Niuk, a Korean interpreter at the 
Russian Legation, as another example of the rise of anti-Russian feeling in Seoul. On 22 February 
1898, three assassins attacked Kim Hong-Niuk on the lane between the British Consulate-General 
and the Russian Legation. He was one of the most influential people in the country and yet hated by 
the public because of the notorious reputation he had earned by taking advantage of his position as 
an interpreter for Kojong at the Russian Legation. Jordan also commented that “the only feeling 
which the incident has produced amongst Coreans […] is one of almost universal regret that it did 
not succeed”.489 Jordan shared a general belief that the attack upon Kim Hong-Niuk had been 
indirectly encouraged by Kojong, who had been irritated by the Russian Legation via their 
interpreter.  
The anti-Russian movement reached its peak on 10 March 1898, when the Independence Club 
held their first mass protest in Seoul. Three days before, on 7 March 1898, Speyer sent an ultimatum 
to the Korean Government and warned their Government would take any necessary measure if the 
Korean Government would not accept the hiring of Russian military instructors and financial advisor 
within 24 hours.490 Speyer believed that Kojong and his Government would eventually accept the 
Russian requests due to their weakness. However, once the news was heard, the Independence Club 
saw it as a right opportunity to abandon the Korean Government’s weak stance in face of Russian 
threats and argued that the Korean Government should decline the Russian offer. With 
approximately 10,000 people gathered, the first Manmin'gongdonghoe (the People’s Joint 
Association) took place in Jongno, Seoul and they publicly condemned Russia’s aggressive policies 
including the hiring of Russian advisors, the attempted lease of Chŏryŏngdo Island and the proposed 
establishment of the Russo-Korean Bank.491 Foreign representatives shared a view that “they have 
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witnessed no similar outburst of hostility, and that it far exceeds in extent and intensity any 
demonstration that ever took place against the Japanese”.492 
Having been encouraged by the public support, on 11 March 1898, Foreign Minister Min Chong-
Muk officially notified the Russian Legation that Kojong and the Korean Government had decided 
not to employ any Russian military instructors and finance advisors and told them that those 
Departments would be only run and supervised by Koreans. Min also emphasised that the decision 
had been made by “the unanimous approval of former Prime Ministers and the Government” and 
that it reflected “the desire publicly expressed of the people at large”, which means the success of 
The Independence Club’s mass protest.493 Speyer was apparently unprepared to receive such a 
complete rejection but eventually on 17 March 1898, Speyer agreed that their military instructors 
and finance advisors would be withdrawn.494 Soon, only more than just one month after the 
opening, the Russo-Korean Bank, which had been severely damaged by the withdrawal of the 
Russian financial advisor, closed permanently on 9 April 1898.495 Moreover, Speyer was also replaced 
with Nikolai G. Matunine, who adopted more moderate policies than those of his predecessors 
Waeber and Speyer. Jordan had an impression that the change by Matunine of Russia’s Korea policy 
was affected by a rumoured Russo-Japanese negotiation over the questions of Korea, which would 
result in the Nishi-Rosen Protocol of 1898.496  
Russia’s withdrawal of military instructors and finance advisors and the change of Russia’s 
Korea policy were a magnificent victory the Independence Club won. It was significant not only 
because the imperialist policies of a foreign power were hindered by the people of Korea, but also 
because it materialised the political power of the Independence Club, which had been used as an 
instrument against Russia for now, that might eventually challenge Kojong’s authority in the 
future.497 However Jordan was very sceptical of the decision made by the Korean Government. He 
particularly criticised the announcement that only Koreans would be employed to run the 
Departments of War and Finance by saying that it was “largely the outcome of their craze for 
independence”.498 Jordan evaluated that it was successfully for the country to have 4,000 Korean 
men of their national military force drilled by Russian instructors and believed that the number 
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would be sufficient to deal with any domestic disorders. However, Jordan was strongly convinced 
that Korea’s financial administration would revert to “the status of chaos from which they emerged 
two years ago” without foreign assistance.499 
Jordan’s reaction once again reveals his strong point of view that the independence of Korea 
should be underpinned by first achieving the modernisation and the stabilisation of the Korean 
administration. He believed that it would seriously undermine the independence of Korea if the 
disorganisation of the financial administration eventually caused a possible foreign intervention by 
any means. However, Jordan’s such view also provided a ground to justify the current position of 
Brown within the Korean Government. Immediately after the withdrawal of Russian advisors, when 
the question of the re-employment of Brown as a Financial Advisor arose, Jordan argued that Brown 
should gain some assurance on the permanency of his position, based on his intact contract with the 
Korean Government.500  
 
Russia’s Attempted Lease of Masanpo and Kŏjedo Island, 1899-1900 
 
Russia’s Korea policy remained moderate and even quiet while Matutine oversaw the Russian 
Legation. However, in May 1899, Russia resumed their interest in the idea of leasing a port on the 
southern coast of Korea, which was triggered by two main reasons. Firstly, the Korean Government 
announced to open the new Treaty ports of Sŏngjin in Hamgyŏng-do, Kunsan in Chŏlla-do and 
Masanpo in Kyŏngsang-do.501 The Russian Navy was particularly interested in the possible lease of 
Masanpo, located in the west of Pusan. Russian admiral Admiral Yevgeni Alekseyev already surveyed 
Kŏjedo Island and nearby ports in 1895 and concluded that Masanpo would be desirable as a naval 
port.502 Furthermore, it was only 40 kilometres from Chŏryŏngdo Island, where Russia attempted to 
gain a site for their exclusive use of a coal depot and other military facilities but eventually lost to a 
foreign settlement on the island. Jordan also confirmed that, although its commercial value was 
doubtful, Masanpo was considered by many naval authorities of various nations as “one of the finest 
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in the world” because of its uniform depth of water, excellent holding grounds and plenty spaces to 
anchor up to 60 or 70 warships.503  
Secondly, Aleksandr Ivanovich Pavlov, the new Russian Chargé d'affaires who replaced Matunine 
in December 1898, pursued a more aggressive policy than his predecessor. He was the main 
architect of Russia’s expansive policies in Qing China and thus Tokyo was alarmed by the 
appointment of him as the Russian Chargé d'affaires in Seoul. In his conversation with British 
Minister in Tokyo Ernest Satow, Japanese Foreign Minister Aoki Shūzō mentioned a report about the 
resumption of Russian activities, including Russia officers allegedly surveying in the northernmost 
provinces of Korea without permission from the Korean Government.504 Jordan at first pointed out 
Aoki’s allegation was based on an “anti-Russian bias” and stated that the events concerned had been 
caused by other causes than Pavlov’s new approaches.505  
However, once Jordan saw Russia and Japan started to purchase a site for their own consulates 
within a week from the opening of the harbour, he realised how much importance both countries 
attached to this port and followed the development of the event.506 In July 1899, when Stein visited 
Masanpo to purchase the land that had been already selected by Pavlov, he found out that the site 
had been already purchased by a Japanese national through a Korean employee.507 While the Korean 
Government declined to intervene, Japanese Minister Hayashi Gonsuke rejected the transfer of the 
land purchased by the Japanese on the ground that Russia had not actually obtained any title-deeds 
for the site.508  
In response to the Japanese refusal of the transfer of the land, Russia took two different 
approaches. Firstly, Russia started to look for an alternative outside the Treaty port. In the mid-
October of 1899, London and the British Minister in St. Petersburg became aware of the information 
that Russia had been interested in the lease of Kŏjedo Island.509 The British Admiralty also showed 
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… The geographical position of Cargodo [Kojedo] Island is excellent. Situated 50 miles from 
Takeshiki, and 135 miles from Sassebo [Sasebo] (the two Japanese ports which close the entrance 
to the gulf and render our position in the Sea of Japan somewhat analogous to that which we 
occupy in the Baltic and Black Seas), a port in Cargodo would enable us to watch the movements 
of our neighbour. A sudden sailing away of 10,000 Japanese soldiers in peace time from Fusan, an 
event quite possible at present, would be made impossible when once an ‘eagle’s nest’ was built 
in Cargodo. And then Cargodo, being 490 miles from Vladivostok, and 560 miles from Port Arthur, 
would serve as a link between the chief port in the Pri-Amur district and that in Manchuria.510 
 
Kŏjedo Island shared the same strategic values as those of Masanpo due to its proximity to the 
Treaty port. Therefore, if Russia gained a lease of Kŏjedo Island exclusively for their military 
purposes, the island would provide a foothold for the Russian fleet to operate in the Chinese Seas as 
well as in the Pacific Ocean, which would impose a great threat upon Japan as well as British 
territories and dominions in the region.  
Secondly, Russia threatened the Korean Government that they would take any necessary 
measure to safeguard their interests if the Japanese remained in the possession of the land, which 
Russia claimed that they had selected first.511 However, the Korean Government maintained their 
stance that the purchase by the Japanese national of the disputed land was duly made in accordance 
with the regulations of Treaty ports and pointed out all foreign legations were allowed freely 
purchase the land owned by Koreans within 10 kilometres from a Treaty port. Korean Foreign 
Minister Park Che-Sun, thus, declined any responsibility for the transfer of the purchased land.512   
 After failing to gain any support from the Korean Government, Pavlov met Hayashi to discuss the 
matter at the end of January 1900. In this conversation, Pavlov asserted that the Russian Legation 
would demand compensation from the Korean Government, which would be in the form of the 
grant of a site equivalent in value to the site selected by Pavlov and then subsequently purchased by 
the Japanese. Hayashi answered that he would not give any objection to Pavlov’s proposal for 
compensation on two conditions; that Pavlov’s demand should be limited within a radius of 4 
kilometres stipulated by the Treaty; and that Russia should not be granted any site on Kŏjedo or any 
other islands in the bay.513 Also, while Kojong referred the question of the disputed in ‘the usual 
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way’ to Foreign Minister Min Chong-Muk, Hayashi told him that any land given as a compensation 
should be strictly used not for military or naval purposes, even though Jordan doubted that the pro-
Russian Foreign Minister would oppose Russia’s requests.514  
Interestingly, in the early March 1900, while Russia pressed the Korean Government into granting 
a site as a compensation for the land that had been purchased by the Japanese, Pavlov accused that 
it was not Japan but Britain that had actually funded and made the purchased the disputed land. 
According to Pavlov’s source, who claimed to have witnessed the process of the purchase, a British 
admiral allegedly bought the land by paying with the check in the name of Jordan.515 Jordan, who 
thought this accusation was “the most extraordinary one that had ever been brought” to his notice, 
he assured that no British national had been involved in the alleged purchase of the land because 
“the British system did not admit of transactions of that kind”.516 Russia’s concern over the alleged 
British engagement stemmed from their experience about the British opposition to their aggressive 
policies in 1897-8. Aside Japan, it was the British representative that most actively opposed Russia’s 
Korea policies, such as the replacement of Brown and the attempted lease of an exclusive site on 
Chŏryŏngdo Island. Speyer once mentioned the British opposition as one of the main reasons why 
his Korea policies failed, and Jordan also agreed that the presence of a British fleet at Chemulpo 
“undoubtedly contributed […] to the reaction against British influence”.517 Thus, Pavlov’s friendly 
attitude towards Jordan stemmed from his anxiety to avoid any serious objection from the British 
representative and to have good-will in the settlement of the event.518  
After a Russian squadron had examined Masanpo and its surrounding ports, the Russian Legation 
made a proposal for the grant of a site on the Ch’ilwon Peninsula near Kŏjedo Island, which was still 
outside a radius of 4 kilometres from Masanpo Treaty port.519 However, at the end of March 1900, 
Russia modified their proposal and assured to the Korean Government that his choice of the site 
would be confined into the 4 kilometre radius of the treaty port. Pavlov explained that he changed 
their request because he did not fully support the demand of the site outside the designated area of 
the Treaty port had been made by the Russian Navy and admirals.520 Russia also gave an assurance 
that Russia would no longer seek the lease of a site on Kŏjedo Island. However, in return for it, 
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Pavlov requested demanded a guarantee by the Korean Government that Kŏjedo would not be 
alienated to any other foreign Power in the future. When he was asked by Min Chong-Muk for his 
opinion regarding the non-alienation of Kŏjedo Island, Jordan answered that it would make an 
unfavourable precedent and provide a ground for a foreign Power to request the reversion of the 
island.521  
Pavlov’s demands were accepted by the Korean Government and both parties signed two 
agreements regarding the lease of an exclusive site to Russia and the non-alienation of Kŏjedo Island 
on 30 March 1900. The first agreement about the site of Masanpo contained the six clauses: 
 
 A piece of ground within the 10-li [4-kilometre] radius prescribed by Treaty at Masanpo shall 
be leased by Corea to the Russian Government, either permanently or temporarily, as the 
latter choose. 
 A delegation from the Foreign Office in Seoul and the Russian Consul at the port shall 
arrange details which shall be embodied in an Agreement. 
 Private land of Coreans shall be purchased by the Corean Government. 
 Russian Government to enter into possession of Concession after a month from date of 
settlement arrived at between the Foreign Office Delegate and the Russian Consul. 
 When the Russian Government enter into possession, the Corean Government shall be 
indemnified for their expenses and paid the price of the ground. 
 Existing Treaties shall regulate the storage and landing in Concessions of Russian naval 
supplies.522  
 
The second agreement regarding the non-alienation of Kŏjedo Island also included the clauses 
that; “the Russian Government engages never to ask for, in connection with any industrial or 
commercial enterprises whatsoever on behalf of its subjects or itself, the purchase or lease of any 
land on Koje Do or neighbouring islands, or on the mainland in the vicinity”; and “the Corean 
Government enters into a reciprocal engagement never to permit any other Government to buy or 
lease for similar purposes any ground in the places mentioned”.523 It was followed by the signing of a 
protocol between the Russian Vice-Consul and the Korean local authority at Masanpo on 12 April 
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1900, which an area of 900,000 square metres had been exclusively leased to the Russian 
Government for a coal depot, a hospital and other purposes.524  
Jordan was already aware that Russia and Korea had reached an agreement to meet Russia’s 
demand for the lease of a land as a compensation for the Japanese purchase of the designated site. 
On the other hand, he was uncertain about the existence of the non-alienation clause because there 
were two contradictory statements; one from Korean Foreign Minister Min Chong-Muk that the 
question of a guarantee of the non-alienation of Kojedo Island had been excluded during the 
negotiation; and the other that the Korean Foreign Ministry had already informed the agreement to 
the Japanese Legation.525 However, Jordan became fully aware of the agreements, he raised serious 
strategic concerns regarding the Russian lease of the land. He commented that “Masanpo and its 
approaches, which constitute by common consent by far the finest harbour in the East, are virtually 
placed within the exclusive sphere of Russian influence”.526 He also worried that Masanpo, would 
not only serve as a link between Vladivostok and Lüshun, but also become a much more important 
naval port due to its strategic significance. 
The Parliament also raised concerns when the Russian lease of Masanpo was reported by The 
Times that it would be the violation of Russia’s assurance of 1886 that they would not occupy any 
part of Korea.527 Many members of the Parliament asked if the Russian lease of the land within 
Masanpo actually violated any assurance given by Russia in 1886, which became a pretext for Britain 
to withdraw from the British-occupied Kŏmundo Island, also known as Port Hamilton.  The members 
of the Parliament also asked if; any explanation had been made by the Russian Government before 
their action; and if Russian troops were currently present at Masanpo for the military occupation of 
the port.528  
In response, Lord Salisbury clarified the fact that the main objective of the Russian lease of 
Masanpo was mainly for a coal depot and a naval hospital but mentioned it was still unknown 
whether Russia would deploy their forces to Masanpo or fortify the leased land. He also pointed out 
that Masanpo was a Treaty port open to all nations and thus Russia’s any naval supply would be 
supervised by existing Treaties with other foreign Powers. Therefore, he concluded that no exclusive 
rights were given by the Korean Government to Russia. Also, neither the integrity of Korea nor the 
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interests of British nationals were affected or damaged by the Russian lease of Masanpo. Regarding 
the Russian assurance of 1886, Salisbury answered that, technically speaking, the guarantee of the 
integrity of Korea of 1886 was given not to Britain but to Qing China, who claimed their traditional 
suzerainty over Korea. Thus, he concluded that it would not be answered until “circumstances arise 
affecting the rights or interests of Great Britain”.529  
Salisbury’s answers to the members of the Parliament exemplified Britain’s Korea policy at that 
time at this time. According to British Minister in Tokyo Ernest Satow, Britain’s interest in Korea 
were of “a secondary order” and it was so obvious that even the Japanese Government expected 
that they could not look for British assistance when facing Russian penetration into Korea.530 In the 
period between 1897 and 1900, when Russia attempted to maximise their interest in Korea by 
securing the lease of the ports on the southern coast of Korea, Britain utilised the existing Treaty 
rights as a countermeasure against the expansion of Russian influence upon Korea. The level of 
British intervention arose only when British interests in Korea were seriously challenged, for 
instance, by the Russian attempt to replace Brown with the Russian financial advisor.  
While Britain took diplomatic approaches to refrain Russian from securing exclusive privileges in 
Korea, Russia also did not pursue aggressive policies any more. Although the Russian Navy was 
interested in the ideas of leasing of a port on the south coast of Korea and fortifying it to be their 
main naval base for the Russian fleet in Northeast Asia, the Russian representatives and key 
members of the Russian Government were aware that any international conflict would be sparked if 
Russia insisted on the seizure of a non-Treaty port on the Korean Peninsula. Thus, the Russian 
Government and Navy agreed that Russia’s exclusive concessions at Masanpo would only serve as a 
link between Vladivostok and Lüshun, with a coal depot and a naval hospital.531 Instead of fortifying 
it, the Russian Legation attempted to attract Russian investors to settle in Masanpo because Russia 
believed that its exclusive concession at Masanpo also had a commercial potential to become a hub 
of maritime trade in Northeast Asia thanks to its geographical importance.532 The confrontation 
between the Russian Legation and the British-Japanese representatives in Korea, which had been 
triggered by Russia’s aggressive policies, became much quieter by the middle of 1900.  
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Chapter 4: The Deterioration of Anglo-Korean Relations, 1899-
1902 
 
The Changes of the Domestic and International Circumstance of Korea, 1898-
1901 
 
The Centralisation of Kojong’s Power, 1898-99 
 
The political circumstance of Korea and its surrounding region were dramatically changed by 
several factors by the summer of 1900. By the end of 1900, Kojong successfully consolidated his 
influence and power upon the Korean Government and his nation by removing his political enemies, 
including the Independence Club, led by American-educated reformists. Since its foundation in 1896, 
the Independence Club vigorously promoted the ideas of the self-strengthening and the 
independence of the nation. Especially after the successful organisation of the first 
Manmin'gongdonghoe of March 1898, which resulted in Russia’s withdrawal of their military and 
financial advisors and the subsequent changes of their policies in Korea, the Korean Government 
started to worry about the rise of support for them. In order to undermine the Independence Club, 
Kojong, with help from foreign representatives including the United States Minister Horace Allen, 
removed Soh Jaipil from his position as a foreign advisor to the Korean Government by offering a 
compensation for the cancellation of his contract.533  
 Jordan also worried about the emergence of the Independence Club as a political party. In July 
1898, for instance, when Kojong appointed Cho Byung-Sik, who had played a key role in helping 
Russia pursue their aggressive policies in 1897. In response to the appointment, approximately 600 
members of the Independence Club came to Cho’s house and called for an interview and once they 
failed to meet him, they sent a delegation to Kojong and requested his resignation. Due to the 
protest, Kojong eventually dismissed him from his position.534 Jordan commented that this was the 
symbolic moment that the Independence Club sensibly damaged Kojong’s authority for the moment 
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and it was also of a great danger that “the Club will abuse the influence it has obtained, and proceed 
to revolutionary measures, which may result in an appeal of force”.535 
The confrontation between the Independence Club and Kojong became much fiercer by the end 
of 1898, mainly by two events; Kim Hong-Niuk’s plot to poison Kojong and the Crown Prince to death 
on 12 September 1898; and Kwanmin'gongdonghoe (the Assembly of the officials and people) and 
Kojong’s subsequent announce of the transformation of the Privy Council into a representative 
assembly in November 1898. In case of Kim Hong-Niuk, he and his accomplices were immediately 
arrested and only a month later, after the alleged tortures, ill-treatment and lack of proper legal 
process for justice, they were executed on 10 October 1898.536 When it was rumoured that Kim 
Hong-Niuk was being tortured  in prison, Jordan sent a warning to the Korean Government that such 
measures allegedly taken against Kim Hong-Niuk would be “a violation of all kinds of humanity” and 
damage “the reputation Corea has acquired as a Power anxious to enter upon the path of progress 
and enlightenment”.537 The Independence Club also saw this incident as a serious violation of the 
Royal Edict of 9 July 1894 regarding the complete abolishment of torture and demanded the 
resignation of Sin Ki-Sun, the Minister of Law, after one of the arrested had been found injured by a 
knife in prison.538 At first, Kojong only reduced his salary for a month in responsibility for the 
mistreatment of the arrested.539 However, due to the increased pressure from the Korean public, 
who showed their solidarity with the Independence Club by closing their doors of all the shops in 
Seoul, Kojong eventually sacked Law Minister Sin Ki-Sun and Head Judge Yi Yin-Woo.540 
Encouraged by the success of enforcing a ministerial change upon the Korean Government, the 
Independence Club started to strongly demand the establishment of a more progressive 
government.541 The Independence Club materialised the ideas into six demands at the 
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Kwanmin'gongdonghoe between 28 October and 2 November 1898 and Chief State Councillor Park 
Chung-Yang presented them to Kojong.542 Kojong approved the proposal and announced that the 
Privy Council would be turned into a form of a representative assembly, where 25 out of 50 
representatives should be selected amongst the members of the Independence Club by ballot.543 
However, such conservative high-ranking officials as Cho Byung-Sik, who were threatened by the 
movement, spread a rumour that the long-term objective of the Independence Club was to establish 
a republic.544 Having been surprised by the rumour, Kojong issued an order to disband the 
Independence Club, to arrest the key members of the Independence Club and to dismiss the officials 
who had agreed to present the six demands.545 
Kojong also took a countermeasure against the Independence Club by appointing Cho Byung-Sik 
as a State Councillor and Min Chong-Muk as a Foreign Minister, who had closely worked with former 
Russian Minister Speyer.546 In fear that Cho Byung-Sik might resort to the use of force in order to 
repress the public, who were organising a series of mass protests to call for the release of the 
arrested members of the Independence Club, Jordan and American Minister Allen visited Matunine 
to tell him that any use of force should not be approved by the Russian Legation because they 
believed that the current measures taken by Kojong and the Korean Government complied with a 
view of the Russian Legation. 547 Additionally, Jordan also sent a message to Min Chong-Muk and 
asked to notify two or three days in advance if the Korean Government would like to repress the 
public by means of force in excuse that “the British Legation currently does not have any means to 
protect the safety and the properties of British nationals in Seoul”.548  
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The joint action taken by Jordan and Allen prevented Kojong from using military or police forces 
against the public supporting the Independence Club.549 Thus, Kojong mobilised ‘the Peddlers’ Guild’ 
and allowed them to attack the participants of the mass protests.550 In his audiences with Kojong on 
22 and 24 November 1898, Jordan denounced that the Korean Government had employed the mob 
force, which Kojong denied, and argued that the dismissal of the peddlers should be critical to avoid 
further disturbances.551 However, despite his efforts to avoid any violence, Kojong deployed military 
forces in Seoul on 22 December 1898 and issued a decree to ban any mass protest in the street, 
which eventually resulted in the disbandment of the People’s Joint Assembly and the Peddlers’ 
Guild.552  
In November 1898, Jordan showed his sympathy with the Independence Club. When the 
Independence Club protested Russia’s demands regarding the employment of advisors and the lease 
of Chŏryŏngdo Island, Jordan worried about their nationalist and anti-foreign sentiments. However, 
when the Independence Club were challenged by Kojong and the Korean Government, he made a 
comparison between the Independence Club and Kojong, in favour of the former. 
 
It is extremely difficult to say how far the movement represents a genuine demand for reform 
as distinguished from mere political agitation so common in Corea; but many of the prominent 
men connected with it have gathered their ideas of progress in foreign countries and are to all 
appearance convinced that the only hope for their country lies in a radical reform of the 
Government.  
The Emperor and the old aristocracy, on the other hand, naturally regard the proposed change 
as a curtailment of the prerogatives and privileges which they and their ancestors have enjoyed 
for five centuries and are not disposed to yield without a struggle.553 
 
Thus, immediately after the illegalisation of the Independence Club, Kojong pardoned the 
conservative aristocrats that had been criticised and accused by the Independence Club and their 
supporters. Kojong replaced such key reformists as Park Chung-Yang, Min Yong-Hwan, Yi Hak-Kyun, 
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Yi Jong-Kon and Yi Sang-Jae with those conservative aristocrats by January 1899. Yun Chi-Ho even 
had to flee into exile in order to avoid any prosecution. The Independence Club’s ideologies of a 
progressive administration and their mass actions to organise protests were indeed inherited by the 
Korean nation and they were vividly expressed in the March First Movement of 1919 and the 
subsequent establishment of the Provisional Government of Korea.554 However, the immediate 
impact of the Independence Club’s failure to establish a progressive government was the 
enhancement of the reactionary administration.  
After the disbandment of the Independence Club, the conservative Korean Government realised 
that a new “constitution” would be necessary to create a codified ground to avoid any request by 
the public for the introduction of representative democracy. As a result, on 17 August 1899, Kojong 
declared the Taehan'gukkukche (The Constitution of the Great Han Empire), which consisted of the 
following articles: 
 
 Article 1: The Empire of Korea is an independent empire recognised by all nations of the 
world.  
 Article 2: The political system of the Empire of Korea has been handed down for last 500 
years and it will remain an unchangeable absolute monarch for eternity. 
 Article 3: The Emperor of Korea has absolute and unlimited power. It intends to 
independently establish a political system in accordance with the International Law.  
 Article 4: If any subject of the Empire of Korea violates the Emperor’s authority, they should 
be treated as unreasonable men, no matter whether or not any action has been actually 
taken to do so. 
 Article 5: The Emperor of Korea holds the authority to command the army and the navy of 
the nation; to organise his troops, and declare or lift martial law. 
 Article 6: The Emperor of Korea holds the authority to legislate; to promulgate, and to 
administer justice. His Majesty also has the authority to amend domestic legislation to 
pardon criminals. It intends to independently legislate in accordance with international law.  
 Article 7:  The Emperor of Korea regulates the administrative system of each Ministry and the 
salaries of clerks and officers. His Majesty also issues a decree required for administrative 
purposes. It intends to independently govern in accordance with international law.  
 
554 Chandra, Imperialism, Resistance, and Reform in Late Nineteenth-Century Korea, p. 216. 
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 Article 8: The Emperor of Korea has rights to appoint and dismiss all ranks of officials; and to 
award or deprive any knighthoods, orders and any other promotion. It intends to 
independently employ staff members in accordance with international law. 
 Article 9: The Emperor of Korea has the authority to assign an envoy to any country with the 
Treaty; to declare war, and to sign treaties. It intends to independently send an envoy in 
accordance with international law.555  
 
Usually, the constitution of a country stipulates the title of a nation, the source of sovereignty, 
the rights and responsibilities of its national and the jurisdiction of sovereignty.556  However, 
Kojong’s Taehan'gukkukche only defined the official title of Korea and the source of sovereignty and 
yet, it specified that the political system of Korea was an absolute monarchy, where the 
administration, jurisdiction and legislation of Korea should be centralised to the Emperor of Korea.557 
Comparing with the Independence Clun’s proposal to establish a representative assembly and select 
representatives by ballot, the Taehan'gukkukche was mainly designed to avoid any challenge by a 
representative body or an individual against the Emperor’s authority.558  
Despite the reactionary and authoritarian nature of the Taehan'gukkukche, it is conceivable that 
the introduction of the “constitution” provided a legal ground for the Emperor to apply universal 
laws and systems within the territory of his nation. Although the authority of the sovereignty was 
exclusively enjoyed by the Emperor, it is undeniable that the Taehan'gukkukche became a starting 
point to define Korea as a modern sovereign state in the form of absolute monarchy.559 On top of 
that, the Taehan'gukkukche defined the Emperor’s sovereignty “in accordance with the international 
law”, which was repeated in Articles 3, 6, 7, 8 and 9. In these articles, international law was 
mentioned as the norm and used to justify that the Emperor’s absolute power meant to govern the 
nation without any intervention from overseas.560 Therefore, the introduction of the 
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Taehan'gukkukche should be viewed as an extension of Kojong’s assumption of the title of emperor 
in 1897, where officials and aristocrats used the international law as a norm to explain why Kojong 
was qualified to address himself an Emperor. 
The Taehan'gukkukche clearly demonstrates what the main principle of Kojong’s policy to 
underpin the independence of Korea was. Despite their weakness and limitations, the Independence 
Club argued that the independence of the integrity of Korea should be achieved by a series of 
reforms for the improvement of the administration; that any concessions including metal mines, 
railways, coal mines, forests and loans should not be given to foreign Powers without an approval by 
a consensus of the Korean Cabinet and the Privy Council; that the financial administration should be 
centralised to the Ministry of Finance; that serious criminals should be on public trial; and that the 
appointment of government officials should be discussed between the Emperor and the Minister.561 
On the other hand, Kojong chose completely contrary approaches to the question of the nature of a 
political system. Kojong authorised the Ministry of Household to exclusively supervise 43 mines 
across the nation and, with his monopoly over diplomacy, Kojong was the only person who could 
decide if the transfer of mine concessions to a foreign Power would be approved.562 Furthermore, 
Kojong had absolute power over the administration, the jurisdiction and the legislation and thus his 
power could not be checked or balanced by any opposition within the country. Thus, although 
Kojong’s Taehan'gukkukche could be seen as a prototype for a constitution of a modern state, it did 
neither reduce the corruption of the Korean Court nor improve the efficiency of the Korean 
administration. Rather, the Taehan'gukkukche encouraged competition and rivalry amongst 
different factions to gain the Emperor’s “favour”. Without any institution to share the authority of 
administration, the Emperor’s favour would be a “source of income as well as a source of pride”.563  
 
The Proposed Neutralisation of Korea, 1900-1 
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By the summer of 1900, Northeast Asia also faced a serious challenge to the regional order when 
the Boxer Rebellion reached its culmination. The Boxer Rebellion was an accumulation of a series of 
peasant uprisings across northern China since 1898. Yihetuan (The Society of the Righteousness and 
Harmony), also known as the Boxers in English, who were a group of peasants who practised martial 
arts as with religious beliefs mainly in Shandong Province. They were threatened by the expansion 
by Western missionaries of Christianity into the region and then became very anti-Christian and anti-
foreign, especially after Germany seized Jiaozhou Bay in excuse of the murder of their two 
missionaries in Shandong. Since the end of 1898, the Boxers started to attack foreign missionaries in 
Shandong and Zhi’li provinces and it soon became a nationwide movement. In June 1900, having 
been encouraged by the scale of the Boxer Uprising, Qing China officially expressed their sympathy 
with the Boxers and declared war against foreign Powers and immediately the Boxers encircled the 
Foreign Settlement in Beijing and started to attack foreigners.564 
Kojong was also concerned about the development of the Boxer Rebellion in Qing China.  On 25 
June 1900, Kojong invited foreign representatives to the palace and expressed his sorrow for those 
who had been murdered amid the Boxer Rebellion. On behalf of the foreign representatives, 
Japanese Minister Hayashi Gonsuke thanks him for his sympathy and informed him that the allied 
forces were preparing to liberate foreign settlements in Tianjin and Beijing. He also assured that the 
foreign representatives would be of any assistant in their possession to offer if the Boxer Rebellion 
would cause any problem on the Korean side. The United States Minister Horace Allen suggested 
sending three steam ships, owned by the Korean Government to run between Yantai and Chemulpo 
to carry refuges running from the Boxer Rebellion as well as to obtain information on the course of 
the events. Kojong gave his assent to the suggestion and promised that he would arrange it 
immediately.565  
During the audience, Kojong particularly showed strong concurrence when Hayashi and Russian 
Minister Pavlov commented about the roles of a government. Following his assurance of assistance 
to Kojong, Hayashi also argued that “the duty of Corean Government […] was to take steps to 
preserve order amongst their subjects both in the capital and in the provinces, and the central and 
local authorities should co-operate for the attainment of this object”.566 Having agreed to Hayashi’s 
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comment, Kojong stressed that the Boxer Rebellion happened because the Qing Chinese 
Government seemed powerless to control the rebellious mobs. Furthermore, when Pavlov accused 
the Chinese Government of failure in repressing the disorder, Kojong strongly agreed and pointed 
out that the regrettable split within the Chinese Government eventually prevented them from acting 
upon the events. It is plausible to think that Kojong’s expressions were a guarantee that he and his 
Government would be able to prevent such disorder within the nation, which might result in foreign 
intervention.  
In August 1900, while the allied forces were successfully marching towards Beijing and Russian 
troops were advancing towards Manchuria in justification for the protection of their nationals in the 
region, Kojong appointed Cho Byung-Sik as a special envoy to Japan with a mission to acquire 
support for international recognition of the neutrality of Korea. In his meeting with Japanese Foreign 
Minister Aoki, Cho Byung-Sik asked if it would possible to pursue the neutralisation of Korea on the 
model of Belgium or Switzerland.567 The idea of the neutralisation of Korea on the basis of Belgium 
or Switzerland was originally designed by Foreign Advisor Paul Georg von Möllendorff in the 1880s 
because of similar geopolitical situations, where both countries were surrounded by Great Powers 
but managed to leave independent thanks to an international guarantee. This idea was shared by 
Korean intellectuals and foreign officials but only remained at a level of individual discussion.568 
However, the idea was fully adopted by the Korean Government as one of their main objectives 
in diplomacy. In 1899, William Franklin Sands, Foreign Advisor to the Korean Ministry of Household 
and a former secretary at the United States Legation, played a key role in materialising it. Following 
the model on Belgium or Switzerland, Sands’s neutralisation plan aimed to acquire an international 
guarantee by Great Powers and Japan and Russian must be included amongst the signatories. While 
the previous plans only relied upon the good-will of other Great Powers for the assurance, Sands’s 
scheme emphasised that Great Powers would be beneficial from the neutralisation of Korea 
because; it would contribute to the maintenance of the status-quo and open-door policy in 
Northeast Asia; and the guarantors would be allowed to supervise the Korean Government’s 
reforms.569 Sands’s neutralisation was approved and supported by the pro-American ministers 
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within the Korean Government, who pursued administrative, economic and educational reforms 
with the funding of American loans.570 
Considering the conversation between Cho Byung-Sik and Aoki, Cho’s neutralisation based on the 
model of Belgium or Switzerland was the same scheme Sands had designed. Aoki declined the 
Korean Government’s proposal by pointing out that the material conditions and historical 
developments enabled these relatively small countries to maintain their independence against Great 
Powers, whereas Korea currently lacked such conditions. Cho still argued that the neutralisation of 
Korea would be a desirable agreement despite the current conditions, but Aoki concluded that it was 
“not of a serious nature”.571 John H. Gubbins, Acting British Chargé d’affaires in Korea, reported that 
the condition Aoki suggested was Korea’s capacity to “provide herself with a standing army of 
50,000 men”, which must be impossible for Korea to fulfil at this time.572 Kojong also approached the 
United States Minister Allen and asked for the participation of the United States in the neutralisation 
of Korea but Allen, whose Government had been unwilling to deeply engage in the political affairs of 
Korea, declined and discouraged Kojong’s proposal.573 In November 1900, the British Legation in 
Korea concluded that Cho’s mission to acquire Japan’s support for the neutralisation of Korea 
failed.574 
While Korea’s proposal for the neutralisation of the Korean Peninsula was unwelcomed by Japan, 
Russia also became interested in an arrangement with Japan regarding the neutralisation of Korea. 
On 30 June 1900, Russian Minister in Seoul Pavlov telegrammed to the Russian Government that, if 
the Boxer rebels crossed the Yalu River and enter a Korean territory, it would be exploited as an 
excuse by Japan to deploy troops to Korea and to eventually seize the nation. 575 Moreover, since 
Manchuria was placed under the de facto military occupation of Russia, the Russian Government 
aimed to focus on consolidating its dominant position in Manchuria.576 Therefore, on 7 January 1901, 
the Russian Legation in Tokyo approached the Japanese Government to ask if they intended to reach 
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an agreement regarding the neutralisation of Korea to settle the question of their interests in 
Korea.577 The Japanese Government rejected the Russian offer by linking it with the current Russian 
occupation by of Manchuria. Katō Takaaki declined by pointing out that “the current presence of 
Russian troops in Manchuria would be the main source of disorder and unrest in Korea unless Russia 
publicly announced their intention to withdraw from Manchuria”.578  
The British Legation in Korea only acquired the information in March 1901. Hayashi confirmed 
that the rumour about the Russian proposal of placing Korea under an international protectorate. 
However, while Japan raised the Russian occupation of Manchuria as the main reason why the 
neutralisation was unacceptable, Hayashi told John Harington Gubbins that his Government had 
rejected the Russian proposal because of the current internal situations of Korea, which Hayashi saw 
it very “backwards”.579 
Hayashi’s additional reasoning might be intended not to show their strategic concern that 
Russia’s seizure of Manchuria would damage Japan’s interests in Korea. However, the poor status of 
Korea was also an acceptable reason for the British representatives in Seoul. At some points, Britain 
considered the neutralisation of Korea when in 1896, when it was rumoured that Japan and Russia 
were trying to reach an agreement over Korea, Britain offered the neutralisation of Korea to Japan, 
even though they withdrew the proposal when Japan asked Britain to take a leading role in 
arranging the international recognition of the neutrality of Korea. When Kojong asked whether 
Britain would be interested in an international guarantee of the independence of Korea, Claude 
MacDonald, then British Minister to China, declined the proposal and suggested it would be 
achieved by the modernisation of the country. By the beginning of 1901, Britain came to a 
realisation that Korea still had a long way ahead to strengthen itself sufficiently to maintain 
independence from neighbouring Powers.  
 
Anglo-Korean Confrontation, 1900-1901 
 
British Acquisition of Ŭnsan Mine, 1899-1900  
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By 1900, one of Britain’s main policies in Korea was to deter the penetration of Russian influence 
in co-operation with Japan, whose interest in the country could be threatened by a Russian advance. 
However, in the meantime, Britain also had great interests in obtaining concessions in Korea, just 
like other Great Powers who had already acquired in a form of compensations for the damages 
caused by Korean locals; or in form of equal privileges in accordance with most-favoured-nation 
clauses in their Treaties with Korea.580 Brown, whose position as the Chief-Commissioner of the 
Korean Customs and Financial Advisor to the Korean Government, played a significant role in 
identifying the most desirable concessions and rendered help for the British side when requested.  
On 30 April 1898, on behalf of a British syndicate in Shanghai, Jordan filed an application for the 
grant of a mining concession in P'yŏngan-do Province.581 In reply, the Korean Government declined 
the application for mainly two reasons; one that most of mines in the province were currently under 
the exclusive management of the Ministry of Household; and the other that the Council of State 
passed a resolution not to yield any concessions to foreigners.582 However, Jordan pointed out that 
the Korean Government had already granted several concessions to other foreign Powers even after 
the introduction of the resolution and warned that “what has been conceded to the subjects of 
other Powers cannot be withheld from those of Great Britain”.583 He once again asserted that the 
Korean Government should approve the proposal if the terms were “identical, word for word, with 
the language of the contract between the Corean Government and the German firm”.584 Thus at the 
end of September 1898, the Korean Government agreed to grant a mining concession in P'yŏngando 
Province.585 The course of Britain’s negotiation with the Korean Government demonstrates two 
facts; that Jordan exploited the most-favoured-nation clause of the Treaty and made an aggressive 
demonstration to acquire the concession; and that Jordan had to discuss the matter with three 
different Foreign Ministers in charge. Such frequent changes of government officials were seen by 
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many foreigners as one of examples to show how inefficient and how corrupt the Korean 
administration was.586  
The concession was originally given to Mr Chance but soon transferred to Pritchard Morgan, a 
Member of Parliament, and Morgan claimed to activate his mining concession in November 1899. In 
the original agreement, the British national was only granted a mining right but which mine to be 
given had not been decided. However, Jordan and Morgan unilaterally selected Ŭnsan mine in 
P’yŏngando Province and notified the Korean Government.587 Park Che-Sun replied that Ŭnsan mine 
was under the management of the Ministry of Household and thus be used for the Royal Court and 
recommended to select other mines within the region.588 Jordan had even sent a group of engineers 
to examine the mine without permission from the Korean Government and they were blocked by Yi 
Yong-Ik, the Minister of the Household.589 
Jordan’s action regarding the concession of Ŭnsan mine was so unilateral that even Lord Salisbury 
questioned how it would be possible to have selected the mine even before the signing of the 
contract of September 1898.590 Jordan even admitted that the rights to select a mine for the 
concession was reserved by the Korean Government. However, Jordan still insisted on acquiring 
their developing rights at Ŭnsan mine by arguing that the original contract had not listed Ŭnsan mine 
as an exempt. Jordan even coerced that “nothing can do more harm to the good name of His 
Imperial Majesty’s Government than any attempt to evade the written pledges given to the 
Representative of a friendly Power”.591 Park Che-Sun replied that the German contract, which the 
British contract modelled, did not include Ŭnsan mine because it was already out of the negotiation 
and thus the Ŭnsan mine should not be granted in the same manner.592   
Since Foreign Minister Park Che-Sun strongly opposed Jordan’s claim over Ŭnsan mine, Jordan 
had an audience with Kojong and received a promise that Kojong would “instruct the Minister for 
Foreign Affairs to arrange the matter within one week” to Jordan’s satisfaction.593 Jordan saw it as a 
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de facto approval, even though Kojong probably meant to leave this complicated problem to his 
minister, and duly notified that the work would commence by the end of January 1900 and despite 
Pak’s opposition, Morgan hired 150 Japanese men to protect their mining activities and headed 
towards Ŭnsan mine.594  In response to it, the Prefect of Ŭnsan issued an order to require each 
village to supply 10 men.595 Jordan even warned that he would apply for a warship to protect British 
nationals if any measure taken by the Korean side to deter their mining activities.596   
When the confrontation escalated to an extent that the Korean Government deployed military 
troops to Ŭnsan to maintain order, the Japanese and the Russian Legations urged to reach an 
agreement regarding the mine. Acting Russian Minister Stein proposed a settlement with British 
compensation for existing interests to the Korean Government.597 When London questioned the 
nature of Russia’s mediation in the matter, Jordan explained that the main objective of the Russian 
involvement was to keep Min Chong-Muk, a well-known pro-Russian official, in the office to facilitate 
a favourable arrangement over the disputed lease of Masanpo.598 Regardless of Stein’s intention, 
Jordan was satisfied with the idea of settlement with compensation and finally reached an 
agreement stating that; money already spent on mine should be refunded; Koreans should be 
allowed to work at the mine for next 12 months, and the armed men employed by the company 
should be withdrawn.599  
The Anglo-Korean confrontation over Ŭnsan mine reveals two important facts. Firstly, it revealed 
the nature of Britain’s Korea policy. Since the complete independence of Korea from Qing China was 
internationally recognised in accordance with the Treaty of Shimonoseki, Britain advocated that the 
independence of Korea should be achieved by means of the self-strengthening and modernisation. 
They advised Korea to remain open to all foreign nations and thus any Power would not insist on the 
acquisition of an exclusive concession. However, when Jordan saw an opportunity to develop one of 
the finest mines in the country, Jordan did not hesitate to gain it despite the lack of documented 
evidence to show that the mine had been granted to the British national. Jordan even resorted to 
coercion when he faced strong opposition from the Korean Government. This Ŭnsan mine dispute 
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shows that Britain’s Korean policy mainly intended to maximise their interests in the country, 
especially when Korea failed to show decent progress in the modernisation of the country. 
Secondly, the Korean Government’s response to the Ŭnsan mine dispute shows that there were 
two different groups regarding their relations with Britain. Min Chong-Muk and Yi Yong-Ik, who 
strongly opposed to the transfer of Ŭnsan mine as the Foreign Minister and the Minister of 
Household, were very well-known pro-Russian politicians within the Korean Government. Especially 
in case of Yi Yong-Ik, his firm resistance against the transfer of the mine under the management of 
the Ministry of Household was seen as proof of his close relationship with Russia because Russia was 
advising the management of mines when the question arose.600 However, it should be remembered 
that all the properties, including mines, of the Ministry of Household, belonged to Kojong and he 
was the one who would eventually approve any transfer of concessions from his possession. 
Furthermore, since Morgan was not only a businessman but a Member of Parliament who could 
exert influence upon the British Government. Therefore, Kojong’s approval of the transfer of the 
mine reflected his willingness to gain Morgan’s favour so that he would positively represent the 
interest of Korea to the British Government.601   
 
Brown’s Attempts to Obtain Foreign Loan, 1899-1901 
 
The concession of Ŭnsan mine was not the only measure Kojong took to maintain a close 
relationship with Britain. In August 1899, John McLeavy Brown, who defended his position as the 
Chief-Commissioner of the Korean Customs from Russia’s attempt to replace with Russian advisors 
in 1898, requested the renewal of his contract to extend 5 years from the original expiry date. His 
contract was still valid for another year, but he insisted on the renewal because he thought “the 
uncertainty of his tenure of office militated against his making arrangements of a permanent nature 
which were required in the interests of the service”.602 Financial Minister Cho Byung-Sik was 
reluctant to agree with the renewal of the contract in excuse that it would require the express 
approval from the Council of State. However, Kojong assured that the sanction from the Council of 
State would be unnecessary and gave a new contract that would expire in October 1905.603  
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After the renewal of his contract, he was ordered by Kojong to raise a loan up to an amount of 
5,000,000 Wons, approximately equivalent to £500,000, for establishing a stable currency system. 
Brown was also authorised by the imperial decree to offer the customs revenue as security. The 
decree also allowed him to keep the collection of the customs revenue under his control until loan 
he was ordered to raise should have been paid.604 Having been officially authorised by Kojong, 
Brown headed for Shanghai to have a preliminary negotiation with the Hong Kong and Shanghai 
Bank Corporation (hereafter the HSBC).605 Jordan was sceptical of gaining a loan from the HSBC 
because of several reasons; firstly, the average custom revenue of £60,000 per year would be barely 
sufficient to provide for the service and the redemption of the loan, even though it was unlikely to 
raise the whole amount at once; secondly, he doubted if the HSBC would take it as a sufficient 
assurance of payment that the Korean Customs was under British control.606   
 The negotiation with the HSBC was, from Brown’s perspective, very satisfactory. In October 
1899, the HSBC already authorised their agents in Chemulpo to establish and run a branch in Seoul 
for 10 years. Brown commented that the HSBC had “waken up at last to the possibilities of the 
country”.607 The loan from the HSBC could be beneficial for two reasons; firstly, a loan from a British 
bank would cause less political intervention, especially comparing with Russia or Japan; secondly, 
the presence of Brown at the Korean Customs would defer any attempt by either Japan or Russia to 
replace him in their favour.608 However, the HSBC eventually declined to offer the proposed loan to 
the Korean Government. Brown was convinced that the HSBC worried their financial commitment to 
Korea would affect their ongoing negotiations for the transfer to Russia of the loan on the Chinese 
Northern Railway. Despite a denial by the chief manager of the HSBC, Brown believed that 
“something had occurred in connection with this matter sufficient to hamper the Bank’s freedom of 
action in Corea”.609 
After the failed attempt to gain a loan from the HSBC, Japan and Brown entered a negotiation of 
a new loan from the Daiichi Bank of Japan. The Korean Government previously had a loan of 
3,000,000 Wons (£300,000) contracted in 1895, 2,000,000 Wons of which was paid off by 1897. The 
payment of the remainder of 1,000,000 Wons should be paid by the end of 1899. However, after an 
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arrangement between Brown and the Imperial Bank of Japan, the Korean Government was allowed 
to pay only 750,000 Wons by at present and the remaining 250,000 Wons should be paid 6 months 
later or longer.610 Japan used this remainder as a pretext that the collection of the Customs revenue 
was still held by Japan for security and it should not be guaranteed as security for raising any other 
foreign loan. Japan already protested on the same ground to the proposed loan of 10,000,000 Wons 
from the United States.611   
The Japanese proposal for the loan coincided with the needs of both parties. For Brown, a new 
foreign loan was urgently necessary to hold his position and keep the Customs under his control 
because the collection of the Customs revenue would be very likely to be offered as security for the 
loan. If Brown gains a loan to be repaid in the next 30 years, the Customs would remain under British 
control for the same duration.612 Japan expected that a new loan would be an opportunity to 
enhance their influence over the Korean Government. Japan’s main objectives of the loan were; to 
prevent the Korean Customs revenue from handing over to the corrupted Korean officials; to 
balance off the penetration of any other Foreign Powers, and to make it reinvested into Japanese 
business in Korea.613 Furthermore, both were alarmed when pro-American officials had attempted to 
gain an American loan and thus they hastened to reach an agreement. This loan obviously intended 
to enhance their co-operation between Brown and Japan. Brown’s draft proposal even included a 
clause that, in case of Brown’s retirement or death, “the choice of his successor shall lie with the 
British and Japanese Governments”.614 Acting Minister Gubbins advised Brown to edit off the clause 
not to cause any opposition by gaining more British control over the Customs. Gubbins also worried 
that it would be exploited as a pretext for Japanese interference.615  
However, just before presenting it to Kojong for confirmation, the Japanese Legation withdrew 
from the loan negotiation because the ministerial changes within the Japanese Cabinet were 
imminent.616 However, Hayashi was still hopeful that new ministers would still support the proposed 
loan via the Daiichi Bank to the Korean Government with some modification of the terms.617 At the 
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end of November 1900, the president of the Daiichi Bank came to Korea to renew the negotiation of 
the loan on modified terms. The Daiichi Bank was willing to render loan from their own resources 
and requested privileges to print the Customs’ paper notes and to use some parts of the Customs 
revenue for the operation of their branch in Korea.618 Therefore, the negotiation remained unsettled 
and the president of the Daiichi Bank left for Japan. Immediately, Brown was asked by the Vice-
Councillor of the Council of State and the Finance Minister about the nature of the negotiation with 
the Japanese banker. The Russian Chargé d’affaires also raised a question about the negotiation in 
an audience with Kojong. Having realised the strong opposition against the Japanese loan scheme, 
Brown eventually cancelled his negotiation with the Daiichi Bank.619   
Brown’s plan to obtain a Japanese loan shows a close relationship between Britain and Japan. The 
loan scheme negotiated between Brown and Japan could offer many benefits to both sides. While it 
was difficult to obtain a loan from other sources, Japan’s loan offer with the 30 years of repayment 
duration would enable Britain to keep the Korean Customs under control for such a long time. Since 
Brown played a key role as an insider who delivered key information for British interests, the loan 
could make Britain stay influential within the country. For Japan, it would enhance their influence 
over Korea. As was shown in case of their opposition to an American loan, the loan could be 
weaponised to balance off the economic and political penetration of other foreign Powers. 
Furthermore, since the creditor usually determined where the loaned money would be spent in 
priority, it could be used to fund Japanese business in the country. Despite its eventual failure, the 
negotiated loan exemplifies the current Anglo-Japanese relations.   
 
Anglo-Korean Dispute over the Position of Brown, 1901 
 
Britain’s Korea policies between 1899 and 1901 excited opposition, especially a group of pro-
Russian politicians. Yi Yong-Ik was one of the most prominent figures amongst them. Yi Yong-Ik 
started his political career as the Prefect of Tanch'ŏn in Hamgyŏngdo Province in 1883 thanks to 
Kojong’s favour for Yi’s help amid the Imo Mutiny of 1882. In 1887, he was appointed the 
Superintendent of mine works in Hamgyŏngdo Province and after taking various positions in the 
central and provincial governments, he was promoted to be the Superintendent of nationwide mine 
works in 1897. In 1900, he became the Minister of Household and oversaw the asset of the Royal 
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Court, some of which were the mines that had been transferred from the Ministry of Works to the 
Ministry of Household.620  
Thus, when Jordan unilaterally decided to select Ŭnsan mine, which was managed by the Ministry 
of Household and proceeded with the development without Kojong’s approval, Yi Yong-Ik 
immediately intervened in the dispute and opposed the operation of the British firm at the mine. 
The confrontation between the British company and Korean miners became so fierce that even 
military troops had to be deployed to prevent further violence between them. The dispute over 
Unsan mine was eventually settled by Kojong’s assent to the concession. However, Yi Yong-Ik, whose 
duty was to protect Kojong’s assets, must be antagonised by the aggression of Britain.  
Moreover, Yi Yong-Ik was unhappy with Brown’s complete control over the collection of Customs 
revenues. At this time, the financial administration of the Korean Government was run by two 
different ministries; The Ministry of Finance and the Ministry of Household.621  While reformists in 
the Korean Government were open to foreign loans and investment into the private sector, royalists 
at the Ministry of Household preferred the Government-led development with financial resources in 
possession of the Korean Government.622 They believed that the Customs revenue would be of 
additional resources for the development plan. However, Brown consistently declined any requests 
from the Ministry of Finance for the transfer of the revenue income to the treasury.623 Such 
antipathy against Brown reached its peak when Yi Yong-Ik heard of the negotiation between Brown 
and the Daiichi Bank of Japan for a new Japanese loan. Yi Yong-Ik also had his own loan plan for the 
establishment of a stable currency system, the same objective as Brown’s loan plan. Not only was it 
provoking that Brown attempted to draw a new loan just after completing the payment of the 
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previous loan to Japan, but also both loans could not be consistent because Yi Yong-Ik’s French loan 
also took the collection of the Customs revenue for security.624 
Therefore, Yi Yong-Ik plotted to remove Brown from the Korean Customs. Yi Yong-Ik proposed 
the dismissal of Brown from the post of the Chief-Commissioner of the Korean Customs, on the basis 
that Brown had not obeyed his promise with Kojong that he would have evacuated from their 
residential building, which was the property of the Korean Government, by 19 March 1901. Once 
Gubbins received the note from Foreign Minister Park Che-Sun, he saw that Yi Yong-Ik’s action “has 
its origin in a Palace intrigue, has Russian encouragement, and depends on Russian and other 
backing”.625 Gubbins appealed that sufficient time should be given before vacation, where he 
suggested 1 October 1901, and he demanded an expression of regret. In return, Park Che-Sun said 
he would withdraw the note if the following conditions were met: 
 
 An expression of regret for ejecting Palace officials from his [Brown’s] premises to be 
tendered by Mr Brown to Household Minister. 
 An account for all Customs money up to the present to be furnished to the Finance 
Department by Mr Brown, and this course to be continued in the future.  
 In future Mr Brown to comply with all instructions received by him from the Corean 
Government. 
 His Excellency and myself to settle the question of Mr Brown’s vacation of his house.626 
 
As Pak was mentioned, “there were other matters besides house question, this latter being of 
minor importance”, 627  the second and the third clauses were not the question of the house but this 
obedience to the Ministry of Finance and the Korean Government. Since Brown assured that no such 
promises about the evacuation of the house had been made, Gubbins decided to complain to the 
Korean Government. It was worth noting that Japanese Minister Hayashi showed his support for 
Britain by saying that “to remove him would entail serious consequences”.  Gubbins also emphasised 
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that a warship was on its way to Korea and later he telegrammed the Admiralty that the presence of 
more warships would be required if the situations did not improve.628 While the Marquess of 
Lansdowne answered to the questions by the Members of Parliament that both Governments would 
reach a satisfactory agreement shortly, he instructed that Britain “cannot admit their right to dismiss 
Mr Brown before the expiry of his contract”.629 
On 1 April 1901, Gubbins met Yi Yong-Ik and accepted his explanation that the intrusion by Palace 
officers of Brown’s house on 19 March 1901 had occurred on a complete misunderstanding. Park 
Che-Sun also confirmed that the proposal to dismiss Brown had been cancelled and that the 
interpreter would be punished for the misconduct.630 However, the question of Brown’s vacation 
from the official residence was not settled yet because the Korean Government insisted that the 
official buildings, belonging to them, should be taken back for their use. Thus, while having British 
warship “Endymion” at Chemulpo, Gubbins and the Korean Government started to discuss the 
arrangement for the vacation of the official resident buildings.631  However, the Korean Government 
not only insisted that Brown should vacate his residence by 1 June 1901, less than two months away, 
but also added a new demand that they should leave Customs office buildings as well.632 
Furthermore, the Korean Government started to use the dispute over the house vacation as a 
pretext to attack Brown by; questioning the validity of his contract, which had not been approved by 
the Council of State; or arguing that Brown’s services as the Chief Commissioner would be no longer 
necessary.633 
At this point, Gubbins strongly called for the cooperation of Japan claiming that; 
 
“The importance of the retention of Mr. Brown as Chief Commissioner is, I venture to suggest, 
greater for Japan than for us, for, apart from the fact that she is the only Power with large 
commercial interests in this country, the retention of the present Chief Commissioner constitutes a 
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modus vivendi between the rival interests of Russia and Japan, which it would be difficult to 
disturb without detriment to present international relations.”634 
 
Gubbins clearly saw that Japanese interest in Korea would be compatible with that of Britain and 
called for Japanese support on the British side in the matter. Japanese Minister Hayashi sent a 
correspondence with a request for permission to protest strongly against the removal of Brown and 
a suggestion that “Corea should be definitely requested by the Japanese Government to consult 
Japan in future when appointing a Chief Commissioner”.635 While thanking Tokyo’s strong assistance 
in the matter, Japanese Foreign Minister Katō Takaaki and British Minister in Japan MacDonald 
believed that the suggestion about Japan being consulted in the appointment of a Chief 
Commissioner should not be considered because Korea should be treated as an independent 
state.636 While Britain still tried to reach an agreement over Brown’s vacation of official residence 
buildings, new Acting Foreign Minister Choe Yong-Ha asserted that Brown should obey an order by 
the Ministry of Finance of the vacation, which was an initial request made by Yi Yong-Ik. While 
cooperating with Hayashi to give the same representation in each separate audience with Kojong, 
Gubbins even started to entertain an idea of reinforcing a naval guard from British warship 
“Barfleur” at Chemulpo but his idea faced disagreement from Tokyo.637 
However, the dispute over Brown’s vacation of the official residence suddenly came to an 
agreement. On 22 May 1901, Foreign Minister Park Che-Sun admitted that the initial attack upon 
Brown was linked with a French loan from the so-called Yunnan Syndicate. The question of the 
negotiated loan should be brought forward once Brown had been removed from the position of the 
Chief Commissioner of the Korean Customs.638 The Yunnan Syndicate loan also took the collection of 
the Customs revenues as security and hence the removal of Brown was a prerequisite for the loan.639 
On 24 June 1901, Brown’s vacation of the official residence was finally settled by allowing Brown one 
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year from the date on which the new site for his new residence was selected and placed at Brown’s 
disposal.640  
The Korean Government’s attempt to remove Brown implies how important his presence was for 
British interest in Korea. British control over the Korean Customs, which was largely independent of 
either the Royal Court or the Korean Government, became strong leverage over Korea. Since 
customs revenue was one of the few stable income sources in the country, any loan should take the 
customs revenue as security. Moreover, As Gubbins pointed out, British control over the Customs 
played a significant role to control the balance of influence between Russia and Japan. Additionally, 
this incident clearly demonstrated the close co-operation amongst London, Tokyo and Seoul to 
defend Brown’s current position. It confirmed the facts; that they had shared interests within the 
country; and that their close co-operation would be beneficial to each other.  
 
Anglo-Korean Confrontation over the Proposed Loan of Yunnan Syndicate, 
1901-2 
 
Britain’s Reaction to the Yunnan Syndicate Loan 
 
The Yunnan Syndicate (Syndicat de Yunnan), whose loan offer threatened Brown’s position as the 
Chief Commissioner of the Korean Customs, was established in 1898 by the French and the British 
nationals with the main objective of the acquisition of mining concessions in Yunnan Province, China. 
Its concession for 60 years covered a half of Yunnan Province and they were authorised to dig for all 
kinds of minerals within their concession.641 In 1900, Min Yong-Chan, who was taking part in Paris 
Exposition 1900 was introduced by French Minister in Korea Victor Collin de Plancy to the Yunnan 
Syndicate and they discussed if the Syndicate would be interested in rendering a loan to the Korean 
Government. Once Plancy returned to Korea for his duty in March 1903, Auguste Cazalis, the 
representor of the Yunnan Syndicate, immediately came to Korea for the negotiations with Yi Yong-
Ik.642 Yi Yong-Ik had a great interest in establishing a sound currency system, but the Korean 
Government did not have a sufficient amount of fund to underpin it. Hence, since 1899, Yi Yong-Ik 
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contacted several Powers for a loan.643 Furthermore, the idea of a French loan was also consistent 
with the Korean Government’s intentions to establish a closer and friendlier relationship with Great 
Powers other than Japan and Russia.644  On the other hand, Yunnan Syndicate mainly focused on the 
acquisition of mining concessions in Korea.645 Thus, both parties signed the loan contract on 16 April 
1901. The terms of the loan contract were the following; 
 
 Article 1: Cazalis provides a loan of 5,000,000 wons, which is approximately 12,500,000 
francs, to the Korean Government. This loan will be used for establishing gold and silver 
coinage in Korea, and to exploit coal mines in Pyongyang.  Two-thirds of it would be 
delivered in the form of gold bullion and one third would be in the form of silver bullion.  
 Article 2: The interest of the loan is 5.5% per year and the rate of bank commission is 10%. 
The loan and its interest are paid for 25 years. 
 Article 3: The loan is paid in 25 instalments and each instalment equals is paid each year. The 
Korean Government pays to a bank designated by Cazalis, in form of what Cazalis demands; 
or gold; or silver; or other foreign currencies.  
 Article 4: If the Korean Government fails to pay it in time, then the collection of the Customs 
revenues would be facilitated.646  
 
Gubbins became aware of the Yunnan Syndicate loan while meeting Cazalis on 20 April 1901. 
While Cazalis told him that the Korean Government would grant an important mining concession in 
return for a loan, Gubbins believed that the loan would destabilise Brown’s position as the Chief 
Commissioner of the Korean Customs.647 Furthermore, after surveying the nature of the loan, 
Gubbins concluded that he should have requested not to support the loan if he knew it for four main 
reasons.648 Firstly, Gubbins pointed out that the loan had been negotiated by Yi Yong-Ik, who led 
recent attacks on Brown’s position as the Chief Commissioner of the Customs. He also pointed out 
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that he was a prominent pro-Franco-Russian figure, suggesting his action had been encouraged by 
the Russian the French and Legation.  
Secondly, he believed that the influx of such an amount of money would “not only encourage 
them [the Korean Government] in their present reckless expenditure but also to lead to further 
disorganisation of the finance of the country” without supervision by qualified foreigners.649 It 
demonstrates Gubbins’ perception on the status of the Korean Government, whose efficiency was 
below satisfaction. He also suspected that the term “exploiting Pyongyang coal mines” had intended 
to disguise the construction of the Seoul-Ŭiju railway, which he believed to have been encouraged 
by the Russian Government for strategic reasons.650 Thirdly, Gubbins believed that Brown, as the 
Chief Commissioner of the Customs, should have been consulted if the Customs revenue was taken 
as security for the loan. Lastly, Gubbins argued that the Customs revenue should be used for the 
improvement of navigation on the coast of Korea.651 He also criticised that a syndicate registered in 
London should have consulted its operation with the British representative in the country.652  
Cazalis explained the nature of the loan to reduce any suspicion on the British side. Firstly, he 
argued that the Yunnan Syndicate’s interest was not in Korean loan but mining concession and that 
the loan was only provided in return for the mining concession. He clarified that the loan would not 
be provided if the concession was not granted by the Korean Government. Secondly, the main 
objectives of the loan, stipulated in the contract, were just nominal. Cazalis argued that the Korean 
Government would be at liberty to use the loaned money for their own wills other than the 
development of Pyongyang coal mines. Thirdly, Cazalis explained that this French syndicate had 
registered in London only because of the favourable terms of English Company Law. However, 
Gubbins still suspected that they might have deliberately recruited British shareholders for “silencing 
any opposition”.653  
Gubbins’s suspicion still did not vanish when Cazalis and Yi Yong-Ik modified some terms of the 
original contract to the following; 
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 Interest on loan to be raised from 5.5% to 6%, in return for which banker’s commission of 
10 % to be waived.  
 A limit of six months to be given in which to supply the gold and silver bullion for the loan. 
 A foreign bank in Japan or Shanghai to be selected as the medium for repayment.  
 Loan to be repayable in less than twenty-five years if Corean Government desires it.654 
 
Gubbins found the wording of this modified agreement very “defective”.655 The agreement lacked 
the starting date of “six months” given to choose between gold and silver. Neither no price per 
ounce nor the rate of exchange between gold and silver was clarified in the agreement as well. 
Furthermore, regarding the medium of for repayment, Gubbins also reminded that “agencies of 
Russo-Chinese Bank are established at both Shanghai and Yokohama” and suspected Russia’s 
engagement in the loan.656  
To avoid Britain’s opposition to the French loan, Herbert Bourke, the British represent of the 
Yunnan Syndicate in London, suggested adding a clause that “the Chief Commissioner of Customs 
and the Commissioner at any open ports should be English for the period during which the loan may 
run”.657 However, Gubbins declined the suggestion by arguing that “Customs service in Corea is 
largely recruited from Chinese Customs, and is, as in China, international in character” even if it 
would be possible.658 Therefore, after careful considerations, Gubbins suggested that the loan 
should be definitely cancelled; and that The Yunnan Syndicate’s attempt to gain mining concessions 
would be backed only if the Customs revenue would not be pledged to any concession.659 London 
also approved his suggestion and instructed not to give any support to the loan on the ground that 
the Customs revenue should not be pledged as security for it.660 
Britain’s reaction to the Yunnan Syndicate loan reaffirms the two core principles of Britain’s Korea 
policy. Firstly, it was another example that Britain would never question the position of John 
McLeavy Brown as the Chief Commissioner of the Korean Customs. While Brown was being severely 
challenged by Yi Yong-Ik and the Korean Government, London and the British Legation were 
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convinced that the French loan with the collection of the Customs revenue as security would 
eventually remove British control over the Korean Customs, which Britain had benefitted from since 
his appointment. Secondly, Britain was anxious about any possible Russian advance towards Korea, 
especially when Russian troops were stationed in Manchuria as a result of the Boxer Rebellion.661 
Although French Minister Plancy said the loan had been negotiated not by the French Government 
but by a French national,662 Plancy asked Pavlov if the loan could be backed by the Russo-Chinese 
Bank.663 Britain was unaware of the talk between the French and Russian Ministers but Britain would 
not tolerate any action that would lead to enhancing Russia’s strategic position in Korea.  
 
Anglo-Japanese Opposition to the Loan  
 
Britain was not the only foreign state who were concerned about the negotiated Yunnan 
Syndicate loan. Japan also feared that the loan would seriously undermine Brown’s position as the 
Chief Commissioner of the Korean Customs as well as Japan’s interests that could be protected by 
his presence in the country. Hayashi especially mentioned that the Customs revenue should not be 
taken as security.664 Having understood that the French and the Russian Ministers denied their 
involvement in the Yunnan Syndicate loan,665 Hayashi attended an audience with Kojong and 
demanded not only the abandonment of the Yunnan Syndicate loan but also the dismissal of Yi 
Yong-Ik, who was responsible for the French loan and the Korean Government’s attack upon 
Brown.666 Gubbins first thought Hayashi had misunderstood his position regarding Brown’s vacation 
of official residence buildings. 667 However, it is conceivable that Hayashi intended to use this dispute 
over the Yunnan Syndicate loan and the attack upon Brown as pretexts to remove Yi Yong-Ik from his 
position permanently. As of May 1901, Yi Yong-Ik was the most influential and powerful aristocrat 
within the Korean Government. When the question of the French loan was brought forward to the 
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Council of State, half of the council were in favour while the other half were against the plan. 
However, he was sufficiently influential to gain Kojong’s support at that time.668  
Gubbins asked London if he should support his demand for the dismissal of Yi Yong-Ik, which 
might seem like a drastic action, but he was given an instruction to fully support Hayashi’s proposal 
to remove Yi Yong-Ik from his current position. Gubbins was also instructed to oppose the French 
loan on the ground that the Custom revenues should not be pledged as security.669 Once Kojong 
hesitated to proceed with the loan in face of strong opposition from Britain, Japan and the United 
States,670 French Minister Plancy exerted great pressure upon the Korean Government.671 However, 
until 15 May 1901, Plancy did not realise that the Yunnan Syndicate was registered in London and 
once he knew the fact, he stopped pressing the Korean Government for a while.672  
While the confrontation between France and the Anglo-Japanese coalition was deepened, 
Gubbins came up with a plan to protect Brown’s position. Brown has accounts with his name at the 
HSBC and the Japanese Bank in Korea and he deposited Customs revenue in those accounts. Since 
both banks were supervised by either Britain or Japan, Brown would be able to keep his absolute 
control under the Customs revenue by not allowing the money to be used for the repayment of the 
loan.673 This proposal was fully approved by Britain and it became his ground to claim that his 
position was now protected by the British and Japanese Governments.674  
However, when Gubbins had an audience with Kojong, he had an impression that it was Kojong 
who favoured the idea of the French loan and encouraged the attack against Brown.   Regarding 
the Anglo-Japanese opposition to the Yunnan Syndicate loan, Kojong made several questions to the 
Japanese and British Ministers. 
 
His Majesty [Kojong], in referring to the contract for the loan, questioned me as to the reason for 
negotiations with concerned a British Syndicate having been conducted through the medium of the 
French Legation. Mr Hayashi was also asked by the Emperor why the loan contract was not opposed 
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by the Japanese Government on the ground that a portion of the Japanese loan was still unpaid (…) 
and further why, if the loan contract was viewed with disfavour by the British Government, they had 
not opposed it more actively.675 
 
It must be reminded that Yi Yong-Ik, who had been accused by the British and Japanese Ministers 
for the plot, was the Minister of Household in charge of Kojong’s assets. Furthermore, despite 
speculation by Gubbins and Hayashi that the new influx of money would be only wasted by corrupt 
Korean aristocrats, Yi Yong-Ik had been trying to establish a stable currency system since 1898 and a 
large amount of foreign loan was crucial to funding it. Brown’s initial attempt to gain a loan from the 
HSBC was also authorised by Kojong to establish a sound currency. Therefore, it was plausible that 
Kojong wanted the Yunnan Syndicate loan to succeed as much as Yi Yong-Ik did. Kojong’s questions 
about the nature of their opposition indicate; that Kojong understood why those Powers strongly 
opposed his loan scheme; and that Kojong realised his currency reform would have to be postponed 
again.  
 
Transfer of Loan to Syndicate of Korea 
 
The Yunnan Syndicate loan did not proceed further, not only because of the strong opposition 
from the British and Japanese Legations but also because Mr Cazalis, the representer of the Yunnan 
Syndicate in Korea, died of illness in September 1901.676 However, in December 1901, the Korea 
Syndicate, who had taken over the Yunnan Syndicate’s loan rights, resumed their efforts to re-
negotiate the terms of the loan.677 Baron de Bellescize, a French man and the representer of the 
Korea Syndicate, negotiated the new loan with Yi Yong-Ik and other Korean officials. The Japanese 
Legation in Seoul also became aware of the new negotiations by the Korea Syndicate because Baron 
de Bellescize made an enquiry to a Japanese steamship company about the cost of “bringing a large 
quantity of gold bullion from Antwerp”.678 Acting Japanese Minister Hagiwara Shuichi and British 
Minister to Korea John Jordan agreed that this loan would once again damage the independence of 
the Korean Customs and decided to protest against it.  
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On 7 January 1902, Baron de Bellescize visited Jordan for a meeting to discuss the possibility of 
British support for the loan, which he hardly expected. Jordan argued; that the Customs revenue 
should not be pledged to security for a loan; and that the loan to Korea would not be profitable 
because a 3,000,000 wons of the Japanese loan of 1895 had been quickly squandered by corrupt 
Korean officials in months.679 However, Baron de Bellescize showed his hope that the newly injected 
money via the Korea Syndicate loan would be used in a beneficial way and two days later notified 
the British Legation that the first shipment of gold bullion, worth 1,000,000 wons, would be 
delivered by a steamship from Antwerp by the end of February 1902.680  
Having noticed that the Korea Syndicate loan had been proceeding, Jordan, in his audience with 
Kojong on 14 January 1902, he argued that the new loan would place the Korean Customs in the 
hands of “a Power which had no interest in the foreign trade of Corea”.681 While stating how serious 
consequences were faced by a country with a disoriented loan, Jordan mentioned Siam as a fine 
example of its stable economy and argued that “Siamese finances had attained a flourishing 
condition under British direction”.682 When Kojong asked why Jordan opposed the proposal that had 
been made by British capitalists, Jordan also argued that “the political stability of Corea was of more 
importance to us than the interests of a few individual British subjects” and that “the history of all 
countries showed that political independence was incompatible with national insolvency”.683 
Comparing with the fact that Japan and Russia opposed to the Korea Syndicate loan because the 
Syndicate should not be granted a monopoly of mining concession,684 Britain’s opposition was on the 
basis that the British control over the Korean Customs should not be disturbed. It shows where 
Britain’s interest in Korea lay.  
After facing opposition from other Powers, on 28 January 1902, Foreign Minister Park Che-Sun 
notified the cancellation of the Korea Syndicate loan to the French Legation on the grounds; that it 
had no legal ground for the Yunnan Syndicate to transfer the loan rights to the Korean Syndicate 
without the agreement from the Korean Government; that the Yunnan Syndicate still remained 
intact and thus the contract with them was now expired because the Yunnan Syndicate had not 
delivered the agreed sum of gold bullion.685 Considering the fact that Kojong worried about the 
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compensation the Korean Government had to make in case of cancelling the loan, it was a very 
practical and reasonable approach by Park Che-Sun to compromise the current situations. Therefore, 
by the end of February 1902, Jordan reached a conclusion that this case was closed, even though 
French Minister Plancy insisted on the proceeding of the loan until June 1902.686  
Since Kojong repressed civil rights movement in 1898 and became an absolute monarch in the 
following year, Kojong aimed to achieve two objectives; the neutralisation of Korea and self-
strengthening. However, changing circumstances in and outside Korea severely challenged Kojong. 
With the fear of the Boxer Rebellion and a possibility of Russian penetration, Kojong wanted to gain 
international recognition of the neutrality of Korea. However, it was largely ignored by Japan, who 
feared it would weaken their strong influence within the country; and the United States, whose 
Korea policy was not to interfere with the Korean affairs. Britain, who had once considered the idea 
in the past, was indifferent towards Kojong’s neutralisation of Korea. 
However, Britain vigorously reacted when Britain saw an opportunity to obtain concessions or 
when Britain’s interest was directly offended by Korea and did not hesitate to resort to coercion and 
threat when their national obtained a mining concession at Ŭnsan mine or when Brown’s position 
was attacked by Yi Yong-Ik and other Korean royalists who aimed to deliver their own reform and 
modernisation programme by pledging the Customs revenue as security for a foreign loan. One of 
Kojong’s main foreign policies was to invite other foreign Powers into Korea and let them balance 
each other. However, Britain’s attempts to deter the Korean Government’s efforts to gain a foreign 
loan show that such an approach, especially when Korea was incapable of maintaining its own 
independence, was improper.  
Moreover, it was an important stage for the development of Anglo-Japanese cooperation within 
Korea. Through a series of events that threatened Brown’s control over the Korean Customs, both 
Governments reaffirmed that they have shared interests in Korea. The closed tie became much 
stronger when the Anglo-Japanese Alliance was signed on 30 January 1902 and Britain recognised 
Japan’s special interest in Korea. Having failed to gain the French loan from the Yunnan and Korea 
Syndicates, Kojong and Korea now had to cope with the upcoming Russo-Japanese rivalry.  
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Chapter 5: Britain and the Question of Korean Independence, 1903-1905 
 
Anglo-Korean Relations before the Outbreak of the Russo-Japanese War 
 
The Expansion of Russian Influence over Korea, 1903 
 
The tension between Japan and Russia escalated again after the outbreak of the Boxer Rebellion 
of 1900. When the uprisings spread nationwide and reached Manchuria, the rebels destroyed 
Russia’s Chinese Eastern Railways. Qing China, who had been encouraged by the nationwide anti-
foreign uprising, declared war against Great Powers and in July 1900. Since then, even Qing Chinese 
forces united with the Boxers and started to attack the Russians. Therefore, in justification of 
protecting the property and safety of Russians in the region, Russia deployed their troops to 
Manchuria and by October 1900, Russia placed Manchuria under their military occupation.687 In 
August 1900, Russia announced its intention to withdraw in the near future. Despite the withdrawal 
announcement, however, Russia attempted to negotiate several separate agreements with Qing 
China to maintain their military presence in Manchuria. Due to Russia’s aggressive attempts, Great 
Powers showed their grave concerns towards the Russian occupation of Manchuria. 
The United States Secretary of the State John Hay announced its support for Open Door policy in 
Manchuria, by stating “the territorial and administrative entity” of China should be respected.688 
Britain and Germany also concluded the Anglo-German Agreement, also known as “Yangtze 
Agreement”, in October 1900 and supported the maintenance of the Open-Door trade within 
China.689 However, the Anglo-German Agreement became no longer valid when German Chancellor 
Bernhard von Bülow announced that “there were no German interests of importance in Manchuria, 
and the fate of that province was a matter of absolute indifference to Germany”.690 Therefore, 
Britain needed a new strategic partner in Northeast Asia. 
Meanwhile, Japan became threatened by the Russian occupation of Manchuria. By 1900, Japan’s 
main principle of Korea policy was so-called “Mankan-kokan-Ron (The Exchange of Manchuria and 
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China”, the idea of Russia and Japan recognising Korea and Manchuria as each other’s sphere of 
influence. However, when Russia offered the naturalisation of Korea while occupying Manchuria, 
which obviously wanted Japan to recognise the status quo, came to a realisation that Manchuria and 
Korea were inseparable. Therefore, both nations started to negotiate an alliance and on 30 January 
1902, the Anglo-Japanese Alliance was officially concluded.691 In response to the Anglo-Japanese 
Alliance, France and Russia also issued a mutual declaration that either party would reserve a right 
to join any confliction if a third party disturbed the status quo in Northeast Asia, which was 
practically no significance.692  
Therefore, under the international pressure calling for the withdrawal of troops, on 8 April 1902, 
the Qing Court and the Russian Government signed a convention regarding Manchuria and set a 
three-stage evacuation plan. The convention included the following; 
 
The Russian Government provided that no disturbances arise and that the action of other 
Powers should not prevent it, to withdraw gradually all its forces from within the limits of 
Manchuria; 
 
 Within six months from the signature of the Agreement to clear the south-western portion of 
the Province of Mukden [Liaoning] up to the River Liao-che [Liao River] of Russian troops, and 
to hand the railways over to China, 
 Within further six months to clear the remainder of the Province of Mukden [Liaoning] and 
the Province of Kirin of Imperial Troops,   
 Within the six months following to remove the remaining Imperial Russian troops from the 
Province of Heilungchiang [Heilongjiang].693   
 
Russia respected the agreement and conducted the first withdrawal of their troops from the 
agreed region in October 1902. However, right after the first withdrawal, Sergei Witte, who 
preferred a moderate and diplomacy-based policy regarding Manchuria, became powerless. Witte 
believed that Russia had been overstretched to Northeast Asia without properly colonising Siberia 
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and that the withdrawal of troops from Manchuria would be much more beneficial for Russia.694 
However, his failure to deliver separate agreements with Qing China seriously undermined his 
influence within the Russian Government. Instead, Aleksandr Mikhailovich Bezobrazov and other 
hawkish officials successfully earned the Tsar’s favour and became the advocators of new 
expansionist policies in Northeast Asia. They argued that it would be a catastrophic mistake for 
Russia if Russian troops were withdrawn in the second phase. 695   Furthermore, although the seizure 
of any territory in Korea would not be desirable because it would eventually lead to a war against 
Japan, Bezobrazov was particularly interested in placing Korea under the Russian sphere of 
influence. Thus, since early 1903, Russia resumed their aggressive policies by demanding 
concessions.  
First, Russia attempted to gain railway concession between Seoul and Ŭiju. In January 1903, a 
Russian national visited Korea and showed his interest in taking over the concession of railway 
construction that was believed to have been given to the Cie de Fives-Lilles, a French company, or 
advancing fund to the Korean Government for the completion of the railway on the security of the 
railway itself.696 Once his intention was known, Japanese Minister Hayashi Gonsuke warned that “its 
acceptance would not be consonant with Japanese interests in the Peninsula”.697 Ŭiju was located on 
the Yalu River and the northern border with Manchuria. Thus, its potential to be linked with railway 
networks in Manchuria had great strategic values.698 Hayashi coerced that the Japanese government 
would demand great privileges if the railway concession was granted to Russia.699  Therefore, under 
Japanese pressure, Korean Foreign Minister Cho Byung-Sik rejected the Russia offer on the grounds; 
that the Korean Government had an agreement only regarding the origin of materials and the 
nationality of engineers; and that the Korean Government were still responsible for the construction 
of the railway.700 Stein showed his satisfaction that the railway between Seoul and Ŭiju would be 
constructed by the Korean Government and not transferred to any other Foreign Power. Jordan 
observed that Russia seemed “not prepared to undertake extensions of that great work into Corea, 
but, in the meantime, she wishes to exclude her Japanese rival from the field which she reserved for 
herself”.701  
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However, Russia’s main interest in northern Korea was their lumber concessions on the Korean 
bank of the Yalu River, which had been granted in 1896.  While Kojong was staying at the Russian 
Legation in September 1896, J. I. Bryner, a Russian merchant from Vladivostok, successfully gained 
timber concessions on the banks of the Yalu River and the Tumen River and Ullŭngdo Island. In 
return, Bryner must pay 25% of profit to the Korean Government.702 On 3 January 1897, Bryner 
officially established “Korea Timber Company” and started a business. In May 1898, after one year, 
then Russian Minister in Seoul N. G. Matiunin became interested in the purchase and running of the 
timber company. Matiunin approached Bezobrazov and other close aides of Tsar Nicholas II and 
shared his idea. At that time, Russian military instructors and finance advisors were withdrawn from 
Korea after facing strong opposition from the Korean public and other foreign Powers, especially 
Britain. 
While the focus of Russia’s Northeast Asia policy shifted from Korea to Manchuria after the 
Russian acquisition of the lease of Lüshun and Dalian, these officials preferred the idea of purchasing 
the timber concession and establishing “The East Asiatic Development Company”. The Tsar also 
entertained the proposal because it would give Russia a pretext to intervene in the affairs of Korea 
and enable them to check Japanese influence within the country.703 The Tsar promised to inject 
70,000 rubles as an investment to start a survey in the country.704  
With the full support, an expedition team, led by Williams Neporozhnev from the Russian 
Ministry of Household, was sent to Korea for surveying the forests and mines in northern Korea. He 
purchased Bryner’s timber company and inherited his timber concession as well. After negotiating 
with Kojong, he gained the rights to establish a special management organisation to supervise the 
mines belonging to the Korean Ministry of Household.705 Neporozhnev also demanded other 
concessions including railway construction between Chinnamp’o via Wonsan to the Russo-Korean 
border, road construction and mining along the railways. They aimed to obtain exclusive concessions 
throughout northern Korea and “build a wall against the Japanese who had already settled in 
southern Korea”.706 Russian Chargé d'affaires Aleksandr Ivanovich Pavlov worried that it would be 
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catastrophic if Russia provoked the Korean Government and other foreign Powers by demanding too 
many concessions throughout a large area and controlling them exclusively.707 
As Pavlov concerned, the Korean Government declined to grant other concessions but the 
establishment of a supervision organisation for the Korean Ministry of Household.708 Morever, 
Matiunin, who had organised all the important correspondences between the Korean Government 
and Neporozhnev’s team thanks to his position as a diplomat, was newly assigned to Melbourne, 
Australia in October 1898.709 Therefore, the ambitious establishment of the East Asiatic 
Development Company’ had to wait until 1901. To maintain their concession, in 1900, Russian 
Minister Pavlov asked the Korean Government to extend the validity of the timber concession in 
northern Korea because the timber company should have established within three years from when 
Neporozhnev had newly acquired the timber concession.710  
Considering Bezobrazov’s immense interest in northern Korea, it was not a coincidence that 
Bezobrazov reclaimed Russia’s timber concessions when Russia decided to pursue “the New Course” 
in Manchuria and Korea. On 21 March 1903, former Russian Minister to Seoul N. G. Matiunin 
reported the following; 
 
Russia now needs commercial interest to exert influence upon Korea, especially since military 
instructors, finance advisors and the Russo-Korean Bank had withdrawn in 1898. We must use the 
timber concession, originally granted to Bryner, and fortify along the Yalu river in preparation for 
a possible war against Japan. The validity of the timber concession will soon expire so we must 
establish a timber company operating along the Korean-Manchurian border. The concession must 
be protected by military troops.711 
 
Therefore, on 27 February 1903, Russia officially notified that a Russian firm would activate their 
timber concession and on 4 March 1903, the operate timber business.712 Before long, the Korean 
Government officially complained to the Russian Legation that Russian and Chinese labours should 
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not work at Paengmasan Mountain because the mountain was outside the basin of the Yalu River.713 
Paengmasan Mountain was located on the way between Uiju and Pyongyang and well-known for its 
strategic values since the pre-modern era. Furthermore, since April 1903, Russians started to 
purchase land and houses in Yongamp’o, a port located at the mouth of the Yalu River. It was also an 
important port as a link between Ŭiju and Lüshun. It was not a treaty port and thus any purchase by 
foreigners of land and house was strictly prohibited.714 However, Russia still insisted that 
Paengmasan Mountain and Yongamp’o were located on the basin of the Yalu River, where they 
claimed to have timber concessions. These activities show that the Russian timber business in the 
Yalu River area had some military purposes.715  
 
The Yongamp’o Crisis and the Question of Opening the Yalu River, 1903 
 
In May 1903, the British Legation was alarmed when a French national was granted a mining 
concession in Changsong, P'yŏngando Province. Changsong was located on the Korean basin of the 
Yalu River, where Russia claimed their timber concessions, and it was 80 kilometres away north of 
Ŭiju. British Minister John Jordan believed that the choice of the mine was made on the basis that it 
was very accessible to the Russian timber concession and Ŭiju. Jordan saw it as a strategically 
significant action to establish a foothold of the Russo-French alliance on the Korean basin of the Yalu 
River.716 Moreover, the British Legation in Seoul noticed that the Russian company had already 
started to establish houses and workshops at Yongamp’o, a small port at the mouth of the Yalu 
River. The Korean government appealed to the Russian Legation that such buildings should not be 
erected until the full-scale survey of the Yalu River basins had been undertaken by the Korean and 
Russian authorities in accordance with the timber concession agreement of 1896. Nevertheless, the 
Russian Legation denied any responsibility for the matter and asserted that it should be discussed 
between the Korean government and the Russian timber company.717 
The British Legations in Seoul and Tokyo also understood that approximately 40 Russians and 100 
Chinese workers were present at Yongamp’o with a small detachment of Russian guards and they 
were mostly engaged in building operations. Since there was no significant military activity, Jordan 
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and British Minister in Japan Claude MacDonald believed the current statue was “quiescent”.718 
However, when E. Laporte, a French national and the commissioner of the Korean Customs, sent a 
report after surveying the Yalu River, the British Legation realised that the Russian seizure of 
Yongamp’o was on a larger scale than expected. In his report, Laporte explained the status of 
Yongamp’o in the following; 
 
(…) the Russian Timber Concession Company have, under the name of their Corean interpreter, 
purchased about 50 acres of ground in the best location, which they are inclosing with a mud wall, 
and where they are erecting barracks, &c. Fifty Russians and more than 200 Chinese, who live in 
barracks within the enclosure, are at work, and though no soldiers in uniform are seen, the 
presence of horses and rifles seems to indicate a military status. (…) The Selection of a site at Yong 
Am Po suitable for an open port is difficult, as the Russians have the best location; but probably a 
section alongside and behind the above location is as good as ca be found.719  
  
Furthermore, according to the Chinese Legation, Russian officers hired hundreds of Chinese 
mounted bandits. Allegedly, approximately 500 bandits had been recruited and deployed to the 
Korean basin of the Tumen River for the protection of timber concessions.720 Having received various 
reports regarding Russian aggression on the Korean border, Jordan reached a conclusion that “the 
Russian Timber Concession is probably only a screen to cover ulterior political designs and to extend 
the policy which is being pursued in Manchuria to the adjacent portions of Corea”.721 
Additionally, Russia also attempted to connect their telegram lines between Andong on the 
Chinese side of the Yalu River and via Yongamp’o to Uiju without any permission from the Korean 
Government. Russia’s measure could have secured a direct communication line between Korea and 
Europe via Manchuria, which was Russia’s “long-desired junction”.722 The Korean Government 
instructed local officials to remove these telegraph poles in justification that it had not been 
consulted with the Korean Government beforehand. The Russian Legation strongly condemned the 
Korean Government’s action by saying that the telegraph lines would have used for the Timber 
Company. However, the Korean Government notified that Russia’s claim had no ground because the 
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question of telegraph line “can only be decided between the Timber Company and His Majesty the 
Emperor” and warned that “it will give rise to unpleasant consequences” if the Timber Company 
would retry to erect telegraph poles again.723 With a military presence at Yongamp’o, Russia’s 
attempts to connect telegraph lines with Manchuria indicates that the timber concessions along the 
Yalu River had military considerations.724  
Russia’s suspicious activities at Yongamp’o and the Yalu River threatened other foreign Powers, 
especially Japan, who had been antagonised by the Russian occupation of Manchuria and Russia’s 
hard-line policies towards Korea, and Britain, who were in an alliance with Japan. In response to this, 
Jordan argued that the Korean government should be advised to open the Yalu River to foreign 
trade.725 It is worth noting that Britain chose the opening of Yongamp’o as a countermeasure to the 
Russian fortification of its concessions along the Yalu River. In the past, when Russia attempted to 
secure an exclusive concession on Chŏryŏngdo Island and Masanp’o Island, Britain also took the 
same approach against Russia. Furthermore, since Russia occupied Manchuria in 1900, the Open-
Door policy provided a justification for other Foreign Powers to urge Russia to respect the integrity 
of China.726  
By 1902, British and Japanese Ministers recognised their shared interests in the affairs of Korea 
and closely co-operated with each other. Once the Anglo-Japanese Alliance was concluded, both 
parties agreed with the following; 
 
 The Japanese and British Government should decide all important questions for Korea 
concerning home and foreign affairs. 
 A loan to Korea should only be made by England, Japan or the United States. 
 The employment of foreign advisors should be discouraged. 
 Unity should be promoted between the Korean Court and the Korean Government.727 
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Thus, Jordan and Hayashi agreed to take joint action. They believed that any direct confrontation 
against Russia would worsen the current situations. Hence, they decided to appeal to Kojong for the 
opening of the Yalu River to international commerce.728 In his audience with Kojong on 15 July, 
Jordan tried to persuade Kojong to open the Yalu River for two reasons; commercial and political. 
Jordan asserted that the Yalu River was already being used for a massive scale of foreign trade, 
which could have been an additional source of tariff revenues if the Korean government officially 
opened the river to foreign traders. Meanwhile, Jordan also warned about Russia’s territorial designs 
in Korea. He emphasised that Manchuria was slipping into the hands of Russians since Russia had 
successfully gained a firm footing and expanded influence throughout the region. Jordan argued that 
Korea would be turned into “the state of tutelage” by a similar process of what had happened in 
Manchuria, but He insisted that it could be deterred by opening the Yalu River and Yongamp’o to 
international trade.729 Japan also took parallel but more aggressive approaches. While arguing that 
the Yalu River should be open to all nations, Japan relocated their consul from Pyongyang to Uiju to 
deal with consistent conflicts between Japanese lumber traders and Chinese employees of the 
Russian Timber Company.730 
In the audience, Kojong assured Jordan that the Ministry of Foreign Affairs would take the 
question into account immediately. However, Foreign Minister Yi To-Chae, despite his support for 
the idea of the opening of the Yalu River, admitted that the Korean Government were seriously 
concerned about Russian opposition.731 In June 1903, Russian Minister Pavlov already told Jordan 
that Russia would oppose the opening of the Yalu River because “the Russian Government 
considered that the moment was inopportune for opening to foreign trade a place in close proximity 
to Manchuria while the question relating to that portion of the Chinese Empire was still pending”.732 
It was compatible with Russia’s main stance on the opening of the Yalu River, which was seen by 
Russia as “a countermeasure against Russia’s interest”.733 In fact, the Korean government did not 
hasten to open the river. In response to Jordan’s continuous demands, the Korean Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs replied that the opening procedure would take a long time due to surveys to be 
undertaken before the opening of the river.734 In September 1903, Jordan particularly mentioned 
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Yongamp’o would be the most suitable and convenient port for foreign trade but it was again 
ignored by the Korean Ministry of Foreign Affairs.735  
However, the Korean Government was not the only one responsible for the delayed opening of 
the Yalu River. By the mid-October of 1903, Foreign Minister Yi Ha-Yong told Jordan that he and his 
predecessor favoured the idea of opening the Yalu River, but nothing was decided yet. His answer 
indicated that it was Kojong who was deterring the opening of the port.736 Jordan suspected that 
Kojong was waiting for the outcome of the Russo-Japanese negotiation they entered in August 
1903.737 As Kojong thought, Yongamp’o was one of the significant points in the Russo-Japanese 
negotiations. The Intelligence Department of the British Ministry of War evaluated the strategic 
importance of Yongamp’o in the following; 
 
Further, Russia is already in possession of a Concession at Yong-am-po, at the mouth of the Yalu, 
where she is reported to be building fortifications, and if, as seems certain, she remains in 
Manchuria, she will eventually extend her military posts higher up the river. Having done this, she 
may be expected gradually to acquire a preponderating influence in the neutral zone, and as far 
south at Seoul, where, according to the Japanese Minister in London, she has commenced “serious 
intrigue”.738  
 
Later in November 1903, even the United States joined Japan and Britain to exert pressure upon 
the Korean government for the opening of Yongamp’o.739 The United State Secretary of State John 
Hay was promoting the Open-Door policy as the main principle of the United States’ foreign policy, 
especially regarding Northeast Asia.740 Therefore, although the United States Minister Horace Allen 
personally believed; “that it had been fully explained to them that Ŭiju was some distance from the 
Yalu and a place of no commercial importance” and “that the river at that point was not navigable 
by steamers”, the United States Government took the opening of the Yalu River as the main 
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objective.741 Despite such pressure, Kojong hesitated to open the port to foreign trade until the 
Russo-Japanese War broke out and Seoul was occupied by Japanese troops.742 
Korea’s reluctance to open Yongamp’o might stem from Kojong’s expectation that it would keep 
Russia and the Anglo-Japanese Alliance competing each other so that neither would eventually take 
a dominant position within the country. However, the delayed opening of the port was not a 
measure to counterbalance Japanese influence. Russians revealed their obvious ambition in Korea 
by fortifying Yongamp’o without any consent from the Korean government.743 Rather, it was more 
conceivable that Kojong was waiting to see the result of negotiation between Russia and Japan, 
which had started in August 1903. If Russia and Japan reached an agreement regarding Yongamp’o 
before Kojong making any decision, then Kojong would have just accepted it without upsetting 
either party. However, Kojong failed to see either country’s design regarding Korea. Japan wanted 
Russian recognition of Japan’s special influence in Korea while Russia only wished to acknowledge 
Japan’s influence in Korea south of the 39th parallel. Therefore, both governments failed to reach an 
agreement and Kojong missed an opportunity to open Yongamp’o by their own decision. 
 
The Question of Korean Neutrality in Event of War 
 
While taking a very careful policy regarding the Russo-Japanese confrontation over Yongamp’o, 
Kojong aimed to obtain international recognition of the neutrality of Korea before any war between 
Russia and Japan broke out. The neutralisation of Korea was Kojong’s long-desired foreign policy and 
he enjoyed the idea since the 1880s. Kojong’s latest attempt to gain the international guarantee of 
the neutrality of Korea was 1900 when Kojong sent Cho Byung-Sik to Japan to discuss Japan’s 
support for the neutrality of Korea. Kojong also continuously contacted the United States for their 
support to gain an international assurance of the neutrality of Korea. However, such attempts 
eventually came without fruit because; Japan saw Korea as a country incapable of defending the fate 
of the nation on their own; and the United States were reluctant to interfere with the affairs of 
Korea.744  
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Other foreign powers also considered the idea of Korean neutrality. In 1896, London proposed 
the recognition by Japan, China, Russia and Britain of the neutrality of Korea when it was rumoured 
that Russia and Japan would reach an agreement regarding Korea. However, Britain soon abolished 
the proposal because Britain had no desire to take a leading role.745  In 1901, while occupying 
Manchuria, the Russian Government proposed the neutrality of Korea to the Japanese Government. 
However, Japan believed that Russia only intended to gain recognition by Japan of Russia’s special 
interest in Manchuria while making Korea a neutral zone. Russia’s attempt to neutralise Korea 
continued again in 1902. Russia invited the United States, along with Japan to organise an 
international neutralisation of Korea. However, the United States’ traditional foreign policy did not 
allow a high level of engagement with other Great Powers and thus Russia again failed to reach an 
agreement.746   
In 1903, as the tension between Russia and Japan escalated to a point where a war between two 
countries now seemed inevitable, Kojong tried to organise the international recognition of the 
neutrality of Korea. To do so, Kojong aimed to improve their relationship with Britain by a 
reconciliation. On 24 July 1903, General Yi Kun-Taek, one of Kojong’s favourites, came to the British 
Legation to deliver Kojong’s message. According to Yi, Kojong was very disappointed and concerned 
when he heard that Britain had entered an alliance with Japan. Even Jordan could feel Kojong’s 
frustration because Kojong’s attitude to Jordan had become “from having been uniformly cordial 
and friendly” to “somewhat cold and unsympathetic”.747 However, General Yi Kun-Taek added that 
watching Britain’s actions taken after the signing of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance, Kojong reached a 
conclusion that the Anglo-Japanese Alliance had exercised “a moderating and restraining influence 
upon the policy of our allies [Japan] in Corea”.748 He particularly mentioned Article 1 of the alliance, 
which stipulated the recognition of the independence of China and Korea and showed his belief that 
Britain would make efforts to support the integrity of Korea.749 
On 18 August 1903, the Korean Ministry of Foreign Affairs instructed Korean representatives 
Russian and Japan to contact both Governments to consult neutrality of Korea if war broke out 
between two countries. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs requested a definitive reply from both 
Governments, stating none of their operations would take place within the boundary of the 
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country.750 Nonetheless, Japan declined the Korean offer in an excuse that it would cause a 
misunderstanding as if Japan’s aggression were very likely.751 
On 21 January 1904, just before the outbreak of the Russo-Japanese War, Korea declared the 
maintenance of neutrality in event of war to European Powers, the United States and Japan, thanks 
to helping from the French Legation in Seoul. Japan and Russia, two belligerents, declined to accept 
the declaration because they had no intention to neutralise the country that would inevitably 
become the main battlefield. Besides them, other Great Powers acknowledged the declaration of 
Korean neutrality. Kojong and the Korean Government were so encouraged by the broad acceptance 
of their neutrality declaration and relieved that the country would not be caught up in the upcoming 
war. Kojong even intended to turn this wartime declaration into permanent neutrality and hence 
ordered his government to consult with the French Legation for procedures required.752   
Korea’s neutrality declaration was also recognised by Britain. While welcoming Korea’s 
declaration of their neutrality in an event of war, Britain also demanded the Korean government to 
neutralise Russia’s exclusive concessions on the Korean basin of the Yalu River, especially the 
Russian-seized Yongamp’o, in spirit of their neutrality declaration. Nevertheless, the Korean 
Government seemed uninterested in hastening to open the Yalu River. The opening of the Yalu River 
had been deliberately postponed by Kojong in order to avoid any suspicion that Korea would incline 
to either Russia or Japan. Therefore, once the Korean Government believed to have gained the 
international recognition of Korea’s wartime neutrality, the opening of the Yalu River was not a 
priority of Kojong’s foreign policy any more, especially in comparison with permanent neutrality 
issues. 
On the contrary, Jordan saw the opening of the Yalu River as proof of the Korean Government’s 
commitment and determination to remain neutral. Thus, he believed that the Korean Government 
were naïve to believe that the country would not suffer from a war between Russia and Japan on the 
wrong belief that both belligerents would have to respect the neutrality of Korea because of 
international pressure.753 Jordan was convinced that the Korean Government should undertake 
additional measures if they aimed to remove any other’s perception of Korea, who were believed to 
be “cultivating a Russophile policy”.754 Despite his expectation, Jordan had an impression that 
Kojong, who was very satisfied with the international recognition of neutrality, would not be 
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interested in the opening of the Yalu River to foreign trade any longer. His view was shared by the 
Japanese and American ministers who jointly requested the opening.755   
A series of the events prior to the outbreak of the Russo-Japanese War obviously demonstrates 
why Korea’s declaration of neutrality in case of war failed to obtain Britain’s support. Firstly, the 
declaration of Korean neutrality was not followed by the neutralisation of Russia’s exclusive 
concessions in Korea. Yongamp’o and Russia’s timber concessions along the Yalu River were being 
fortified by Russians without permission from the Korean Government. However, even after 
announcing their neutrality, the Korean government did not take any further action to prevent 
Russia from strengthening their foothold and enjoying their exclusive privileges on the Yalu River. 
Therefore, Britain was convinced that the Korean government deliberately neglected or even 
encouraged the expansion of Russian influence in the country. Secondly, it was critical that the 
Korean Government did not obtain the recognition of neutrality by Japan and Russia, two 
belligerents who would fight over Korea. If either belligerent determined to occupy Korea and 
facilitate the territories for their strategic purposes during the war. Consequently, Britain and other 
foreign powers were not fully convinced to support the neutralisation of Korea by all means. At this 
point, Jordan rather believed that “a peaceful solution might place them under the political tutelage 
of Japan”.756 
 
Anglo-Korean Relations during the Russo-Japanese War, 1904-5 
 
British Pressure on the Korean Court after the Outbreak of the Russo-Japanese War 
 
On 8 February 1904, the Russo-Japanese War broke out with Japan’s sudden attack against a 
Russian fleet at Lüshun, even though the declaration of war was officially delivered two days later. 
On the same day, 3,000 Japanese troops landed at Chemulpo and headed for Seoul. The British 
Legation, as a representative of an ally of Japan, they fully cooperated with the Japanese Legation 
since the outbreak of the war. The first joint action by the British and Japanese representatives was 
to advise Kojong not to leave the palace. On 7 February, one day before the outbreak of the war, 
Japanese Minister Hayashi contacted the British Legation and told Jordan that he had already 
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consulted Kojong and advised him to stay at the palace.757 He asked Jordan to discourage Kojong if 
he would like to escape the palace and look for refuge at the British Legation. Hayashi also allowed 
Jordan to give any assurance that Kojong would not be disturbed by Japanese troops if he remained 
at the palace. Having already arranged their response to Kojong’s refuge attempt, Jordan gave the 
same advice when Foreign Minister YI Chi-Yong visited the British Legation just minutes after 
Hayashi’s departure and asked for Kojong’s asylum at the British Legation.758  
Jordan’s action fundamentally stemmed from Britain’s traditional non-intervention policy 
regarding Korea. Kojong already made similar examples. For instance, when Japanese assassins killed 
Queen Min at the palace, 4 months later, he fled to the Russian Legation and his presence at a 
foreign legation severely damaged Japanese influence in the country. Due to a short distance 
between Kyŏngun’gung Palace and the Britain Legation, Kojong asked about the possibility of 
seeking asylum at the British Legation in case of emergency after his departure from the Russian 
Legation. Britain always advised the British Legation in Korea not to engage with palace intrigues or 
any other deep intervention in the affairs of Korea. His rejection of Kojong’s proposal was in 
alignment with Japanese minister Hayashi’s intention. Since thousands of Japanese troops were 
heading for Seoul, it was necessary for Japan to seize the capital of the country and place Kojong 
under their control. Jordan facilitated the Japanese advance by urging to the Korean Foreign minister 
that Korean troops should restrain from taking any action against Japanese troops “which might 
result in useless bloodshed”.759 Therefore, Kojong had to give up the idea of seeking asylum at the 
British Legation and decided to rely upon the British government’s good offices in accordance with 
the Anglo-Korean Treaty of 1883.760   
While the British Legation in Seoul took actions in alignment with the Japanese Legation to exert 
pressure upon the Korean government, they also took a very cautious approach to avoid any direct 
confrontation against Russia. On 9 February, once Seoul fell under the de facto occupation of 
Japanese troops, Japan wanted to repel the Russian Legation staff and guards from Seoul. Japanese 
minister Hayashi believed that it would be more acceptable for the Russian minister if the 
withdrawal request was delivered not by him as a representative of the enemy but by the British 
minister.761 However, the Foreign Office in London did not want to interfere with the matter because 
they were concerned the British Legation would responsible for misrepresentation.762 Hence, instead 
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of the British minister, the French Legation took charge of all arrangements for the evacuation of the 
Russian Legation from Seoul.763 
London was very concerned about “misrepresentation” because the proposed mediation might 
give a false impression that Britain was actively participating in this war. According to Article 2 of the 
Anglo-Japanese Alliance, Britain should remain neutral if Japan was involved in a war against Russia 
over Korea. Thus, if the mediation was regarded by Russia as active support for the Japanese side, it 
could lead Britain into a war against Russia and its ally France. The possibility of a conflict against 
France was greatly reduced by the signing of the Entente Cordiale on 8 April 1904, but generally, 
Britain’s Korea policy during the Russo-Japanese War concentrated on helping Japan consolidate its 
control over Korea while avoiding any direct confrontation with Russia.764 
 
Britain’s Response to the Japan-Korea Treaty of 1904 
 
Immediately after the Japanese occupation of Seoul, Britain became aware of the signing of the 
Japan-Korea Treaty of 1904 on 23 February 1904. The Japan-Korea Treaty of 1904 stipulated the 
following; 
 
 Article 1. In the matter of Administrative Reform, Corea will give effect to Japan’s 
disinterested advice. 
 Article 2. The security of the Imperial family of Corea is guaranteed by Japan.  
 Article 3. The integrity and independence of Corean territory is guaranteed by Japan. 
 Article 4. Should there be any encroachment by a third Power, or any internal outbreak, or 
should the Imperial Family be in any danger or the integrity of the Empire be menaced, 
Japan will take such action as she may deem necessary and Corea will grant her, in such 
case, all facilities. In order that Japan may be able to carry out her undertaking, she will be 
allowed to make use of certain places in Corea for military purposes. 
 Article 5. No arrangement which is inconsistent with the stipulations of this Agreement can 
be made by either party with a third Power without the mutual consent of both nations. 
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 Article 6. Matters not specified in this Agreement but connected with it shall be determined 
between the Corean Minister for Foreign Affairs and the Japanese Representative.765  
 
Japan explained to Britain that the nature of the Japan-Korea Treaty of 1904 was “concluded with 
a view to facilitating military operations, in order to show that such use is with the full cognisance 
and consent of the Corean Government, and not in disregard or in violation of the independence 
and territorial integrity of Corea”.766 Hayashi explained to Jordan that the Japan-Korea Treaty was 
merely a duplication of the Japanese proposal to Russia during their mutual negotiations in 1903, 
which had been declined by the Russian government.767  Furthermore, Hayashi warned the Korean 
government that they should not consult the service of foreign advisors without his consent.768 
Although the Japanese Government argued that it was not intended to damage the integrity of 
Korea, which was stipulated in the Treaty, other articles clearly indicated the infringement of Korea’s 
sovereignty in administration, diplomacy and military.   
However, despite Japan’s explanation that it obtained full consent of the Korean Government, 
Britain noticed that the Treaty had not been voluntarily signed by the Korean government. Jordan 
was aware that Yi Yong-Ik, then Minister of Finance and War and a well-known anti-Japanese 
politician, was forced to leave for Tokyo under pressure from the Japanese Legation because he had 
rejected to sign the agreement for “his reluctance”.769 Jordan also believed that the agreement, 
which had authorised Japan to intervene in Korea’s domestic affairs and to utilise Korean facilities 
for Japanese troops, intended to violate the independence of Korea. Nevertheless, Jordan did not 
raise any question regarding the Japanese violation of the Korean neutrality. He believed that Korea 
was incapable to defend the integrity of the country on its own and thus eventually Korea “would be 
obliged to act at the dictation of the belligerent power which first occupied her capital.”770 From 
Jordan’s point of view, the violation of the neutrality of Korea was inevitable since the Korean 
Government failed to secure it by diplomacy or military means. 
Therefore, Jordan refrained from intervening in the neutrality issues when Russia warned that 
Korea would be regarded as a belligerent nation if Japan received any support from Koreans during 
the war. In response, Hayashi simply suggested that the Korean Government should instruct their 
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provincial governors to cut off any communication with Russia.771  On 20 May, the Korean 
Government inclined to Japan when Kojong announced the abolition of all treaties and agreements 
with Russia, including the Russian timber concession of 1896. It was also a result of the advice of the 
Japanese Government, who emphasised the significance of Korean cooperation during the war.772  
Although it was another step to undermine the neutrality of Korea, the British Legation simply 
acknowledged the abolition of the treaties with Russia and avoided any interference with it. Britain’s 
connivance at the Japanese control over Korean diplomacy facilitated Japan’s consolidation of its 
influence within the country. 
 
Japan’s Introduction of Administrative Reforms 
 
Since Japan successfully took control of the Korean Court and Government, Japan decided to 
undertake administrative reforms in Korea. In June 1904, Japanese Foreign Minister Komura Jutarō 
informed British Minister to Japan Claude MacDonald that they would initiate reforms in Korea as 
soon as possible. Komura justified the reform scheme for two main reasons; debased coinage and 
concessions given by Kojong to foreign merchants. Komura accused Kojong of making a profit with 
the depreciation of coins by fixing a higher value than its actual worth. Komura and MacDonald 
agreed that the debased coinage would be seriously damaging to all nations trading with Korea.773 
The second concern was Korean concessions given by Kojong to foreign firms. Komura complained 
that Kojong and the Korean Court gave these concessions “in the most foolish manner” and were 
concerned that the Korean government suffered the yielding of concessions.774  Japanese minister to 
Korea Hayashi Gonsuke also shared a similar view with MacDonald. MacDonald agreed with 
Hayashi’s scepticism of Korea’s self-strengthening and said that the reform of Korea could be only 
done by two things, “to show strength and to use kindness.”775 
According to Komura’s argument, the administrative reform intended to solve the financial issues 
of the Korean government. Yet, since he criticised Kojong for exploiting the monopoly of the coinage 
and thoughtlessly giving concessions to foreigners, the main objective of the reform was obviously 
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to restrain Kojong’s political influence. In August 1904, Hayashi duly requested the reforms to 
Kojong, which included the reorganisation by a Japanese advisor of the financial administration and 
the dismissal of foreign advisors currently hired by the Korean Government. Additionally, Hayashi 
also requested that Durham White Stevens, then foreign advisor to the Japanese Legation to the 
United States in Washington, should be appointed as an advisor to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.776  
Kojong was unhappy with the proposed appointment of Stevens.777 Therefore, Kojong privately told 
Jordan that he would prefer a British national as a foreign advisor and asked if he could intervene 
with Hayashi to make it happen. However, Jordan had no intention to pressure the Japanese 
minister on the matter and ignored Kojong’s request.778 
In addition to the administrative reforms, the Japanese government also requested the 
withdrawal of Korean legations abroad.779  Since the opening of the nation to the world in 1876, 
Kojong relied upon diplomacy to secure the independence of Korea and thus maintained overseas 
legations despite the cost. On the contrary, it was for a long time seen by the British legation as a 
waste of the national budget, which was already insufficient for the modernisation of the 
administration and military. Jordan believed it was a reasonable step to enhance the financial 
situation of the country and also assured that Japanese legations would successfully handle Korean 
overseas affairs.780  Jordan was particularly happy with Japan’s assurance that James McLeavy 
Brown, a British national in charge of the Korean Customs, would not be affected by the proposed 
abolition of foreign advisors from the Korean government.781  Jordan believed that the Korean 
Customs was largely a British administration and that there would be no difficulty in the renewal of 
Brown’s contract. 
After the Yongamp’o Crisis of 1903, Britain was convinced that the Korean government would 
neglect or even allow the expansion of the Russian influence beyond Manchuria. Furthermore, 
Britain became very sceptical of the Korean government’s capacity to self-strengthen or modernise 
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its military and administration. Britain hence agreed to facilitate Japan’s occupation of the country 
and concurred with Japan’s administrative reform. Moreover, Japan assured that the position of 
Brown would not be threatened even if administrative reform would enhance Japan’s dominant 
position in the country. Overall it was a favourable decision for British interests in the country 
because the Japanese occupation would stop Russian penetration into Korea and the Korean 
Customs would remain under British influence. 
 
The Establishment of a Japanese Protectorate over Korea, 1905 
 
Korea’s Final Efforts to Secure British Support 
 
Since the middle of 1904, the Japanese government believed that they were unable to afford a 
long-term war due to excessive casualties and limited resources and sought a third-party mediator 
who would arrange a peace negotiation with Russia. Russia was unwilling to enter a peace 
conference despite their successive defeats in Manchuria and the Korean seas. However, since their 
unsuccessful campaigns caused internal turmoil and the Battle of Mukden caused severe casualties, 
Russia agreed to negotiate a peace treaty with the Japanese government through the mediation of 
United States President Theodore Roosevelt. Therefore, since February 1905, Western newspapers 
started to report the progress of peace negotiations. 
Yi Han-Eung, Korean Acting Minister to Britain in London, noticed that both Russian terms and 
Japanese terms included clauses that would severely affect the independence of Korea. Russian 
peace terms stated that “Korea to be placed under Japanese suzerainty” and Japanese peace terms 
stipulated the “recognition of Japan’s influence in Korea as supreme.”782  Since both parties would 
recognise Japan’s suzerainty over Korea regardless of which side would win the war, the Korean 
government sought British intervention in the peace talks. With the Korean government’s instruction 
emphasising that Britain would be the only power to “give weight in this matter,” Yi Han-Eung 
contacted the British Foreign Office in London and asked for intervention in peace negotiations. He 
argued that the integrity of Korea was recognised in accordance with the Anglo-Japanese Alliance of 
1902 and thus it should be respected since Japan was a signatory.783  However, Lord Lansdowne 
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rejected any talk with Yi by stating that “any discussion of the terms of peace as affecting Korea 
would not, in my opinion, be likely to have any useful results at the present moment.”784 
Yi Han-Eung once again requested the British Foreign Office for intervention in peace 
negotiations on 22 March but Lord Lansdowne limited himself to acknowledge the receipt of his 
memorandum on 1 April. Having failed to secure British support, on 12 May, Yi committed suicide in 
his bedroom to take responsibility for it.785  Despite Britain’s reluctance, Kojong still wished to gain 
British support for the integrity of Korea. Immediately after Yi’s suicide, Kojong instructed the 
Korean legation in Paris, France to take over the duties of the Korean legation in London. 
Nevertheless, such an attempt was soon stopped by Hayashi and Stevens.786  Once again, in June 
1905, Kojong attempted to directly contact Jordan while avoiding the channel of the Korean Foreign 
Ministry, which was under the control of Hayashi and Stevens. He requested Britain’s intervention in 
peace negotiations to guarantee the integrity of Korea that had been stipulated in the Anglo-
Japanese Alliance. Jordan declined the request by pointing out that the negotiations were being 
undertaken exclusively between Japan and Russia.787   
It is worth noting that both Yi Han-Eung and Kojong argued that the independence of Korea 
should be respected in accordance with the Anglo-Japanese Alliance of 1902. At first, the Anglo-
Japanese Alliance was regarded by Koreans as Britain’s consent to Japan’s superior position in the 
country, but soon the Korean government used Article 1 of the alliance, which stipulated the 
integrity of Korea, to justify Britain’s assistance. They also believed that the independence of Korea 
would be maintained if the Anglo-Japanese Alliance and the Franco-Russian Alliance were checking 
each other.788  However, since the main objective of the alliance was to prevent Russian penetration 
into China and Korea, Britain had no intention to make military and diplomatic commitment to 
secure the independence of Korea. 
 
Japanese Acquisition of the Korean Customs 
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Since Japan introduced administration reforms to the Korean Government, the question of the 
position of James McLeavy Brown, the Chief Commissioner of the Korean Customs. His contract was 
to be expired in October 1905, but Jordan was confident that his position would be challenged by 
Japan. While he oversaw the Korean Customs, Japan acknowledged his control over the Korean 
Customs was beneficial to Japan’s interest in Korea and thus both countries often stood together 
when his position was challenged by Russia in 1898 or Korean royalists in 1900. Moreover, British 
control over the Korean Customs was one of Britain’s key interests in Korea. Therefore, Jordan 
emphasised the importance of keeping the Korean Customs under the British control, “whatever 
may be the future political status of Corea” because “the interests of British trade imperatively 
require the maintenance of the present Tariff arrangements, and that object can best be attained by 
continued British direction of the Customs Administration”.789 
However, despite Britain’s high expectation, Hayashi notified the British Legation that the control 
of the Korean Customs would be transferred to Japan and advised that Brown should retire of his 
post of Chief Commissioner once the current contract with the Korean Government was expired. 
Since it would massively damage Britain’s commercial interest in the country, Jordan asked London 
whether he should “make sure” to see Japan seriously wanted to remove him after the expiry of the 
contract.790 However, London advised that “we could not insist on the retention of Mr Brown” 
against an ally’s will, the discussion should be individually made in a friendly manner.791 Lord 
Lansdowne once again confirmed that the Japanese Government currently had no intention to 
employ his service in the new Customs Administration and hence advised to retire on a favourable 
term.792 After arranging Brown’s retirement, Hayashi duly informed Kojong of his intention to retire 
from the post of the Chief Commissioner of the Korean Customs.793  
Brown’s replacement was originally arranged by Robert Hart at the Chinese Customs. However, 
Mr Brown, who came to Korea for the Chief Commissionership, was unhappy with his post and 
returned to China. It was a fresh reminder to Japanese residents in Korea that the Korean Customs 
was still affiliated to the Chinese Customs. Hence, some Japanese traders called for the 
establishment of a Customs Union between Japan and Korea.794 However, In August 1905, Hayashi 
took a more realistic approach and officially announced that the Administration of the Korean 
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Customs would be supervised by the Japanese Finance Advisor.795 Considering it was still an early 
stage of the colonisation of Korea, detaching the Administration of the Korean Customs from the 
Chinese Customs to the Japanese Finance Advisor was probably the best measure Japan could take. 
Moreover, Japan promised the current Treaties between Korea and other Foreign Powers would not 
be disturbed for a fixed period. Thus, a separate customs management was still required.  
 
British Agreement with the Japanese Protectorate Scheme 
 
As it became clear that Japanese influence in Korea would be acknowledged by Russia, Japan 
started to discuss a protectorate scheme with the British government. In July 1905, Japanese prime 
minister Katsura Tarō pointed out to MacDonald that the main cause of the Russo-Japanese War was 
“the habit of the Emperor of Korea, of high Korean officials, of intriguing with foreign Powers, and of 
making arrangements and agreements in the most irresponsible manner.” He thus argued that the 
power of the Korean emperor and ministers should be severely restricted “for the peace of the Far 
East and the future good government of Korea.”796  While Katsura underlined the necessity of the 
limitation of the Korean emperor’s power, he also argued that such measures would not affect the 
treaty rights that foreign powers had been enjoying in Korea. Katsura confirmed that such privileges 
as consular jurisdiction and customs tariff would be dealt with through the same procedure as 
Japan’s unequal treaty revision if they should be changed. 
Japan’s special rights in Korea was also acknowledged by the revised Anglo-Japanese Alliance of 
1905. Because the United States and Britain were seen by some Koreans as the potential protectors 
of Korea due to “good offices” clauses in their treaties, it was important for Japan to convince Britain 
that a Japanese protectorate would be preferable.797  Britain also believed that the corrupt Korean 
government was incapable of maintaining its independence.798  Therefore, Britain agreed to 
acknowledge Japan’s right to “take such measures of guidance, control and protection” in Korea.799  
After the Treaty of Portsmouth was concluded on 5 September 1905, the Japanese government once 
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again revealed their willingness to establish a protectorate over Korea. Lord Lansdowne agreed to 
the protectorate scheme and assured that Britain would not oppose it.800 
The Korean government was very worried that the revised Anglo-Japanese Alliance had officially 
recognised Japan’s right to make Korea a protectorate. Therefore, the Korean Government 
demonstrated their dissatisfaction to the British Legation and claimed that the new agreement was 
inconsistent with the Anglo-Korean Treaty of 1883 that had recognised Korea as an independent 
state.801  However, at this point, Jordan worried that even an acknowledgement of the receipt of the 
correspondence would lead to further protests from Kojong and thus he even refused to reply to it. 
With Britain’s consent, the Japan-Korea Protectorate Treaty was eventually concluded on 17 
November 1905 and Jordan believed that the protectorate scheme could be justified by Japan’s 
considerations for their own national security since it would prevent Korea from forming an alliance 
with such a potential enemy as Russia.  
Britain concurred in the Japanese establishment of a protectorate over Korea on the basis that 
the Korean court and emperor had destabilised the regional order. Moreover, Japan’s assurance to 
maintain foreign powers’ treaties with Korea was also an important reason why Britain agreed with 
the protectorate plan. On 1 November 1905, Lord Lansdowne wanted to ensure that Britain’s 
current treaties with Korea would remain undisturbed and he was satisfied when the Japanese 
government agreed with it.802  Even after the signing of the Protectorate Treaty, the Japanese 
government continuously assured that they would respect the open-door policy in Korea and that 
Korea’s treaties with foreign powers would remain in effect.803   
To sum up, Japan’s establishment of a protectorate on Korea met Britain’s expectations. First, 
since Kojong had destabilised the regional order by continuously inviting foreign powers to check 
Japanese penetration, the Japanese protectorate plan would prevent Russian advances towards the 
country. Secondly, Japan assured that Britain’s treaty rights, which they had been enjoying since the 
Anglo-Korean Treaty of 1883, would be respected even if Korea became a Japanese protectorate. 
Britain was hence convinced that they would still maintain their commercial interest in the country 
thanks to the Japanese assurance. 
  
 
800 Lansdowne to MacDonald, 26 September 1905, No. 91, FO 405/160, 
801 Jordan to Lansdowne, 18 October 1905, No. 18, FO 405/161, 
802 Lansdowne to MacDonald, 1 November 1905, No. 29, FO 405/161; Lansdowne to MacDonald, 9 November 
1905, No. 36, FO 405/161. 





In this research, Anglo-Korean relations between 1895 and 1905 was divided into five chapters; 
British representative’s engagement after the Japanese Murder of Queen Min, 1895; Britain’s 
response to Kojong’s presence at the Russian Legation, 1896-7; Kojong’s assumption of emperor title 
and Anglo-Russian confrontation on the southern coast of Korea, 1897-1900; the deterioration of 
Anglo-Korean relations, 1900-1902; and Britain and the question of the independence of Korea, 
1903-1905.  
In the first chapter, London and British representatives in Northeast Asia confirmed that the 
independence of Korea would be the main principle of Britain’s Korea policy. However, before long, 
British Consul-General Hillier had to witness the Japanese murder of Queen Min, which was not just 
a brutal murder, but also a physical attack against the Royal family.  After Japan’s failed attempt to 
deny any link with the murder, Hillier joined other foreign representatives. This group of foreign 
representatives appealed to the Japanese Legation for the disbandment of the Japanese-drilled 
Korean guards, who were mobilised by the Japanese Legation and acted against Kojong and the 
Crown Prince. 
While Hiller was cooperating with other foreign representatives and exerting pressure upon the 
Japanese Legation and pro-Japanese Koreans to prevent further violence, London and the British 
Minister in Tokyo were concerned that the group of foreign representatives were led and presented 
by the Russian Minister, whose Government was seen by Britain and Japan as hostile. After receiving 
a complaint from the Japanese Government that the British representative in Seoul was disturbing 
the duty of the Japanese Minister, London instructed Hillier not to cooperate with the Russian 
Minister. This incident shows that Britain’s view on the independence of Korea was different to what 
Korea believed. Thus, although Hillier was extremely unhappy with London’s instruction, he had to 
act upon instruction. 
In the second chapter, it was discussed how Russia consolidated its dominance over Korea while 
taking advantage of the presence of Kojong at their legation. When Kojong sought refuge at the 
Russian Legation, Kojong attempted to establish a closer tie by sending Min Yong-Hwan as a special 
envoy to the Russian Government for military and economic assistance. However, the Russian 
Government showed little interest in full support for the Korean Government and yet Russia used 
Min Yong-Hwan’s proposal as a pretext for Russian penetration and attempted to strengthen 




Interestingly, considering the fact that London and British Minister in Tokyo saw Russia so hostile 
that they had to instruct the British Consul-General in Seoul not to closely work together with Russia, 
Hiller rather had a positive view of the appointment of Russian military instructors and finance 
advisors. It was based on his observation that the Korean Government desperately needed someone 
capable of reducing corruption and improving efficiency within the Korean administration. He was 
satisfactory with the improvement of Korean troops under the supervision of Russian instructors.  
However, once Russia attempted to remove Brown from the post of the Chief Commissioner of 
the Korean Customs, all British representatives and admirals in Northeast Asia closely worked 
together to deter Russia’s attempts. Britain was even ready to display warships in the Korean Seas as 
means of protest against the Russian attempt. This exemplifies how much Britain take British control 
over the Korean Customs seriously. Thanks to Brown, they could maintain the favourable tariff for 
British products imported to Korea. Britain was the second largest exporter to the Korean Market 
and thus British control over the Korean Customs was Britain’s most important interest in Korea. 
Furthermore, Brown exploited his extra position as a Finance Advisor and often helped Britain 
acquire concessions on favourable terms. 
In the third chapter, Kojong assumed the title of emperor and officially announced the Empire of 
Korea in 1897. Kojong, whose foreign policies were based on the concept of international law, 
always thought to raise his international profile up to an equal point with other sovereigns. After 
centuries of tributary relations with Qing China, Kojong believed that the declaration of becoming an 
emperor would be the final step to be on the same level as Qing China and the Empire of Japan. 
Furthermore, once he had experienced Western representatives’ opposition, arguing that the 
assumption of emperor title would make little difference to their relationship with Korea, Kojong 
justified the assumption of emperor title by citing international law. Many researches, especially in 
Korean, see Britain’s promotion of the rank of their representatives in Seoul as a formal recognition 
of Kojong’s emperor title. However, Britain’s such action stemmed from the inconvenience the 
British representative in Seoul had to suffer due to his lower rank.  
Britain’s other concern was Russia’s attempted lease on the southern coast of Korea. Britain 
protested on the basis that any Power should entertain any exclusive prestige in Korea and argued 
that Russian concessions on Chŏryŏngdo Island and Masanpo should violate the Treaty rights. 
Although Russia successfully obtained Masanpo concessions, Russia did not fortify or build a naval 
port on it because the focal point of Russia’s Northeast Asia policy shifted from Korea to Manchuria 
when they gained concessions on the Liaodong Peninsula.   
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In the fourth chapter, it was mainly discussed the deterioration of Anglo-Korean relations. 
Kojong, having successfully repressed civil rights movement by the Independence Club in 1898, 
centralised all the power and became an absolute monarch in the following year. Since then, he also 
transferred the most valuable mines to the Ministry of Household and granted them to foreign 
powers only by his approval. However, when Britain activated their mining concession, Britain 
unilaterally selected Ŭnsan mine, one of the most profitable mines the Ministry of Household had, 
and it was immediately protested by Yi Yong-Ik, the most prominent aristocrat at that time. The 
confrontation between both parties was so fierce that eventually troops were deployed to prevent 
any violence. Ŭnsan mine was eventually granted to a British firm.  
However, Yi Yong-Ik realised that British presence in the country should be weakened to pursue 
his reform to establish a stable currency. To do so, he needed a foreign loan and the only security 
they could offer to the creditor was the collection of the Customs revenue. Therefore, Yi Yong-Ik 
attempted to remove Brown from this position of the Chief Commissioner of the Korean Customs. 
However, he was defeated by British and Japanese representatives and both representative realised 
that they had shared interests in Korea.  
The co-operation was strongly reflected in the Yongamp’o Crisis of 1903. When Russia activated 
their timber concessions and fortified it, Japan and Britain urged Korea to open the Yalu River basin, 
where the Russian concession lied on. When international pressure was piled upon and even the 
Korean Government now favoured the idea of opening the Yalu River to foreign trade, Kojong still 
rejected it. Once he heard the news that Russia and Japan were negotiating, Kojong waited until the 
end of the negotiation and pursue what had been decided. However, the negotiation came with no 
fruit and Ŭiju was eventually open after the Japanese occupation of Seoul. Furthermore, while 
insisting on closing the Yalu River, Kojong announced the neutrality of Korea in event of war. Britain 
saw it as an inconsistent gesture because Kojong still declined to neutralise the fortified Russian 
concession. It influenced Britain’s view of Korea, which had been already bad enough, and Britain 
respected their ally and closely co-operated when Japan established a protectorate over Korea. 
However, Britain had to lose their control over the Korean Customs. 
To sum up, in 1895, when Korea became completely independent and stepped forward, both 
Britain and Korea assured that the independence of Korea should be maintained by strengthened 
and modernised Korean Government. However, before long, both parties came to a realisation that 
it was a dream that would hardly come true. From the British perspective, the Korean Court was full 
of intrigues and the corruption and inefficiency were also too high to expect that the Korean 
Government would stand on their own. Form the Korean perspective, Britain’s independence of 
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Korea was more of the Open-Door policy. Britain insisted that Korea should open more Treaty ports 
to international trade, but they did resort to their military presence when they saw concessions to 
be nailed. Furthermore, since Britain controlled the Customs revenue, the Korean Government had 
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